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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia . 
AT RICHMOND . 
. . 
~·. 
Record No. 1789 
F. W. TWYMAN, Plaintiff in Error, 
.it. v •. 
DOUGLAS S .. ADKINS, ADj\JIL.~ISTRATRIX OF LLOYD 
M. ADI\::INS, DECEASED, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: · • 
Your petitioner, F. W. Twyman, respectfully represents 
that he is aggrieved by the final judgment of the Circuit 
Court of Pittsylvania Uounty, Virginia, entered on 1\farch 
31, 1936, in which Lloyd M. Adkins' Administratrix was 
awarded a judgment against your petitioner for the sum of 
Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars, together with cost·.· of 
said proceedings .. 
Y ou1~ petitioner presents herewith a transcript of the rec-
ord covering- the proceedings in said action, and the parties 
will be hereinafter referred to according to the position they 
occupied in the trial court. 
FACTS. 
The facts in this case ar.e ~s follows : 
~. 
This case arises out of a rear end collision between a Dodge 
automobile, owned and operated by your petitioner, F. W. 
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Twyman (defendant below"), and an auto truck, the property 
of the Carlbrook Dairy, Incorporated, driven by Lloyd Ad-
kins (plaintiff below). 
The accident happened at a point about five miles west of 
Danville, on the J\!Iount Cross Road, near Jamerson's Dairy 
Farm. 
Your petitioner, F. W. Twyman, was, at the time of the 
accident, hereinafter fully described. employed as a company 
foreman at the Civilian Conservation Corps Camp, located 
on what is hereinafter desig11ated as The Mount Cross Road, 
about eight miles west of Danville, Virginia. On the night 
of October 26, 1935, he.drove his Dodge sedan from the camp 
into Danville, Virginia, and then visited a tea room, known 
as the ''Drift Inn Tea Room'', located about eleven miles 
west of Danville, on U. S. Route 58 (Danville-Martinsville 
Higlnva.y). The evidence shows that he left the tea room 
around twelve o'clock and drove into Danville, where he left 
~a young man who had been his companion for a part of the 
·night, and then started on his return trip to the camp, about 
one A. ~I. Just outside of the city limits he picked up four 
boys who were also employed at the camp, namely: Delton 
Nester, Charlie 1\{ays, Otis Hankins and Charles Shelton. 
They stopp_ed to g·et gas and then proceeded on toward their 
camp. In order to do this it was necesary that they drive 
over U. S. Route 58, westerly, until the intersection of U. S. 
Route 58 and the Mount Cross Road was reached. This in-
tersection is a bout two miles west of Danviiie and six miles 
from camp where your petitioner and the other occupants of 
his car were employed. Immediately after your petitioner 
turned his car to the right, off of U. S. Route 58 onto the 
~fount Cross Road, the motor of his Dodge sedan be-
gan to give trouble, and it appeared that the gas line was 
clogged. Thinking that the trouble was temporary, the boys 
in his c.ar g·ot out and helped push the car over the first hiiJ 
that they came to, which was very near the intersection. The 
car continued to give trouble, and they pushed said car, with 
the aid of the motor, up every hill from the intersection to 
the point where the accident occurred, a distance of about 
three miles. 
The evidence shows that while your petitioner was at the 
tea room above referred to that he took three drinks, but the 
police officer, L. W. Cole and State Traffic Officer J. H. 
Farmer, who saw your petitioner one hour after the accident, 
stated that they smelled whiskey on his breath and that they 
·noticed other evidences of intoxication. There were other 
disinterested witnesses, however, who testified that they did 
not notice that he was under the ~nfluence of intoxicants. 
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There is no evidence that any other occupants of your pe-
titioner's car had been drinking. . 
The evidence shows that the ~Iount Cross Road, from the 
intersection of U. S. Route 58 to the point of the accident, is 
very hilly, in fact the road is practically a succession of hills 
with ·short level spaces between. ,Just before the scene of 
the aooident was reached one of the C. C. C. Camp boys, 
Shelton, left the others who were still making an effort to 
get the car to camp, and went on to camp. The other three 
stayed with your petitioner, and they then succeeded in 
getting the car over another hill, and it rolled partly up the 
next hill, was pushed back for a better start, and as it started 
to roll forward or westward again, two of the boys, Nester 
and Mays, got into the car, Nester taking his seat beside 
your petitioner, on the front, and 1\{ays taking his .seat in 
the rear, on the right-hand side. The third· boy, Hankins, 
did not get in at that time. The car continued to roll of its 
own momentum until it was a little way up the grade, west 
of where the accident occurred; it would not g·o further, and 
it was permitted to roll back, or east, and came to a stop at 
the bottom of the hill, or between two hills, after your peti-
tioner had guided it off the hard surface as far as it appeared 
possible to him. The witness, Hankins, stayed outside, and 
di·rected petiti01~er in the parking of said car. (See M. R., p. 
99.) 
The time that your petitioner's car ·came to a stop, at the 
place of the accident, is fixed by the witnesses, at about 3:30 
~.t\.. M., October 27th, and at that time it was undisputed that 
the head and tail lights of the car were burning (M. R., p. 
100). The two boys, Mays and Nester went to sleep imme-
diately after they got into the car, from exhaustion, and your 
petitioner and the third boy, Hankins, discussed as to how 
they eould get the car to the camp, and they too fell asleep . 
.... L\..11 of the occu1)ants of the car, including your petitioner, were 
still sleeping when a truck, the property of the Carl Brook 
Dairy, Incorporated, driven by J.Jloyd Adkins, ran into the 
rear of petitioner's car, knocking it up the hill or west, a dis-
tanee which is estimated by the plaintiff's witnesses, from 
20 to 7 fi .feet into and through the guard rail, on the left-hand 
side of the ~fount Cross Road, as you face west. The impact 
·caused the truck to turn over on its left side, after skidding 
from 65 to 75 feet (see evidence of 0. S. Mayberry, page 58 
of the record) and in turning over the driver, Lloyd Adkins, 
was pinned beneath the truck, and died as a result thereof. 
At the place where the accident occurred there is a guard 
rail on each side of the road or highway, the distance between 
these guard rails is 15 feet, the width of the hard surface. 
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At a point 12 feet on the east end of the guard rail, on the 
right-hand side going west, the shoulder of the road is 4 
feet, 4 i'nches wide. The hard surface from this point to 
the place where petitioner's car came to rest, after the acci-
dent,- is 15 feet wide. The distance from the top of the hill 
east from the place where the truck turned over is 530 feet . 
. (See evidence of H. S. Pierce, page 72 of the record.) The 
grade of said hill is 4.8 degrees until you reach a point 230 
feet from the place where petitioner's car came to rest after 
th~ accident, and is level with the exception of a slight r·ise of 
a foot for 230 feet (M. R., p. 73). From the top of the hill 
-over which the truck came immediately before the accident 
-to the place where the accident occurred, there were no ob-
structions· except the rise of one foot. The evidence shows 
that the night was dark and the atmosphere heavy, but the 
surface of the highway was dry according to G. E. Scarce, 
witness for the plaintiff (see page 30 of the record), at or 
~ about the time the accident occurred. 
The truck driven by Lloyd Adkins was damaged on its left 
front fender and left front end of the frame; the car of your 
petitioner was mashed in the left rear, to the left of the spare 
tire ca 1·rier. 
· The Carlbrook Dairy, Incorporated, the owner of the truck 
involved in the accident, iE? located at Ingram, Virginia. The 
deceased, Lloyd Adkins, was employed on the night or morn-
ing of October 27th as a driver of a milk truck, and he was 
so engnged at the time of his death. He left the dairy at 
2 :45 A. J\ti. with a load of milk to be delivered in Danville and 
at the C. C. C. Camp on the 1\{ount Cross Road. With him 
in the truck, riding as a helper, was his brother-in-law, Ryland 
Shelton, a boy of sixteen years of age. It was necessary for 
them to drive through Danville in order to reach the C. C. C. 
Camp, and then travel an additional distance of eight mileg 
in order to reach their destination. They stopped in Danville 
long enough to eat a sand,vich each, and then proceeded to-
ward the camp. The helper, Ryland Shelton,· went to s1eep 
as soon as they drove out of Danville, and did not know any-
thing· more until after the accident occurred. Since the driver 
was kiJled and the only other occupant of the truck 'vas asleep, 
there was no one who could testify as to the condition of the 
deceased at the time of the accident or whether he .<w,w your 
petitioner's parked car ot· not, or 'what effort, if any, was made 
to avoid the collision. The only evidence as to why and· how 
the collision occurred emanates from the· physical facts a.nd 
ded·ltctions fro'ln the evidence of persons who were not eye 
'l.citnes.9es. 
The facts with reference to why petitioner's car was stopped · 
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or parked on the highway is uncontradicted, but the 'vitness 
for the plaintiff, G"' E. Scarce (see pages 18 through 34 of 
the record) states that petitioner's car was parked slightly 
a<>ross the center line of the :Mount Cross Road, leaving a 
space on petitioner's left-hand side sufficient for a car to pass 
"rjth three-inch clearance between the passing car and pe-
titioner's car, and three-inch clearance between petitioner's 
car and the guard rail. The witness stated that this was the 
position of petitioner's car some twenty minutes before the 
accident occurred, and that when he saw same that the front 
lights were not burning. From the plaintiff's point of view 
the only evidence with reference to the speed of the truck 
and the time that the accident occurred is shown by this wit-
ness. He stated that he passed the Carlbrook Dairy Truck 
a distance of eight and a half tenths of a mile toward Dan-
ville from the point w·here he saw the petitioner's car parked, 
and at that time the truck was traveling at an estimated 
speed of 35 to 40 miles an hour. He fixed the time of the ac-
cident as ahout four A. 1\L The witness also testified that 
when he approached the place that petitioner's car was 
parked that he was traveling at a rate of speed between 40 
and 45 miles per hour, and he saw the car and thought at 
first its headlights were burning, but when he came nearer 
to it he discovered that the headlights were not burning. He· 
stopped his car, and then drove on past your petitioner's car 
on his rig·ht-hand side going east or in the direction of Dan-
ville. This same witness at a later date made a test, together 
with J. \V. Shelton, the latter a brother-in-law of the de-
ceased, to ascertain as to the distance that a car parked in 
the relative position of petitioner's car without lights, as 
claimed by the plaintiff, could be seen by a driver approaching 
fron1 the direction of Danville, and stated that the car could 
be seen at a distance of 37 steps, and that going at 38 miles 
an hour brakes were applied on the test car, and it was un~ 
able to stop before reaching the parked c.ar, and it was neces-
sary to turn left in order to avoid striking it, and they con-
tinued to travel a distance of about 15 feet beyond the parked 
car before the test car could he brought to a full stop. 
The evidence of the plaintiff is conflicting as to the distance 
that the car could be seen by a car approaching from the di-
rection of Danville, as the witness, J. H. Farmer, State Traffic 
Police Officer, made the same test as made by the witnesses 
Scarce and Shelton, and stated that a car parked in the rela-
tive position of petitioner's car, without lights, was visible 
250 feet away, and could be plainly seen .175 feet, and that 
the measurement of 175 feet was. made after he had seen 
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the car, and had brought this car to a stop (see evidence of 
J. H. Farmer, page 47 of the record). 
Lloyd Adkins' Administratrix brought suit against your 
petitio'ller, and the jury returned a verdict for Ten Thousand 
($10,000.00) Dc1llars ag·ainst your petitioner. 
ASSIGN~IENT OF ERROR NO. 1. 
Your petitioner respectfully submits that the Trial Court 
committed prejudicial and reversible error against him in 
refusing to gTant "Instruction F", as offered by your peti-
tioner. (See Certificate of Exception No. 3.) 
The instruction, which was offered by your petitioner, is 
as follows: 
''The Court instructs the jury that it is the duty of all per-
sons using the highways to keep their vehicles under control 
at all times, and have due regard for the conditions of the 
highway, its width and surface; and while driving at night, 
it is the duty of drivers to operate their 1notor vehicles so that 
they can stop within the range of their lights; and in this case 
if you believe from the evidence that the deceased, Lloyd Ad-
kins, immediately preceding, or at the time of ·said collision, 
was operating the truck of~the Carlbrook Dairy in such way 
and manner that he could not stop after he saw, or should 
have seen, the defendant's car, in the exercise of ordinary 
care, and such failure on his part contributed to the accident, 
then you must find for the defendant." (Italics supplied.) 
The Trial Court substantially gave the instruction with the 
exception of the 'vords italicized above. The omission of 
these words constituted, in the opinion of your petitioner, a 
very obvious prejudicial error. Your petitioner submits, with 
great earnestness, that the following proposition of law, not 
heretofore directly decided in Virginia, is a sound principle, 
which has been adopted in a large majority of our states, in 
some instances by decision, in other instances by statute, and 
a principle of law for which your petitioner asked in the in-
struction above set out, and is as follows : .That it is the duty 
of the operator of an automobile to so operate his vehicle 
that he can stop within the ratnl}e of his lights, or to make it 
broader, within the range of his 'Vision,. 
LAW OF THE SUBJECT. 
The 1930 Code of Virginia, as amended by Acts of Assem-
bly, 1932, Section 2154, Sub-section 109, specifically provides, 
in part, as follows: 
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'• Any person driving a vehicle on the' highway shall drive 
the same at a careful speed, ·not greater nor less than is rea-
sonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface 
and width of the highway and of any other con,ditions then ex-
isting." (Italics supplied.) 
Your petitioner submits that the italicized language is cer:r 
tainly broad enough to cover the proposition of la'v requested 
by your petitioner in the instruction at issue, and that such 
an interpretation of the statute would be in accordanc_e with 
sound principle. Your petitioner goes further and says that, 
assuming the statute not to extend to cover such a proposition, 
still your petitioner asserts that the law on this subject, in 
a majority of jurisdictions has been settled by decision, and 
asks that this Court adopt the principle as the law of this 
Con1monwea1th. 
The evidence shows that this accident occurred around four 
o'clock in the morning, that it was very dark at the time, and 
the atmosphere heavy or damp. (See evidence of G. E. 
Scarce, ~I. R., p. 30.) The Mount Cross Road, on which this 
accident occurred, traverses a hilly section and constitutes 
more or less a succession of slopes or hills with short valleys 
between. It is a somewhat narrow road and this road was 
thoroughly familiar to the plaintiff's intestate, Lloyd Adkins, 
who traveled it every day, including Sunday. Under these 
circumstances, it 'vas only proper for the jury to be instructed 
as to what aets of omission and commission constituted neg-
ligent driving, and to have the Statute interpreted, or the 
law of decision adopted, so that they would fully understand 
the duty of the plaintiff's intestate, and thereby be in a posi-
tion to pass upon whether or not he was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence. 
The statement, ''and while driving at night, it is the duty 
of drivers to operate their motor vehicles so that they can 
stop within the range of their lights", is clearly imputed 
from that portion of the statute which says: ''and any other 
conditions then existing·,'' and your petitioner believes was 
a correct interpretation of the law with reference to reckless 
and negligent driving. It was the position of your petitioner 
in offering the instruction to have the proposition of law, 
whether by interpretation of the statute, or by adoption o~ 
the con1mon law rule, read to the jury, so that they would 
fully understand the duty resting upon the plaintiff's in-
testate, and to be in a position to ascertain whether or not. he 
was guilty of contributory negligence. 
Y oti.r petitioner submits that the law on this subject is 
well settled, though not directly decided, as yet, in Virginia. 
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Your petit_ioner, a~ briefly as possible, will discuss some 
of the adjudicated cases on this point. 
· ·ln Welch v. Indiana Coach Oo., 198 N. C: 130, 150 S. E. 
717, the facts were briefly_ these : A bus owned and operated 
by the defendant ran into the rear .end of a truck owned and 
operated by the plaintiff. The defendant based its fJ.efense 
on the ground that the driver of the bus w:as blinded by the 
rays of the sun. The Court approved the following instruc-
tion: 
:·'"It is negligence as a matter of law for a person to drive 
an automobile ·on a traveled public highway, used by pedes-
trians and vehicles, at such rate of speed that such automobiles 
qannot be stopped withi1~ the distance 'Which the operator of 
said car is able to see an object on. the highway in front of 
him.'' (Italics supplied.) 
.. In Blashfield 's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, Volume 5, 
page 449, Section 3318, the doctrine is stated as follows: 
''The general rule is that a driver is held to the duty of 
observing objects on t4e highway, and to drive at such speed 
as to be able to stop within the range of his lights.'' 
.And again referring to the same authority, Volume 2, page 
365, we see the following: 
''A motorist traveling at a speed that would ;make it im-
possible to stop or turn liis car within the space illuminated 
by his headlights, has, under some circu·m.stances, been ,quilty 
of contributory negligence as a 1natter of law in str·ikin,q a 
vehicle parked so that his lights would or should have t·e-
vealed it.'·' (Italics supplied.) 
As will be remembered from the evidence, and as can be 
seen by the allegations as contained in the notice of motion 
for judgment, the only negligence charged on the part of the 
defendant was that he 'vas parked at or near the middle of 
the highway, and that his lights were not burning, although 
there was a contradiction of fact as to both. 
The position, however, that your petitioner takes is that 
admittin,g these allegations to be considered as proven, still 
it is immaterial, insofar as this case is concerned. If Lloyd 
.Aqkins had been driving at a reasonable rate of speed or 
had his car under sufficient control to have stopped without 
hitting an object that came within his vision and failed _to 
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do so, then obviously he was not looking, or if looking, was 
driving at a highly excessive rate of speed. · 
The Vi·rginia Court, without expressly recognizin,q the rule 
asked for in the offered instruction, for all' p1·actical purposes 
adopted the same in the case of Kinsey v. Bn~;gh, 157 Va. 407. 
T.he plaintiff in that ease was driving in a buggy, which 
was struck bv the defendant's truck from the rear. There 
was no light "on the bugg·y, as required by law, and the col-
lision took place in the night time. The defendant testified 
that his lights were in good condition and that he drove about 
300 feet on· a straight road, yet did not see the plaintiff until 
he was within a fe,v·feet of him. The question was whether 
the plaintiff's failure to have a light an his buggy, as required 
by law, constituted neg·ligence which would defeat recovery. 
Judge Iludgins, in considering· this case, said: 
''Then the plaintiff should have been clearly discernible 
to him in time to have avoided the accident. It follows that 
if the defendn·nt had been keeping a proper lookout he 'Would 
have seen the plaintiff in ample time to have avoided striking 
the bug[!y.'' (Italics supplied.) 
tT udge Hudgins goes on further to say: 
."It is improbable tha.t an automobile with prop.erly equipped 
hea(Uights could be so operated on the hard surface of a 
straig·ht stretch of road such as that described, under the con-
ditions disclosed, that its operator, if keeping a proper look-
out, WO'ltld fail to $ee thereon a mo1-'ing object the size of a 
horse and buggy in time to avoid a collision.'' (Italics sup-
plied.) · 
(Note: This case will be further considered in the treat-
ment of the third assignment of error.) 
Your petitioner 'vould further commend to the attention 
of the Court the opinion by Judge Lehman in the case · of 
Albertson v . .Ansbacher, 169 N. Y. S. 188, an opinion of con-
siderable insight and by a Court of great weight. In this 
case the plaintiff's car had stopped a few feet from the right-
hand side of the curb in Central Park. The defendant's 
car struck it from the rear in the night time. In rendering 
the opinion, tT udge Lehman, speaking for the Court, said : , 
"It seems to me clearly impossible for any person exer-
cising any degree of care ·at all to fail to see an automobile 
until he collided with it. It is true that it appears that the 
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ni_qht was somewhat n~isty, but ~t.nless there was a rnost ~tn­
usu.al fog that night, if the defendant's chau,ff eur was exer-
cising any watchfulness, he 'would have seen the plaintiff's 
car before the accident. * e * '' (Italics supplied.) 
Further discussing the possible contributory negligence of 
the plaintiff, the Court said : 
''The lights on the car were lit, but the plaintiff's passen-
ger was working around the wheel, an~l testified that he could 
not state whether his body might not have been interposed be-
tween the taillight of the car and the oncoming automobile. 
* w * lVIoreover, if such an act (of interposing himself be-
tween the tail light and oncoming automobiles) would con-
stitute neg·lige'nce, it could not have contributed to the acci-
dent, fo·r the defendant's chauffe'ttr pa.lpably wo~tld have seen 
the auton~obile, even without the taillight, if he had looked and 
if he did not look, the presence of the taillight could not have 
helped h-i1n.'' (Italics supplied.) 
Your petitioner would like to emphasize that part of the 
above opinion which was italicized. 
In the case of Gleason v. Lowe (Mich., 1925), 205 N. W. 
199, the plaintiff while driving his unlighted wagon along th{» 
high,vay at night was struck from the rear by a car driven 
by the defendant. In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff~ 
the Court said : 
''As I shall try to show to you presently, every man m1.tst 
operate his au.tomobile so that he can stop it within the ran.qe 
of his vision, whether it be daylight or dark1iess. It makes no 
difference what may obscure his vision, whether it be a brick 
wall or the darkness of nightfall. He can't see, he can't op-
erate. He must be able to see where he is going. "' * " As I 
said to you a moment ago, there are other duties imposed on 
motorists, automobilists, by well-settled law of this country, 
of this state. One is, that the operator of an automobile must 
keep a proper lookout ahead. He must: see that which is there 
to be seen in the path of his autorn.obile. He must keep his 
a~ttomobile under contt·ol. He m.ust be able to stop within 
the range of his vision, whether that vision be obscured by 
obstacles or buildings in. daylight or b~.l night. No man may 
be permitted to operate an automobile with its weight, power 
and speed in darkness; if he can't see, he 1nust stop. He must, 
as I said to yon a moment ago, be able to see where he is 
going, . and if his range of vision is 50 feet, if he can see 
50 feet ahead of him, he must regulate his speed so that he 
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can stop in a distance of 50 feet; if he can see 20 feet ahead 
of him, he must regulate his speed so that he can stop within 
20 feet, and so on.'' .. 
''It is 'veil settled, that it is negligence, as a matter of law, 
to drive an automobile along a public highway in the dark 
at such speed that it cannot be stopped within the distance 
that objects can be seen ahead of it.'' (Italics supplied.) 
It is to be noted that the instant case is stronger than Glea-
son v. Lowe, ·for the reason that there is no evidence to show 
the plaintiff's intestate was blinded by any oncoming auto-
mobile, nor was there any other condition which would have 
affected his vision. 
Reference is also made to two excellent annotations on this 
subject, the first of which appears in 87 A. L. R. 900, and 
the second of which, being a supplement to the first, is found 
in 97 .A.. L. R. 546. These two annotations quite clearly dis-
close the fact that the great weight of opinion concludes with 
the proposition that an operator's failure to stop within the 
·range of his vision constitutes negligence as a matter of law. 
The n1inority view seems to hold that whether it constitutes 
neg·lig-ence is a matter for the jury under the particular case. 
The Court's attention is further invited to a consideration 
of the following cases: Marmarek v. City of A plena, 242 N. 
W. 973; PeckinpatUgh v. Engelke, 215 Iowa 1248, 247 N. W. 
822; Orrvar v. 'lJilorgam, 189 Minn. 306, 249 N. W. 42; Simrell 
v. Eschenbach, 154 Atl. 369, 303 Pa. 156. 
The i11stant case is completely silent as to whether. or not 
the plaintiff's intestate ever sa'v your petitioner's car prior 
to the collision. The 'vitness W. }J. Clark (1\f. R., p. 53) tes-
tified that the truck driven by the plaintiff's intestate had been 
inspected for purposes of inspection under the Motor Vehicle 
Law some three days prior to the accident, and found to be 
in good condition. There is no evidence that there was any-
. thing wrong with the lights on the truck driven by the plain-
tiff's intestate. It must be presumed then that they were 
in good condition. The facts, therefore, must be deduced by 
fair inference, and it is submitted that from the physical 
facts of this case only two alternative conclusions are pos-
sible, only two deductions that could be made from the evi-
dence by fair-minded men, and they are these: (1) that the 
plaintiff's intestate was not keeping· a proper lookout, or 
(2) that if he was keeping a proper lookout, he was going at 
a rate of speed which was highly excessive under the cir-
cumstances. 
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PROPOSITION OF LAW AS OFFERED IN ABOVE IN-
STRUCTION SOUND POLICY. 
Your petitioner would most respectfully ask this Court to 
consider the sound policy of the majority view on this propo-
sition of law. Is it possible for an operator to keep his ve-
hicle under reasonably complete control and to exercise or-
din~ry care, and at all time to keep a proper lookout when he 
is driving in the dark? Is it possible to comply 'vith these 
duties when bulky objects on the hig·hway cannot be seen. Un-
doubtedly not. Therefore, as a matter of common sense, it 
is submitted that the operator of an automobile is not com-
plying with the duties imposed upon him by law when he 
is so operating his vehicle as not to be able to stop within the 
range of his vision. 
_ Your petitioner is willing to admit that there are cerj;ain 
cases in which the parking of an automobile under certain 
circumstances constitutes neg·Iigence, but your petitioner sug-
gests, with great earnestness, that collisions between automo-
·biles, resulting as they do in horrible personal injuries and· 
death, are caused in a lar,qe majority of cases by the act of 
the 'lnoving vehicle. A vehicle, if not inherently a dangerous 
instru1nentality when in motion, is at least a potentially dan-
gerous one, and the greater the speed, the greater its dan-
gerous quality. It is the opinion of your petitioner that the 
rate of speed should be made commensurate with the ability 
of the operator to stop within the range of vision in which he 
can, by keeping a proper lookout, see objects ahead of him on 
the highway. It is submitted that the majority view, holding 
a failure· to ~top within the range of vision as negligence per 
Sf3 is sound. But even if this Court should not go so far, th£1 
principle should be submitted to the jury to determine, un-
der proper instructions of the Court. It would unquestion-
ably result in a sound warning to motorists using the higl'-
ways and a signal to them that it is the· primary d'uty and 
obligation 'of the operator of the 1novin.q vehicle to cat·e for 
the .~afety of hi1nself and others. 
Your petitioner submits that the majority view, holding-
that the failure to stop within the range of vision is negli-
gence as a matter of law, is that which should be adopted by 
this Court, but assuming that this view goes too far, your 
petitioner is confident to believe that the proposition should 
certainly be left to the jury to determine, under the facts and 
circumstances of each case, whether the doctrine should hE' 
applied. In refusing to allow the jury to determine this ques-
tion, the Trial Court not only committed error, but an error 
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which was highly prejudicial to your petitioner under the f.acts 
and circumstances of this particular case. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II. 
Your petitioner respectfully submits that the Trial Court 
con1mitted reversible error against him in granting '' Instruc-
tion No. 8'' over his objection. (See Certificate of Exeep-
tion No. 5.) 
This instruction was as follows : 
''The Court instructs the Jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that the plaintiff's decedent was driving the truck 
'vith ordinary care and prudence, and keeping a reasonable 
careful outlook for obstructions and that without fault upon 
his part the plaintiff's decedent was, as a result of the de-
fendant's negligent conduct, suddenly confronted with an 
emergency, and that in attempting to meet such an emergency 
and avoid a collision, he did what an ordinarily prudent per-
son would have done if confronted with a like emerge'ncy, but 
that he failed to avoid the collision, then in such case the 
plaintiff's decedent would not be guilty of negligence because 
it now appears that another course might have been jucli:-
cious. '' 
Your petitioner, in discussing this assignment of error, will 
treat the sa:me u·nder three headings, namely: 
(a) That the giving of an instruction without evidence to 
support it constitutes error; 
(b) That the ev:idence in the instant case did not warrant 
the granting of an emergency instruction; · 
(c) · That the error committed in granting the instruction 
was highly prejudicial and harmful to your petitioner. 
These three propositions will be considered in the above 
order. 
(a) 
GIVING OF INSTRUCTION vVITHOUT EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT IT CONSTITUTES ERROR. 
It is submitted by your petitioner that the law in Virginia 
is well settled as to the following proposition: That no in-
stnwtion sho1tld be given by the Trial Court unless there is 
evidence ~chich, if believed by the jury, would be sufficient t& 
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. Yustain a verdict on a 'motion to set the same aside on the 
,qrounds of insufficient evidence to s~tpport it. This point 
was expressly decided by the Court in the case of Shiflett's 
Adn~inistratrix v.· V a. R. ct P. Co., 136 Va. 72, 78, .... S. ]J . 
. . . . , where the Court, speaking through Judge Burks, at page 
78 of the opinion, said : 
"The test to be applied in determining whether there is 
sufficient evidence to furnish the basis for an instruction is, 
would a verdict in accordance 'vith the instruction be set aside 
for lack of evidence to support it? If not, then the instnlc-
tion may be properly given.'' 
In the case of Barnes v. Ashworth, 154 Va. 218, 241, 153 S. 
E. 711, this Court again, in an opinion by Judge Epes, said : 
"The test to be applied in determining whether there is 
sufficient evidence to furnish the basis for an instruction is, 
would a verdict in accordance· 'vith the instruction be set 
aside for lack of evidence to support it? If not, then the in-
struction may be properly given.'' 
· In the recent case of Canipbell Soup Co. v. Davis, 163 Va. 
89, 175 S. E. 743 (1934), this Court again, speaking through 
Judge Holt, declared: 
'' Plain]y an instruction cannot be given because it is in 
line with a litigant's theory unless that theory finds support 
in the evidence.'' 
(b) 
NO EVIDENCE IN INSTANT CASE TO SUPPORT IN-
STRUCTION. 
Your petitioner in discussing this proposition submits that 
the Virginia law regarding the emergency doctrine is clearly 
stated in the case of Jones v. Han bury, 158 V a. 842, 860, .... 
S. E. . ... , where the Court, speaking· through Judge Epes, 
said: 
"Where one, without his own fault, is suddenly placed by 
the negligence of another in such a position that he is com-
pelled to choose instantly in the face of grave and apparent 
imminent peril between two or more hazards, or two or more 
means of attempting to escape the peril with which he is con-
fronted, the law does not require of him the exercise of all 
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the presence of mind and care of a reasonably prudent per-
son under ordinary circumstances, or even of all that which 
a reasonably prudent man would ordinarily show in the face 
of danger. • * • " (Italic~ supplied.) 
In .. :\ .. nderson on ''An Automobile Suit'', Section 948, the 
following is said: 
".As we have already suggested, in order for one to claim 
the benefit of an emergency, the emergency must not have re-
sulted from his own ·•negligence. In other words, if the ex-
istence of an emergency may be traced to the negligence of 
the party claiming that he acted therein, his conduct will be 
considered in the same manner as if no emergency ha9. ex-
isted. One may not create an emergency and then cldim the 
palliatin,q effect of its existence on the issue of whether or 
not he wa.s negligen-t.'' (Italics supplied.) 
In other words, your petitione:r; submits that the doctrine 
of sudden emergency presupposes first: that person operat-
ing an automobile is suddenly confronted by some grave or 
apparent imminent peril; secondly, that this peril is not of 
his own making; thirdly, that in choosing one of two possible 
avenues of escape from the assumed peril, he is not required 
to exercise the same high degree of care in extricating him-
self from his difficulty that would be required of him in the 
absence of such sudden peril. 
NO EVIDENCE OF EXISTENCE OF AN ·EMERGENCY. 
Your petitioner submits that the record contains no evi-
dence which shows, in fact, that an emergency did exist, or 
in the minds of reasonable men, could have existed. The 
evidence is uncontradicted that the road was straight for 
several hundreds of feet west of the point where your peti-
tioner's car was parked at the time of the accident. There 
is some eYidence that there was some little knoll between a 
point 230 feet east of your petitioner's car and the point at 
which your petitioner's car was parked, but this knoll was 
a rise of only one foot, as can be seen by the testimony of 
witness H. S. Peirce (M. R., p. 73), an expert ·engineer, who 
made a topographic plat of the road. The evidence, according 
to plaintiff's witness G. E. Scarce, is to the effect that your 
petitioner's car could be seen at a distance east of where it 
·was parked, 1.11 feet (M. R., p. 33). J. H. Farmer, State 
Traffic Police Officer, made the same test as that made by 
witnesses Scarce and Shelton, and stated that the parked 
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car, in the relative position of your petitioner's car without 
lights, was visible 250 feet east of the point where your pe-
titioner's car was.located, and could be plainly seen 175 feet 
therefrom. The evidence further discloses that the plain-
tiff's intestate, Lloyd Adkins, was thoroughly familiar with 
the road in ·question, traveling the -'same nightly in his deliv-
ery of the milk from the Carlbrook Dairy. It is further un-
contradicted that your petitioner's car is a large and bulky 
object, of which it is submitted this Court will take judicial 
notice. There is no evidence further to show that there was 
any other traffic approaching or preceding plaintiff's intestate 
at the time, that there were glaring lights or other physical 
facts which might have created a sudden emergency. It i~ 
submitted, therefore, that the facts conclusively do not show 
that an emergency did, in fact, exist. 
NO EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFF'S INTESTATE 
ACTED IN EMER.GENCY. 
In view of the fact that plaintiff's intestate could not tes-
tify, and his helper, Shelton, wa.s asleep at the time of the col-· 
lision, the record is completely silent as to what plaintiff':; 
intestate did, saw, or felt prior to the collision. There is no 
evidence that he saw yo'U,r petitioner's car, if at all; whether 
he atten~pted to slow doum, t'ttrn, or pass by. The only evi-
dence as to what he, in fact, did do comes from the witness 
0. S. ~fayberry (l\L R., p. 58). This ·witness stated on cross 
examination, replying to a question from the Court, as foi~ 
lows: 
''The Court: I-I ow far back towards Danville was there 
an indication that the wheels of the truck or something be-
gan to skid to the place where you saw the milk-that would 
indicate the place where the truck had turned over Y 
. ''Witness: The best I could say, .Judge,-I didn't measure 
it-it looked about 65 or 75 feet. 
''The Court: That would be approximat~ly 25 yards f 
· ''Witness: Yes, sir." (M. R., p. 58.) 
This evidence, though somewhat flimsy, indicates one of 
two things. On the one hand that the driver of the truck 
applied his brakes and skidded a distance of approximately 
75 feet before striking your petitioner's car, or that he struck 
your petitioner's car and knocked it the length of the skid 
marks. There is nothing to indicate that the driver ever 
realized that he 'vas confronted by a sudden emergency, or 
did anything to avoid the same, unless on the theory that 
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the skid marks showed that he attempted to stop. If the la/:-
ter theory be accepted, then the instntct·ion was obviously e·r-
ron.eous, because that showed conclusi·vely that the truck 'lt'a.o; 
being operated at a highly excessi-ve rate of speed. That part 
of the instruction, therefore, which was concerned with 
''through no fault of his own part'' could not have been 
given. 
Your petitioner submits that his position, in contenclli}g 
that obvious error was committed in granting the emergency 
instruction, is well stated by this Court in the case of Bailey 
v. Fore, 163 Va. 611, 619, in which Judge Browning, speaking 
for the Court., quoted with approval what Judge Holt said in 
the case of Davis v. Rodgers, 139 Va. 618, 623, 124 S. E. 408, 
409: 
''The fact that the jury had a right to consider all the 
circumstances in the case is stressed. This is entirely true, 
but the circumstances which it may consider must be of e·vi-
dentiat value. Under the guise of con.si(leritl,g circu'lnstC~~nees 
it is not left free to roa'ln at will. The verdict must rest on 
facts proven, fair i'nferences therefrom or circumstances hav-
ing a tendency to establish. the necessary facts. Where af-
firmative reliej is asked it m~tst affi·rm.atively appear that the 
verdict rests at least on some one of the.se foundations.·' 
(Italics supplied.) 
(c) 
ERROR C01\£MITTED, HIGHI..JY PR.EJUDICIAL AND 
HAR~fFUL. 
Your petitioner respectfully submits he is perfectly con-
scious of the sympathetic considerations running towards 
plaintiff's intestate and his family. Plaintiff's intestate was 
a married man with three children at the time of his death. 
There was evidence from your petitioner that he had hacl 
three drinks sometime prior to the collision. There was evi-
dence for the plaintiff's intestate, although denied by your 
petitioner, which went to the jury, to the effect that your 
petitioner was in a state of intoxication at the moment of the 
collision. ....L\.lthough there was no et·idence which even re-
motely sho·wed any ca;usal relationship between the evidence 
'Of intoxication and the resulting death of plaintiff's intestate, 
your petitioner earnestly submits that such evidence could 
have had a very moving· effect upon the jury in this case. 
Your petitioner, therefore, submits that particularly in view 
of the sympathetic consideration running towards plaintiff's 
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intestate and his family, that an instruction bas.ed on the 
emergency doctrine,. if erroneously given, resulted in great 
prejudice to your petitioner. In other words, it ga;ve the 
jury the opporttttnity of freeing plaintiff's intestate from con-
t·rib·utory negligence by allowin,q them to conclude as follou;s: 
That an em-ergency existed (when there was no evidence it 
did exist), that it was through no fault of plaintiff's intestate, 
hut that even if he was at fault in striking your petitioner's 
car, he was .not under the high degree of care which would 
have been required of him in the absence of an -emergency. 
It allouJed the jury to asswme that an e1nergency existed where 
the vidence is conclusive that -it did not e{x;·ist, and it allowed 
the jury to say that the plaintiff's intestate acted in an emer-
gency, whe1·e there is no evidence to show how he acted, if at 
all. Such evidence, the only evidence that the jury could 
have considered, was so highly inza,qinative and speculative as 
to justify the conclusion that their verdict cotttld readily have 
been rendm·ed in pursu.ance of an instr·uction where there was 
no evidence to s·upport it, and where their conclusion must .. 
in the natt~;re of things, have bee1~ based on conjecture, syrn· 
pathy and S'urm.ise. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. III. 
Considering this assignment of error, your petitioner rep-
resents that the Trial Court committed highly prejudicial 
and reversible error against him in its refusal to sustain your 
petitioner's motion to- strike the evidence of the plaintiff be-
fore-the same was submitted to the jury, and its refusal to 
set aside the verdict of the jury for reasons assigned. (See 
Certificate of Exception No. 7.) 
For the purposes of clarity, your petitioner will treat tl1is 
assignment of error under two headings·: 
(l) That the Court committed error in refusing to strike the 
plaintiff's evidence before submission of the case to the jury, 
and ' 
(2) Its refusal to set aside the verdict of the jury as con-
trary to the law and evidence. 
(1) 
Y.our petitioner submits that the Virginia law is well settled 
that the Trial Court in reviewing the evidence on a motion 
to strike is not confined to the rules that are applicable in 
considering a demurrer to the evidence. The Trial Court 
should consider the verdict in light of all of the evidence 
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and may weigh the evidence at last to some extent. ''Burks 
Pleading and Practice'', Second Edition, page 546, says: 
''But in determining the question of whether as reasonable 
men the jury could have found the.ir verdict, the trial court 
is not compelled to look at the evidence as on a demurrer to 
the evidence. The court considers the verdict in the lig·ht of 
all the evidence and may weigh the evidence, at least to some 
extent. So, where the evidence is conflicting but there is docu-
mentary evidence or uncontroverted evidence, facts, circum-
stances or physical facts that contradict the evidence of the 
party in 'vhose favor the verdict was found and support the 
testimony of the movant; or where the evidence on which the 
verdict is fou,nd is incredible, or, 'where the ,qreat preponder-
ance of the evidence is against the verdict, the trial court may 
properly set aside the verdict.'' (Italics supplied.) 
R·icketts v. J. G. ]jJJcCrory Co., 138 Va. 548, 560, "Burks 
Pleading and Practice",. Second Edition, pages 546, 547. 
Your petitioner frankly admits that a motion to strike the 
evidence made at the conclusion of the evidence in chief 
should not be sustained, unless it is palpably clear that the 
plaintiff has utterly failed to carry his burden. As was said 
by this Court in Jones v. Hanbury, ·158 Va. 842, 848, 164 S. 
E. 545, through an opinion delivered by Judge Epes: 
''Where material facts and circumstances of a case.Jie pe-
culiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, or peculiarly 
within the knowledge of both the plaintiff and the defendant, 
it is a 11ery drastic proceeding to strike out all the plaintiff's 
evidence on a motion made at the conclusion of the plaintiff's 
evidenee in chief, before the defendant has testified. A mo-
tion to strike out made under such circumstances should not 
he sustained unless it is very plain that the court would be com-
pelled to set aside a verdict' for the plaintiff upon a con-
sideration of the evidence strictly as upon a demurrer to 
the evidence, and in the light of the fact that the defendant 
has seen fit not to testify and subject himself to cross ex-
amination. Where a motion to strike o'ld is rnade after all the 
e·vidence for both parties has been introd?J.ced or upon a mo.-
t-iotz to set aside a ve'rdict, a somewhat 'more liberal nt,le is 
sometimes applied for the considera.tion of the evidence in 
pa..~.t::-ing upon the motion; but in cases such as this (where 
the motion to strike out is made at the conclusion of the 
plaintiff's evidence in chief), the court will rigidly apply the 
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rule applicable to the consideration of evidence upon a de-
murrer to the evidence.'' (Italics supplied.) 
Your petitioner moved to strike the plaintiff's evidence at 
the conclusion of the testimony in chief, which motion was 
overruled. Your petitioner again moved to strike the plain-
tiff's evidence at the conclusion of the introduction of all the 
evidence. 
In considering, therefore, whether or not the court com-
mitted. error in its failure to sustain these motions, it will be 
necessa:Jly to some extent to review the evidence. 
As can be seen from the notice of motion filed by the plain-
tiff, the only two acts of negligence charged against the de ... 
fendant are (1) that he tJarked his autontobile at or near the 
middle of the highway, and (2) that his parked car was with-
out lights at the ti'lne of the collision. . 
Your petitioner believes that the great preponderance of 
the evidence showed plainly and clearly that he was not guilty 
of any negligence in the parking of his automobile. It is 
uncontradicted that your petitioner's automobile stopped be-
cause it was inoperative, and that everything was done that 
reasonably could have been done to get it off the highway 
when it would go no further. The evidence is uncontradicted 
that at the time the car was stopped the lights, both head and 
tail, were burning. Your petitioner submits that if the lights 
went out, it was the failure of the battery-a circumstance 
over which your petitioner had no control, and a matter which 
he had no reason to foresee. Aft~r the accident, the witness, 
Ryland Shelton, who was riding with Lloyd Adkins, attempted 
to turn on the lights, but they would not burn (M. R., p. 13). 
The evidence of Otis Hankins and C. E. Shepherd was to the 
effect that the lights were burning 20 to 30 minutes before 
the accident, but your petitioner stated that the battery was 
weak. The only evidence to the ·effect that the lights were 
_not burning 10 minutes before the accident emanates from 
G. E. Scarce (M. R., p. 19) and tTames Bowles C~L R., p. 35). 
It is submitted that assuming that the lights were not burn-
ing on your petitioner's car when the collision occurred, !:?till 
your petitioner submits that he was not g·uilty of negligence, 
since it is further uncontradicted that the lights were left 
burning when his car was parked and continued so to hn rn 
until the battery 'vas , exhausted, a circumstance over whicl1 
. he had no control. 
The evidence of all the witnesses as to the position of youl' 
petitioner's automobile at the time of the collision corrobo-
rated the statement of your petitioner with the exception of 
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the evidence of G. E. Scarce, whose testimony is herein quoted 
for the convenience of the Court: 
"Q. Mr. Scaree, wi~ you please state whether or not there 
were any lights on the .car parked in the road? 
"A. Well, when I came over the knoll, my lights reflected 
on his car, and I thought the lights were on, but when I came 
on down, I seen they weren't. 
'' Q. The first impression, when your lights struck it, was 
that the lights were on, but as you came nearer to it, you saw 
that they weren't Y 
"A. I thought at first it was coming on up the road, going 
slow. 
'' Q. Was the car facing you? 
., A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. Where was the car in reference to the center of the 
road? 
''A. It was almost in the center of the road. 
'' Q. What did you do, so far as your car was concerned, as 
soon as von saw it f · 
''A. f stopped just as quick as I eould. 
"Q. What brakes did you apply? 
''A. I put on my foot brakes. I don't know whether. I put 
on the emergency or not, but the boys said I did. 
"Q. How close did you eome to striking-it? 
''A. About a yard and a half. 
'' Q. Were you running fast? 
''A. I was running about forty-five. 
'• Q. A.nd you managed to clear it by a yard and a half 7 
''A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. What did you do f 
''A.. I backed up about two yards and thro,ved the hind 
end to the railings, and then went on by. J 
· "Q. How did you go by-on your right or the left? 
. ''A. My ri,qht. 
''Q. How much room did you have between the guard rails 
and your car 7 
''A. I would say I had half a yard bet10een the rails an(l 
the car sittin,q in the road. 
'' Q. Half a yard between the rails and your carY 
''A. That much space between the rails and the car. 
'' Q. Between the g'ltard rails atzd the right-hand side of your 
car? 
"A. Yes, .c;ir. 
'' Q. How 'much space was there between the left-hand side 
of tmur r:ar and the car sittin,q in the road? . 
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'"A. Hardly any at all--I had half a yard between." (Ital-
ics supplied.) 
The evidence on this point is continued on page 25 of the 
record. 
''The Court: Mr. Scarce, a little while ago I understood 
you to testify that when you passed that car that nig~t in 
the road, there was only about half a foot between the rig·ht-
hand side of the car and the guard rail. Mr. Carter then 
asked yon the distance between your car and the other car-
he meant the left side. I want to understand what distance 
you estimate between the left-hand side of your car and the 
car in the road. 
"Witness: I would say there was half a foot clearance in 
all. 
''The Court : You mean on both sides Y 
''Witness: Yes, sir. 
''The Court: What distance would you say there was be-
tween the left-hand side of your car, which was next to the 
car in the middle of the road, and the left-hand side of that 
car, the way it was headed; in order to enable you to pass, 
did you scrape itY 
"Witness: No, sir, I would say there was half a foot in 
all. I reckon I was away from him about three inches. 
'' Q. What sort of car were you driving? 
''A. '30 ::Model Ford Sedan. 
'' Q. Do you know whether that was narrower or wider than 
the Oarlbrook Truck 1 
''A.. About the same.'' (Italics supplied.} 
The evidence of the plaintiff's witness, James Bowles, as 
to the position of petitioner's car is taken from page 36 of 
the record and is as follows : 
"Q. Do you know, James, how much space there was on 
either side of Mr. Scarce's car ·when he passed the car stand-
ing in the road Y 
''A. You mean how much space was left after the car was 
parked? 
"Q. Yes. 
''A. I don't know exactly, but I guess about a yard and a 
half or two '!,lards. 
"Q. How much Y 1 
''A. Well, I would say about a yard. 
'' Q. When you passed this car parked in the road, how 
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much space was· there between 1\{r. Scarce's automobile and 
this automobile? 
"1I r. Sanford: Now the witness has testified to that, and 
he is goirig over it again-
"1\fr. Bendall: I just wanted to straighten him out-
'' The Court: I am not quite so sure the 'vitness ~nder­
stood, from the shape of his answer, but you can go ahead. 
''Q. How fast was Mr. Scarce's automobile going when it 
passed by this automobile¥ 
''A. I don't know exactly, but when .it passed the car, I 
guess it was going 10 or 15 miles an hour:,.'' · 
The evidence of James Bowles on this point is continued 
on page 37 of the record as follo~s:. 
"Q. What gear was Mr. Scarce in when he passed! 
''A. I don't know exactly. I was in the back seat. 
'' Q. And you were about a yard from it when he back~d 
up' . 
''A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. How much space was there between Mr. Scarce's car 
and this other carY · 
''A. About a foot or two. 
'' Q. How much Y 
''A. About two feet. 
'' Q. Ho'v much space was there on the other side Y 
''A. I don't know exactly. 
'' Q. Did you see anyone in this automobile that was parked 
there¥ · 
''A. Yes, a· man -q.nder the steering wheel and one beside 
him, and I think the"re was two on the back seat.'' 
It will be seen that these two witnesses, both of whom were 
in the same car and had an equal opportunity to observe the· 
position of petitioner's car, are in sharp conflict, Scarce stat-
in~ that they had about one-half of a Y:ard in wliich to pass, 
at one time, and then when the suggestion of half a foo.t was 
made by the Court, he stated that he had only half a foot 
space altogether between his car and petitioner's car and be-
tween his car and the guard rail on his right. 
The Court's attention is particularly called to the change in 
the testimony of the witness Scarce upon being questioned by 
the Court. His original statement as to the clearance be-
tween the 1·ails 011zd your petitioner's car is in line with the 
testimony of his companion, Bo10les. His subsequent testi-
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mony, ·iv,hich contradicted his earlier testimony, is the only 
evide-nce in the record which does not su,bstootiate the testi-
?nony of your petitioner as to the position of his car in the 
road. 
The witness, Bowles, said that they had a two-foot space 
between their car and petitioner's car, and about one and 
one-half yards between their car and the g·uard rail on their 
right. According to this statement, if your petitioner's car 
was six feet wide-from side to side-and your petitioner 
submits that the Court will take judicial notice of the fact 
that all present-day automobiles are at least six feet wide; 
then, assuming that the car that the witness was riding in, 
was the same width, there was twelve and one-half feet of 
the hard surface-or the main traveled portion of the road-
left open for vehicles to pass. This put petitioner's car well 
on the shoulder on his right-hand side with only two and one-
ha1f feet of same on the hard surface if the road is fifteen 
feet wide, and one and one-half feet on the hard surface if 
the road is fourteen feet "\\-ide, as was stated by the witness 
Scarce. This statement of the plaintiff's witness fully cor-
roborates the e·vide·nce of petitioner as to the position of his 
car. In this connection it should be remembered that the 
actual measurement made by H. S. Peirce, Surv-eyor, as shown 
by his rna p and according to his evidence (see page 72 of 
the record), gives the width of the hard surface as fifteen 
feet and the shoulder as 4.4 feet. A car six feet wide with 
its right wheels in the ditch would occupy or cover 2.6 feet 
of the hard· surface. 
It, therefore, appears that the only evidence of negligence 
· as to the position of petitioner's car emanates from the wit-
ness, Scarce, since the witness Bowles corroborates petition-
er's view. Your petitioner submits that the Jury could not 
reasonably have disreg·a.rded all of your petitioner's evidence 
as to the position of his car, a.nd the evidence that the light~ 
on said car were ·burning, and return a verdict against him 
·-which in effect said he was guilty of negligence in the park-
ing of his car in a dangerous position, 'vhen the only direct 
.evidence enlanated from the witness, Scarce, who was con~ 
tradicted by his fellow passenger, and 'vho made several con-
flicting statements 'vhile under oath in the trial of this case 
and different statements under oath at a hearing before the 
Trial (Tustice (see evidence of G. E. Scarce before Trial Jus-
tice, pag·e 138 of the record). In one case or the other, this 
witneRs gave perjured testimony, and the fact was known to 
the jury and disregarded. 
Your petitioner earnestly submits that when this evidence 
is carefully analyz~d, it is plain and apparent that the great 
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preponderance of the evidence is against the finding of tbo 
jury that he was guilty of negligence in the parking of his 
automobile H.t the place where the ~ollision occurred. When 
the automobile stopped running, the witness, Hankins (~I. R., 
p. 99), stood outside and directed yo1tr petitioner in the park-
irtg of the automobile as far to the right as was practicable. 
Plaintiff's own witness, Bo·wles, corroborates your petition-
er's testimony and that of other witnesses as to where his 
automobile was parked at the time of the collision, and the 
Court is particularly asked to consider the fact that in l1is 
original ~stimony as to the clearance between his own car 
and that of your petitioner, the witness 8carce corroborated 
the evidence of Bowles and the. evidence of your petitioner 
and othe1· witnesses, bu,t subsequently changed his testimony 
upon being questioned by the Co·m·t. 
The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that your petitioner was neg-
ligent, as alleged in the plaintiff's pleadings, and your peti-
tioner suhn1its that it is so obvious this burden was not car-
ried that the Court should have sustained the motion to strike 
after the evidence was completed. 
(2) 
Your petitioner further submits that the Trial Court com-
mittecl reversible error in its failure to sustain the motion 
made by your petitioner to strike the evidence, and the further 
motion to set aside the verdict of the jury because the evi-
dence unquestionably showed that Lloyd Adkins, the plain-
tiff's intestate, was guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law in his operation of the Carlbrook Dairy truck 
at the time of the collision. 
As a n1atter of fact, it is the opinion of your petitioner 
that the evidence of the plaintiff clearly showed that the 
· neglige·nce of the said Adkins in the operation of his truck 
was the p1·oxirnate cau,se of the accident, and that any neg-
ligence, if any, of which your petitioner could be charged, ~vas 
the remote cause. Your petitioner earnestly contends that 
after consideration of all the evidence, reasonable men could 
not differ in the conclusion that if Lloyd Adkins had been 
keeping a proper lookout, had been operating his truck at a 
rate of speed commensurate with the conditions then exist-
ing, had been keeping his truck under reasonably complete 
control, taking into consideration the atmospheric conditions, 
the topography, and width of the road that he was traversing. 
that he could have stopped or turned in time to have avoided 
the collision. ' 
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The only unfavorable evidence, from your petitioner's view-
point, as to how the accident occurred, comes from the plain-
tiff's witness G. E. Bearce. His evidence, quoted heretofore, 
indicates that your petitioner's car_ w:as parked or stopped 
slig·htly across the center lin,..,e. ,of the highway facing in the 
direction of 1\'lount Cross___;_the same direction in which the 
truck operated by plaintiff's intestate was traveling. He fur-
ther testified (taking the worst of his two statements from 
your petitioner's viewpoint regarding the clearance), that 
there was barely space on the left-hand side of your peti-
tioner's automobile for the use of other vehicles. The wit-
ness, however stated that he drove by your petitioner's car and 
continued on towards Danville, "rhere he met the plaintiff's 
intestate driving his truck in an opposite direction. At that 
time the testimony shows the dairy truck was going at a rate 
between 35 and 40 miles per. hour. This witness· further 
stated that at a later date he and J. W. Shelton made a test 
to ascertain the distance that a car parked under siniilar 
circumstances as existed on the night of the ·aecident could 
be seen by a driver of a. vehicle traveling in the same ·di-
rection as was the plaintiff's intestate on the night of the ac-
cident. As a result of this test, it was stated that the parked 
car, without lights, could be plainly seen a distance of 37 
steps or 111 feet, and that the car in which the witness and 
Shelton were riding could not be stopped, going at a speed of 
38 miles an hour, before it reached the parked car, and it 
was necessary to turn left to pass the said car and come to a 
stop 15 feet beyond. The evidence of both of thes·e witnes~es 
shows that at 38 miles an hour, or 45 miles an hour, that 
though a car could not be stopped before it struck the parked 
automobile, ·it could be turned; and the test car was turned 
to the left and an impact, or a collision, was avoided. It is 
submitted by your petitioner that the speed of 38 miles an 
hour 1.11as clearly excessive under the circumstances and con-
ditions then existing; the night was dark and the atmosphere 
heavy, and according to the testimony of the witness Scarce, 
a driver could not see very far in front of him. It w·as, there-
fore, unquestionably gross negligence for a person to operate 
a vehicle at a rate of speed which did not allow him to stop 
in order to avoid striking objects which were within the range 
of his vision at the time. . · · 
The plaintiff's evidence as to the distance that a parked 
car could be seen without lights, in the relative position ·of 
your petitioner's car, ranged from 250 feet to 111 feet. Your 
petitioner submits that taking the shortest distance, it WflS 
. undoubtedly gross negligence to operate a vehicle at such 
speed that it could not be stopped, if visible, 111 feet away. 
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EVEN IF DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT, HIS NEGLI-
G.ENCE ~rHE RE.~IOTE AND NOT THE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
_This Court is asked to consider in connection with proxi-
mate· and ·remote cause, the case of Kinsey v. Bntgh, 157 
Va. 407, which was considered under the first assigillAent of 
error. In t11at case a buggy was driving along a road-at ap-
proximately four miles an hour. There is very little differ-
ence, so far as visibility and ability to stop is concerned, be-
tween four miles an hour and a stationary object of the same 
approximate bulk. In Kinsey v. Brugh, sttpra, the plaintiff, 
riding in a buggy, was struck from behind by the defendant's 
truck. The plaintiff was violating the law to the extent that 
he had no light on his buggy at the time. 
The Court said that there was no causal ne,qligence bet'ween 
the failure of the plaintiff to carry a li,qht and the fa,ilttre of 
the defendant to see the buggy. The headlights of the truck 
'vould have disclosed the bugg-y just as clearly whether it 
had a light on it or not. The Court, speaking through Judge 
Hudg·ins, said at page 41l: 
"The violation of an ordinance or statute does not make 
the violator guilty of negligence which 'lt'ill Bttpport a recovery 
for dam.ages unless such violation was. the p-roximate cause of 
the i1i}ttry. ,. (Italics supplied.) 
At page 414, the Court further said: 
''It is improbable that an ·automobile with properly 
equipped headlights could be so operated on the hard surface 
of a straight stretch of road such as that described, under 
the conditions disclosed, that its operator, if keeping a proper 
lonkout, 'lvoUld fail to see the·reon a m.ovin_q object the size 
of a horse ·and buggy in time to· a·void a collision.'' (Italics 
- supplied.) · · 
In the Kinsey case the operator of the automobile was held 
to he guilty of negligence, which was the proximate cause 
of the injury, supporting a recovery by the man in the buggy. 
In the instant ease, all that your petitioner needs to show is 
that plaintiff's intestate was g~tilty of some ne,qligence which 
efficiently contributed to cause the accident. It is perfectly 
obvious in the mind of your petitioner that not only was the 
plaintiff's intestate guilty of contributory negligence, but 
in reality, although it is not necessary to be shown, he was 
guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the a.cci-
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dent, and that any negligence, of which your petitioner was 
guilty, and which is in itself denied, was, at most, not a con-
tributing but a remote cause of the collision. 
The recent case of Tignor v. V. l!J. P. Co., 184 S. E. 2:34 
(Va., }farch 12, 1936), is an interesting case and one which 
your pe~itioner submits sustains his position. In that case, a 
bus was adnlittedly violating the law by making a left-hand 
turn without going around the center of the intersection. The 
evidence was conflicting as to \vhether the driver gave the 
required hand signal or not. The plaintiff, riding on a mo-
torcycle;· ran into the bus, resulting in injuries to himself. 
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and the Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond set the same aside. 
The judgment of the Trial Court was reversed on appeal by 
a vote of three to two. The majority opinion succeeded on 
the ground that there ·was sufficient evidence to sho\v that 
the bus ''shot out from the curb'' in front of the plaintiff. 
The dissenting justices proceeded on the ground that all the 
testimony in the world could not induce them to believe that a 
big bus ever "shot out from the curb". 
It is apparent, therefore, that the trial judge and two jus-
tices of the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The other 
t~ree justices felt that the defendant alone was negligent, 
but it is reasonably apparent from a reading of the majol'ity 
opinion that a unanimous affirmance of the Trial Court's 
decision would have been made if the bus had been standing 
still in the rniddle of the street. 
The case depended on whether the plaintiff should have ob-
served that the bus was about to leap out in front of him 
before it leaped. The opinion that the .majority found was 
that the bus, in effect, sprang out directly in the plaintiff's 
path. The opinion shows that the majority considered that 
finding of fact as essential to the judgment of reversal. 
In the case of Wyatt v. Telephone Com.pany, 158 Va. 470, 
. . . . S. E. . ... , this proposition is sustained: That even if 
the plaintiff was not negligent and the defendant was negli-
' gent, still the defendant would not be liable unless the de-
fendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the acci-
dent. In that case the plaintiff ran into a telephone pole 
that the defendant had carelessly placed in the highway. The 
Court, at page 477, said: 
''With contributory negligence out of the 'vay we come 
back to proximate cause. It is true that the defendant' has 
violated the statute, and that the plaintiff is given a right 
of recovery by Code, Section 5785 ; but it gives no new t:igh t 
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and was desig-ned merely to prevent a wrongdoer from plea<l-
ing that he had been already punishetl. It is still necessary 
that disobedience of a statute be the proximat~ cause of in-
jury. Edwards v. Laurel Branch G. Co., 133 Va. 534, 114: 
S. E. 108; Horte'J'l.,qtein. v . . Virginia-Carolina R. Co., 102 Va. 
914, 47 S. E. 996, 999." (Italics supplied.) · 
''Of course, it is true that but for the location of this pole 
there would have been no accident, but its unlawbtllocation 
and the happeni1~g of the disaster leaves the question of causa~ 
connection still open. The rule which controls its applica.tion 
is sometimes difficult to apply, but the governing principle 
is plain enough, as the follo~ving authorities abundantly show. 
"In Bird v. St. Paul Fire db lJilari'J~e Ins. Co., 224 N. Y. 47, 
120 N. E. 86, 88, 13 A.. L. R. 875, Judge Cardoza said: 'But 
even in jurisdictions where the liability is broader its bounds 
are the reasonable and the probable. The wrongdoer may be 
charged with those consequences and those only within the 
range of prudent foresight. Milwaukee db St. Paul R. Co. v. 
Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 474, 24 L. Ed. 256; lVebb v. R., W. & 
0. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y., 420, 10 Am. Rep. 389.' 
. "You are not to trouble yourself with distant causes." 
(Italics supplied.) 
Certainly no reasonable man could find that the defendant 
should have foreseen that the plaintiff would crash into him 
from behind. The Court, in the case cited, held that the 
facts presented no question for a jury to pass upon. The 
verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff was set aside and 
final judgment rendered for the defendant. In the Federal 
Court the practice would be to direct a verdict for the de-
fendant. A verdict for the plaintiff in these cases can rest 
on nothing but sympathy for his unfortunate injuries, and 
the function of the Court is to control the jury and keep it 
within the bounds of reason. 
In Hughes v. Luther, 128 S. E.145, 189 N.C. 841, the opinion 
of the Court, in full, is : 
"Plaintiff was driving an automobile on a public road in 
Buncombe County, about 9:30 P. M. As he drove around 
a curve at the rate of 27 or 28 miles per hour, with the lights 
on his automobile, he saw, standing on the rig·ht-hand side of 
the road, about 3 feet from its edge, the defendant's truck. 
There was no light on his truck. Plaintiff saw the truck about 
75 yards ahead of . him. The road was about 18 feet wide. 
Another automobile, with lights burning, was approaching 
from the opposite direction. Plaintiff did not turn_ out, or 
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stop· his automobile, but drove into the truck. He testified 
that he thought the truck was moving. After he struck the 
truck, his automobile skidded about 20 yards. It was injured 
by the collision. 
"Conceding that it was negligence for defendant to stop 
his truck on the road side, in the night time, and not have a 
light on the rear, as required by Statute (C. S. 2615), this 
negligence was not the proximate cause of the injury to plain-
tiff's automobile. Plaintiff approached defendant's truck at 
a rapid. rate of speed, returning, as he says, from a· fishing 
trip, and, it appears, drove into the truck which he saw first 
at a distance of 75 yards. He saw the car approaching 
from the opposite direction, and yet, when he struck de-
fendant's truck, was going at a rate which caused his auto-
mobile to skid 20 yards. 
"In Gumley v. Cowman, 193 N. E. 627, 129 Ohio St. 36, 
on a dark, foggy night, the defendant's truck 'was moving 
forward yery slowly, with the front and rear wheels on the 
right bern sixteen or eighteen inches from the improved por-
tion of the road'. Several witnesses testified that the light 
on the rear of the truck was not burning·.'' 
The plaintiff's intestate drove into the rear of the truck 
and the Court held that he was guilty of negligence as a mat-
ter of law .. 
The Court said (p. 629) : 
''To· say that one can see at least t'vo hundred feet ahead, 
but does not in fact see in his path a discernible object, such 
as the defendant's t1·uck until five or ten feet of it, presents 
a situation utterly irreconcilable with any theory except neg-
ligence of the plainest and sin1plest sort. Likewise, the ques-
tion of proximate cause seems to require an answer too ob-
vious to justify extended discussion. With the foregoing facts 
in mind, how could it reas01tably be concluded that the negli-
gence of the decedent was not a contributing proximate cause 
of the collision?" (Italics supplied.) 
The Court relied upon an Ohio Statute "which requires 
that no person shall drive any motor vehicle in and upon 
any public road or highway at a speed greater than will 
permit him to bring it to a stop within the assured clear dis-
tance ahead' '. -
We take it that the statutory requirement is merely what 
due care would require at common la.w. It corresponds to 
the manda.te in Virgini3; Code, Section 2154 (109) (1932), 
which prohibits ''driving a vehicle when not under complete 
F. W. Twyman v. Douglas S. Adkins, Adm'x. 31 
control". An automobile that was under complete control 
could be stopped in time to avoid hitting a cow or a ,parked 
car or an elephant that was plainly visible a long way ahead 
in the middle of the highway. 
In Spencer v. Taylor, 188 N. W. 461 (Mich.), the plaintiff, 
at night, with his lights dimmed, "collided with the rear of 
an unlighted truck standing upon the margin of the traveled 
part of the highway''. The Court held that he was guilly 
of negligence as a matter of law, saying (p. 462) : 
"We think the court was right in holding plaintiff guilty 
of contributory negligence ,as a matter of law. It is well set-
tled that it is negligence as a matter of law to drive an auto-
mobile along a public highway in the dark at such speed that 
it cannot be stopped within the distance that objects can be 
seen ahead of it.'' . 
In Begatn v. Bittermam, 259 N. W. 266 (N. D., 1935), the 
defendant left his truck in the middle of the highway at night 
with 110 lights. The plaintiff r.an into it and the Court held 
that he was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. 
The Court said (p. 267) : 
''More and more the 'rule of safety'-the rule that one 
must drive at such a speed as to be able to stop 'Within the 
assured clear distance ahead-is being recognized as the im-
perative duty of the driver." 
The Court thus applies as a common law rule of safety 
the rule that is statutory in many states. It is merely a 
rule of common sense. The Court quoted from a Michigan 
~as-e: · 
"The cases dealt with large objects, such as other motor 
vehicles, easily seen, and on the open road. A driver must 
anticipate such objects, lighted or wnl!ighted, carefully or 
negligently driven or parked, and guard against collision with 
the1n. He must see such obstruction as a careful person would 
have seen.'' (Italics supplied.) 
Quoting an earlier North Dakota case, the Court said : 
'' * • • no one has a right 'to willfully and carelessly crash 
into even an unlighted machine, and then say he is entitled 
to damages because the other party was. neglig-ent as a mat-
ter of law, even though the violation of the statutory re-
quirement may be negligence per se. Such negligence does 
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not relieve the plaintiff from the consequence of contributory 
negligence'.'' (Italics supplied.) 
In Stark v. Fullerston Tr1ecking Co., 179 A 84 (Pa., 1g.35), 
the plaintiff's intestate, at dawn, ran into a truck that was 
stalled at the foot of a long hill. The Court held that he 
was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. The Pennsyl-
vania statute had a clause requiring the driver to go slowly 
enough so that he could stop "within the assured clear dis-
tance .ahead''. 
The Court said (p. 86): 
· "It may be conceded that ordinarily decedent's death would 
raise a presumption that he had taken all necessary precau-
tions for his own saf~ty, but this presuntption ha8 no exist-
ence as against the certainty that if he had done so here, he 
would not then have died.'' (Italics supplied.~ 
In Albrecht v. Waterloo Const~nu;tion Co., 257 N. W. 183 
(Iowa, 1934), the Court said (p. 184): 
"It is a rule of law that stopping upon a pav~d highway 
is not in and of itself an act of negligenc~.'' 
At page 186: 
"While we do not hold tl1at it would not be negligen~e to 
stop an. automobile upon a primary highway under any and 
.all conditions, a careful study of the record in thiR case re-
quired us to find that the defendant's act of stopping })is 
car on the highway 'vhere it was visible to approaching 
motorists from both directions for a distance of over 250 
feet, was not the proximate cause of the collision and in-
juries resulting therefrom."· 
In Hataway v. F. Strauss~ Son, 158 So. 408 (T.Ja. App., 
1935), the plaintiff was a passenger in a car driven by Creed. 
Defendant's truck was illegally pa:rked two a.nd one-half 
feet from the curb. Creed ran into it and plaintiff was in-
jured. The Court held that the defendant was negligent and 
the plaintiff was not negligent. But the Court held that the 
negligence of the defendant was not the proximate cause 
of the accident, for the reason that the proximate ca.use of 
the accident was the negligence of Creed, and this negligence 
was the sole. cause of the accident. 
The Court said (p. 411): 
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"We do not believe that presence of this large object, lomn-
ing up ahead and taking up not over one-third of n well 
lighted, 36 foot street, was in any legal sense a cause of this 
collision. This cause was Creed's failure to look or to see.'' 
In summarizing this mise, therefore, your petitioner has 
not been unmindful of the weight to be attached to the ver-. 
diet of the jury when that verdict has been sustained and . 
affirmed by the Trial Court, yet this Court, on numerous oc-
casions, in the interest of doing substantial justice, has set 
aside their finding. 
In Bailey v. Fore, 163 Va. 611, at page 617, the Court said: 
''Of course the plaintiff must prove her case. 
"(2) 'Negligence will not be imputed or presumed, and 
in an actio~ for negligent injuries the burden is on the plain-
tiff to prove that the defendant was negligent as alleged, and 
that its negligence was the proximate cause of the injury com-
·plained of.' 
"Digest of Virginia and West :Virginia Reports (~iichie), 
Sec. 56, page 678. See a long list of cases appended to the 
text. 
''There i& no positive and definite proof of how and why 
the accident here happened. This is true, in our opinion, as 
to circumstantial as well as direct evidence. We are left to 
grope in the fruitless fields of conjectut·e and speculation. 
We know that the decedent was killed by an. impact with the 
defendant's car. B1tt as to just where he was, and when 
and how he got there: w-e are i1~ the dark." (Italics supplied.) 
SUM~IARY. 
In conclusion, your petitioner, by way of summary, earnestly 
submits that three obvious and highly prejudicial errors were 
committed against him in the trial of the instant case in 
the lower Court, and that these errors were as follows: 
I. 
Faihtre of the Court in refusing to grant Instruction No. F, 
·as offered b·y yo1tr petitioner, for the following reasons: 
(a) It was the duty of the court to instruct the jury what 
act or acts of omission or commission constitutes negligence. 
(b) That the Vfrginia. Statute is broad enough to cover the 
instruction asked for, but assuming that such an interpreta-
tion be too broad, still your petitioner submjts that the prin-
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ciple of law, as embodied in the offered instruction, is ·a 
sound principle of common law, which has been adopted in 
many states by decisions in the absence of statute. 
(c) That a majority of the courts determining the question 
have decided that a failure to stop .within the rang·e of vision 
constitutes negligence as a matter of latv; a small number of 
courts hold that whether such failure constitutes negligence 
is a question to be decided by the jury under the facts of the 
particular case. 
(d) The jury should certainly have been instructed on one 
Qf the two applications of this principle of law. 
II. 
Failure of the trial Court in granting plaintiff's Instruc-
tion No. 8 over the objection of yo'ltr petitioner, for the fol-
lowing reasons: 
(a) There was no evidence in the instant case which showed 
the existence of an emergency. 
(b) There was no evidence in the instant case which showed 
that the plaintiff's intestate acted in an emergency. 
(c) The great preponderance of the evidence clearly sho,ved 
that if there was an emergency, which is expressly denied, 
it was caused by the negligence of the plaintiff's intestate. 
(d) Tha.t because of the sympathetic considerations run-
ning throughout the case towards the family of plaintiff's 
intestate and ag·ainst your petitioner, your petitioner sub-
mits that such error was obviously prejudicial to him; in that 
it allowed the jury, under the emergency doctrine, to disre-
gard for all practical tmrposes the question of contributory 
negligence by lessening the degree of care owed by plaintiff's 
intestate, upon the assumption that he acted in an emergency. 
III. 
Failure of the trial Court to strike the plaintiff's evidence 
and set aside the verdict of the jury as contrary to law and 
the evidence, for the following reasons: 
(a) That the great preponderance of the evidence clearly 
shows that the plaintiff failed to carry the burden of showing 
that your petitioner was guilty of negligence, which was the 
proximate cause of the collision. . 
(b) That the evidence shows clearly and obviously that 
plaintiff's intestate was guilty of contributory negligence as 
a matter of law. 
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(c) The evidence clearly shows that assuming the defend-
ant to have been technically negligent, that such negligence, 
if any, was a. remote and not the proximate cause of the col-
lision. 
PRAYERS. 
Wherefore, for the reasons above stated and others to be 
assigned at the bar of this Court, your petitioner prays that 
he may be awarded a writ of error and supersedeas to the 
judgment aforesaid, and that ·the same may be reviewed, re-
versed and anulled, and judgment entered for the defendant 
pursuant to Section 6365 of the Code of Virginia, or that the 
·same may be remanded for a new trial. 
Notice is hereby given that this petition will be adopted as 
an opening brief, and it is requested that an oral presenta-
tion of the same may be granted. 
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of J nne, 1936. 
F. W. TWYMAN, 
By R. PAUL SANFORD, 
Of Counsel. 
R. PAUL SANFORD, 
W. W. BEVERLEY, 
BEVERLY H. RANDOLPH, JR., 
Counsel for Petitioner. 
We, the undersigned attorneys at law, practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in our 
opinion there is error in the judgment complained of in the 
foregoing petition, for which the same should be reviewed 
and reversed. 
R. PAUL SANFORD, 
W. W. BEVERLEY, . 
BEVERLY H. RANDOLPH, Jn., 
It is hereby certified that a copy of the foregoing petition 
was delivered to George E. Bendall and John W. Carter, Jr., 
attorneys of record for Lloyd Adkins' Administratrix, on 
June 13, 1936. 
R. PAUL SANFORD. 
Writ of error and supersedeas awarded. Bond, $11,000.' 
7/23/36. 
EDWARD HUDGINS. 
Received July 24, 1936. 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
In the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County, Virginia. 
DouglasS. Adkins, Administratrix of the Estate of Lloyd M. 
Adkins, Deceased, . . 
v. 
F. W. Twyman. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
To DouglasS. Adkins, Adrpinistratrix of the Estate of Lloyd 
M. Adkins, deceased : 
Please take notice that on the 2nd day of May, 1936, at 
10· A. 1\L, or soon thereafter as I may be heard, the under-
signed will present the Judge of the Circuit Court of Pittsyl-
vania County, Virginia, at the Court House of said Court 1 
his certificates of exception to be signed by the Judge and 
made a _part of the record in this case. 
Also the undersigned will at the same time and place, re-
quest the Clerk of said Court to make up and deliver to Coun-
sel, a transc1ipt of the record in the above entitled cause, for 
the purpose of presenting the same, with a petition for an 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
F. W. TWY~IAN, 
By: R. PAUL SANFORD, 
I-Iis Attorneys. 
Service accepted this 27 day of April, 1936. 
;viRGINIA: 
DO.UGI.JAS S. ADKINS, 
Admx. of the Estate of Lloyd M. Adkins, 
Deceased. 
GEORGE E. BENDALL, 
By: JNO. W. CARTER, JR., 
H-er Attorneys. 
Pleas before the Judge of the Circuit Court for the County 
of Pittsylvania, at the Courthouse thereof on Tu-esday the 
31st day of March, 1936 . 
. Be it remembered ·that, heretofore, to-wit: 
_11;1 ~he Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court for the County 
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of Pittsylvania, at the Courthouse thereof on Saturday the 
22nd day of February, 1936. 
This day came Douglas S. Adkins, Administratrix of ~oyd 
M. Adkins, deceased, and filed her Notice o.f Motion against 
F. W. Twyman, whic)l Notice of Motion is in tliese words: 
Take notice th~t I shall at 9 :30 o'clock A. M. on 1\Iarch 16, 
1936, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, move the 
Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County, Virginia, for a judg-
ment against you in the ~urn of ten thousand ( $10;000.00) 
dollars. The said motion will be based upon the following 
state of facts: 
I am the duly qualified administratrix of Loyd M. Adkins, 
deceased. At an early hour on the morning of October 27, 
1935, the said Loyd M. Adkins was lawfully driving un auto-
mobile-truck along one of the public highways of Pittsylvania 
County, Virginia, to-wit: a certain highly known a::; the Dan-
ville to Mount Cross Road; the said Loyd M. Adkins was 
driving said automobile-truck at a lawful and reasonable rate 
of speed and in the course of said driving was exercising 
ordinary care in order to avoid injury to either himself or 
any other person lawfully and properly using said highway ; 
that on the same day, you also were driving an automobile 
on or along said highway while you, the said F. W. Twyman, 
was under the influence of intoxicating liquors; and you, the 
said F. W. Twyman, experiencing some difficulty in operating 
your said automobile, stopped said automobile and 
page 2 } parked the same at or near the middle of said 
highway and left said automobile so parked at ]east 
an hour without any lights burning thereon; -
You, the said F. W. Twyman, stopped and parked your ~aid 
automobile under the circumstances aforesaid at a poiut in 
said highway where, because of the location of a certain 
hill and knoll, it was impossible for a person exercising ol·di-
nary care in approaching the point where your said automo-
bile was left and parked, to see the same until so close t.o 
your said automobile that it was impossible to stop an ap-
proaching car being operated at a reasonable and lawful rate 
of speed and With ordinary care in time to avoid a collision 
therewith; and after you had so parked your automobile~ as 
aforesaid, the said Loyd M. Adkins approached the point· 
in the road where your said automobile was parked, in a 
lawful :Jllanner and at a lawful rate of speed and in tb~ exer-
cise of ordinary care; yet because of your unlawful, negligent, 
and reckless· conduct as aforesaid and without any fault upon 
his part, the said Loyd M. Adkins collided the autontobile-
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truck being q.riven by him with your automobile parked by 
you and as a result of said collision, the said automobile-
true~ driven by th~ said Loyd M. Adkins turned over causing 
and giving the said Loyd M. Adkins a numoor of seiious and 
fatal injuri~s from which the said Loyd M. Adkins then and 
there and shortly thereafterwards died as a direct and proxi-
mate result of your unlawful, negligent, and reckl~ss con-
duct as aforesaid and to the damag~ of this plaintiff to the 
extent of t~n thousand ($10,000.00) dollars. 
Given under my hand this 15th day of February, 1936. 
DOUGLAS S. ADIITNS, 
Administratrix of Loyd J\11. Adkins, 
Deceased. · 
By Counsel. 
GEORGE E. BENDALL, 
GARTER & WILLIAMS, p. q. 
0 
page 3 } The following is a copy of the Sheriff's return 
on the Notice of 1\tlotion : 
Executed in the County of Mecklenburg, Va., by delivering 
a true copy of the within notice to F. W. Twyman in per-
son. This the 21st day of February, 1936. 
W. E. WILLIAMS, D. S. 
For C. 0. MULLINS, 
Sheriff Mecklenburg County, Va. 
And at another day, to-wit: 
Virgi~a: 
At a Circuit Court continu~d and held for the Countv of 
Pittsylvania, at the Courthouse thereof on Tuesday, the i 7th 
day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hun-
dred and thirty-six. 
This day came the defendant by counsel and filed h1~ 
Grounds of Defense and Special Pleas in ~vriting. 
The Grounds of Defense of the defendant is in these words: 
For grounds of defense as to this action the defendant will 
rely. 
{1) Upon the contributory negligence of the plaintiff as set 
out in a special plea :filed. 
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(2) The defendant denies that he was guilty of any neg-
lig~nce. · 
(3) The defendant denies that he was guilty of any neg-
ligence that was the proximate or ·contributing cause of the 
collision or the death of the plaintiff's intestate as com-
plained of in the Notice of Motion. 
(4) Any and all defenses tha.t may be interposed under the 
general issue. · ~;: · 
BUSTARD· ~ SAN·FORD, 
F. W. TWYMAN, 
By Counsel. 
Attorneys for defendant. 
The Special Plea is in these words : 
The said defendant, by his attorney, comes and says that 
he is not guilty of the premises in this action laid to his 
charge in manner and form as the plaintiff hath complained. 
. And of this the said defendant puts himself upon 
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BUSTARD & SANFORD, 
Attorneys for defendant. 
The Special Plea is in these words: 
F. W. TWYMAN, 
By Counsel. 
The said defendant, without admitting, but expressly deny-
ing that he was guilty of any negligence which caused or con-
tributed to the death of the plaintiff's intestate, pursuant to 
the statute in such cases made and proVided, gives notice 
that if he was guilty of any negligence, he intends to rely upon 
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff in the following 
particulars : · 
(1) At the time and place complained of in your Notice of 
Motion, your intestate, Loyd M. Adkins, was operating a 
truck, the property of the Ca.rlbrook Dairy Ine., along the 
~ft. Cross Road at a high and excessive rate of speed, with-
out regard for the condition and narrowness of said road, 
said rate of speed being in excess of 45 miles per hour. 
(2) Your intestate, Loyd M. Adkins, while operating the 
truck of the Carlbrook Dairy Inc., as aforesaid, along the 
Mt. Cross Road, was not keeping a proper lookout, and care-
lessly and negligently ran the said truck into the back end 
40 . Supreme Court of Appeals of '7irginia. 
of ·my car, and by reason thereof was killed, when I had· 
parked my car out of the lanes of traffic, as far off said high-
way as possible, with all lights required by law burning, and 
was guilty of no negligent conduct. 
As a result of the foregoing, the collision of the truck 
and my car occurred, and the death of your intestate re-
sulted, all of which was the proximate result of your con-
tributory negligence. 
BUSTARD & SANFORD, 
F. W. TWYMAN, 
By Counsel. 
Attorneys for defendant. 
page 5 ~ And at another day, to-wit: 
Virginia: 
. At a Circuit Court continued and hel~ for the County 
9f Pittsylvania, at the Courthouse thereof on Saturday the, 
28th day of March, in the year of our I~ord one thousand 
nine hundred and thirty-six. 
This day came the plaintiff by her attorneys and the de-
fendant by his attorney, and the defendant pleaded not guilty 
to the trespass in the. notice filed, and thereupon came a 
jury to-wit: R. W. Fuller, T. A. Dawson, C. T. Patterson, 
Ben Williams, H. -T. Carter, E. J. Parrish and W. B. Cau-
thorn, who being formed according to la'v and sworn to the 
issue joined, and not having fully heard the evidence were 
adjourned until Monday morning at 9 :30 o'clock. 
page 6 ~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 1. 
The following evidence on behalf of the plaintiff and of the 
defendant respectively, as hereinafter denoted, is all of the 
evidence that was introduced at the trial of this cause. 
Teste: 
J. T. CLEMENT, Judge. 
May. 2", 1936. 
Filed with me May 2nd, 1936. · 
J. T. CLEM·ENT, .Judge .. 
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In the Ci!cuit Court of Pittsylvania County, Virginia. 
Lloyd M. Adkins' Administratrix, Plaintiff, 
v. 
F. W. Twyman, Defendant. 
Before Ron. J. T. Clement and a Jury. 
Chatham, Virginia, 
March 28-29, 1936. 
Appearances: John W. Carter, Jr., Esq., Danville, Va., 
and George E. Bendall, Esq., Danville, :Va., for the Plain-
tiff; R. Paul Sanford, Esq., Danville, Va., for the Defendant. 
page 3 ~ DOUGLAS S. ADKINS (Mrs. Lloyd M. Adkins), 
the plaintiff, called as a witness on her own be-
half, and being first duly sworn, testified a.s follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Bendall: 
Q. What is your name 7 
A. Douglas S. Adkins. 
Q. Where do you live, Mrs. Adkins? 
A. I live at Ingram at the Carlbrook Dairy. 
Q. Are you the wife of Lloyd M. Adkins? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How old are you, Mrs. Adkins 1 
A. Twenty-nine. 
Q. Twenty-nine. How old was Mr. Adkins at the time of 
his death? 
A. fie was twenty-nine--he would have· been thirty in Feb-
ruary. . 
Q. Do you have any children, Mrs. Adkins, by this mar-
riage? 
A. Three. 
Q. What is the name of the oldest one Y 
A. Julian. 
Q. How old is heY 
A. He is eight. 
Q. What is the name of the next one? 
A. Herman. 
Q. How old is he! 
A. Five. 
Q. And the next onef 
A. Carol. 
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Q. How old is Carol Y 
A. He is one. 
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the Administrahix of the estate of your husband. 
Lloyd M. Adkins~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you all lived there at the Carlbrook 
Dair.y, 1\tirs. Adkins? 
A. A year in November. 
Q. What were Mr. Adkins' duties there in connection with 
the dairy? 
A. Carrying milk to Danville, delivering milk in Danville 
and to the C. C. C. Camp. 
Q. Did he deliver that milk on a truck or wagon? 
A. Truck. 
Q. Do you know what make of truck he drove 7 
A. Ford. 
Q. And what was his salary or commission, or how did he 
work for the dairy, Mrs. Adkins? 
A. Well, his salary was $24-between $24 and $25 a week, 
and house and wood was furnished, and milk and butter and 
garden. 
Q. When did you last see Mr. Adkins, Mrs. Adkins, before 
you learned that he was killed? 
A. The morning he· was killed. 
Q. What time did you see him last Y 
A. A quarter to three. 
Q. A quarter to three that morning? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 'Vas he there· at the dairy? 
A. That was when he left the house, a.t a quarter to three. 
Q. When did he go to bed that night?· 
A. Eight. 
Q. Eight o !clock? 
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Q. What time did he get up Y 
A. A quarter to three. 
Q. At the time he left there, Mrs. Adkins, was . he weiJ 
rested or fatigued or worn out f . 
A. Yes, he was well rested. He came in from the dairy 
the evening before a little after three and rested and sat 
. around with the children until supper, and then went to bed. 
Q. Who is Ryland Shelton Y 
A. My brother-my youngest brother. · 
Q. Do you know whether Mr. Adkins had anybody on the 
truck? 
A. Ryland was with him, the only one. 
1-
l 
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Q. What were Ryland''s duties Y 
A. To help put off the milk. 
Q. When did you first learn, Mrs. Adkins, that your hus-· 
band was injured and killed in this accident f 
A. Eight o'clock. · 
Q. Eight o'clock the next morning? 
A. Yes, sir. .. 
Q. I understood you to say, Mrs. Adkins, that you had three 
childrenf · 
A. Yes, sir. ' 
Q. Just tell the court and jury what kind of father Mr. 
Adkins was with reference to his children and you Y 
Mr. Sanford: Does the court think that is proper-as to 
the question of how good he was to his family Y 
The Court: The element of ~ola~ and comfort, yes. 
page 6 r A. He was just as good as could be in every way 
to me and to the children, and he couldn't ·have 
been a better provider than what he was. . 
Q. Mrs. Adkins, what interest, if any, did Mr. Adkins show 
in the welfare of the children, and .in their companyf 
A. Oh, just all the time he had-when he wasn't at work, 
he was there with the children all the time. He spent his · 
leisure hours at home all the time with me and the children. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By 'Nir. Sanford: 
Q. Mrs. Adkins, is Ryland Shelton your brother, and does 
he live there with you Y 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did he get up that morning and leave with your hus-
bandf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you say that was about 2 :45! 
A. A quarter to three, yes, sir. 
Q. Is that the customary time for leaving? 
A. Yes, sir, they wa'n't supposed to leave the dairy no 
later than three o'clock no morning, but they didn't ever 
have to be in any hurry on Sunday morning because the stores 
were all closed, and there was no hurry at all. 
Q. They were delivering milk at the C. Q. d. Campf . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. There was no difference in the time they had to be there 
on Sunday morning and any other morning, was there 1 · 
A. I don't think so. · 
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Q. What time did he get in the night before 7 
A. He got in the dairy about 2 o'clock, and he was at the 
house between three and four. He always stayed around 
the dairy a little while and then came to the house 
page 7 ~ straight, and of course he had to check up. 
Q. Did he go back to the dairy after four o'clock Y 
A. No, he wasn't supposed to. 
Q.· I believe this dairy is located at Ingram, in Halifax 
County ; how far is that from Danville? 
A. Around twenty-four miles, I think; now I am not for 
sure-I don't know. 
RYLAND SHELTON, 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and being first 
duly sworn, testified as . follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Bendall: 
Q. Your name is Ryland Shelton! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How old are you, Ryland Y 
A. Sixteen. 
Q. Sixteen? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you work or go to school Y 
A. I work. 
Q. Where do you work Y 
A. I work at the Carlbrook Dairy. 
Q. What are your duties? 
A. I have been working on the truck, but I am not on the 
truck now. 
Q. Mrs. Adkins is your sister Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Ryland, on the morning of October 27, 1935, were you 
working for the dairy at that time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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,' Mr. Adkins, with a load of milk to be delivered to 
the C. C. C. CampY 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. What time did you leave the dairy f 
A. About twenty minutes to three. 
Q. Was Mr. Adkins apparently awake and knowing what 
he was doing, or was he worn ·out and tired 1 
· A. Yes, sir-· · 
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Mr. Sanford: Objected to as leading. 
The Court: It is leading, but he has a right to show this 
man's condition. 
Q. What was his condition, Ryland, at the time you all 
left there with this load of milk? 
A. What do you mean by ''condition'' f 
Q. With reference to what I just asked-as to his awake-
ness or sleepiness. · . 
A. Yes, sir, he was awake. 
Q. What time was it you said you left the dairy? 
A. About twenty minutes to three. 
Q. You were on the truck with himl 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where did you go when you left the dairy 7 
A. Came into Danville. 
Q. What did you come into Danville for? 
A. To get on the road to go to the C. C. C. Camp. 
Q. Did you stop anywhere 7 
A. At the Busy Bee. 
Q. What for' 
A. To get a sandwich. 
Q. Did Mr. Adkins get a sandwich? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 9 ~ Q. Did you get a sandwich Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who was driving the truck! 
A. 1\{r. Adkins. 
Q. Did you drive at allY 
A. No. 
Q. When you left the Busy Bee, where did you gof 
A. Started to the C. C. C. Camp. 
Q. What was loaded on the truck Y 
A. I don't know just exactly what all was on there. 
Q. Milk? 
A. Yes, sir. . . 
Q. At the time of this accident, were you awake or asleep? 
A. I was asleep. 
Q. Do you know about where you went to sleep? 
A. I dropped off to sleep when we turned into the Mt. Cross 
Road. 
Q. From the Martinsville Road f. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How was· Mr. Adkins operating the truck Y 
A. Twenty-five or thirty miles an hour. 
Q. What kind of truck was it? 
A. '35 V-8. 
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Q. A '35 Ford Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the first you knew of . this accident? 
A. The first thing I remember when I woke up, Twyman 
had a match in his hand, and the gas tank was. 
page 10 ~ busted and gas was pouring everywhere, and I told 
him to blow it out, and I got out-one of my feet 
was through the window; and we tried to get the truck off 
of him and we couldn't, so we went up to Jamerson's to 
get some of the boys to help us, and I telephoned and came 
on back, and we got it off of him-
Q. When you say "we", who do you mean~ 
A. Twyman and I. 
Q. Did he go up there with you to Jamerson's Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know Mr. Twyman 7 
A. I didn't know him before the accident. He wanted to 
go find a telephone, and we went up there and called up-
Q. Do you see Mr. Twyman in the court· roomY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where is heY 
A. Right there. (Indicating the defendant.) 
Q. This is }4:r. Twyman here? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When was Mr. Twyman at the truck there with a lighted 
match and you told him to blow it out-was that after or 
before you went up to Mr. Jamerson's house? 
A. That was before we went up there; that is the first thing 
I remember. 
Q. Were you knocked unconscious? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you receive any injury? 
A. Got a cut on my leg. 
Q. Where were you 7 
page 11 ~ A. Sitting beside Mr .. Adkins. 
Q. Were you seated or lying down? 
A. I was sitting up. 
The Court: Do you remember at what point you went to 
~eep? . 
Witness: The last time I remember was when we started 
up in the Mt. Cross Road, starting off the Martinsville High-
way. 
Q. Ryland, after this accident occurred, who did you see 
besides Mr. Twyman Y 
A. I saw the boys with him. · 
J 
I . 
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Q. How many did you see? 
A. I saw three of them. . 
Q. Where were they? 
. A. Two of the boys came out of the car, and one w.as in-
side. 
Q. One was inside, and two came out Y 
A. Yes, sir. · · 
Q. Where was the automobile With reference to the road 
after the truck had struck it Y ' 
A. It was sitting on the left-hand side, beside the rails. 
Q. "Where was the truck Y 
A. It was turned around and turned over, right in the mid-
dle of the road. · 
Q. What do you mean-over on its top? 
A. No, it was on its side. 
Q. On which side was the truckY 
A. On its left-hand side. 
Q. Where was Mr. Adkins' body Y 
A. On the left-hand side, next to the door. 
Q. When you all were trying to get the truck off him, ·was 
he alive then, or dead? . 
page 12 ~ A. He was dead. . 
man then! 
Q. Did you have any conversation with Mr. Twy-
A. No, except when we were trying to push the truck off 
of him. I could smell whiskey pretty strong. 
Q. What was Mr. Twyman's condition at that time, with 
reference to sobriety or drunkenness Y 
A. I taken him.to be drunk. He couldri't do much towards 
puRhing the truck off of·. him. 
Q. I understood you to say that he first came there with 
a. lighted match Y 
A. Yes, sir, and I told him to blow it out, because I knew 
the ga~ tank-
l\rJ r. Sanford: Is there any good in the repetition of that Y 
He has said that three times. 
Q. After you got up to Mr. Jamerson's house, what did you 
do, Ryland? 
A. Twyman said he was going to go up and 'phone) and 
I said I would get some of the boys :from the dairy down there, 
and when I got back he was still there, standing where I 
left him, and I had to go up there and do the 'phoning, and 
I called the ambulance and .called up Mr. Farmer. . . 
Q. Where did you go when you left him Y 
A. I went down to the dairy, where the boys were. working. 
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Q. Who did you see down there? 
A. Clayton Shepherd and the Thompson boy. 
Q. Do you know whether Mr. Twyman called anybody or 
notY 
A. No, he was still standing where I left him. 
Q. Where did you leave him Y 
A. When I left him, he said he was going· up to the house 
and 'phone. I left him, about as far as from here across the 
street, and I said I was going to get some of the boys, and 
he was still standing where I left him. 
page 13 ~ - Q. How long were you out of his sight? 
· A. Ten minutes. ' 
Q. And he was stili standing there where you left him? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you do then Y 
A. I went and called the ambulance and Mr. Farmer. 
Q. Where did you go to 'phoneY 
A. Mr. Jamerson's. 
Q. Did you see anybody there at Mr. Jamerson's? 
A. Yes, sir. I woke Mr. Jamerson up so I could get in. 
Q. ·when you first saw this automobile, Ryland, did you 
notice any lights burning? 
A. No, sir, weren't any lights burning on it, because I 
went up there and tried to turn them on. 
Q. Was· it dark 1 
A. Yes, it was dark, and kinda drizzling rain and fog. 
Q. Did you notice any marks there on the road Y 
A. No, .sir, I couldn't see them because it was dark. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Sanford: 
Q. Ryland, Lloyd Adkins is your brother-in-law; is that 
right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were employed as a helper on this milk truck 
with him? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you work with him Saturday afternoon Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you stayed there, I believe, at the home with him¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 14 ~ Q. You say you left there about a quarter of 
three! 
A. About twenty minutes of three. 
Q. About twenty minutes of three? 
A. Yes, sir. 
F. W. Twyman v. DouglasS. Adkins, Adm'x. 49 
Q. You testified concerning this accident last week, didn't 
youY 
A. I think so, yes, sir. 
Q. At that time didn't you say you left there at one o'clock? 
A. I don't believe I did; I am not for sure. · 
Q. You don't believe you said you left there at one o'clock¥ 
A. I don't believe so. 
Q. You are not sure of that? 
A. ~o, sir. . 
Q. You are not sure you didn't say one o'clock? 
A. No, I am not sure. 
Q. What time did you get to Danville! 
A. I don't know exactly what time we got there. I know 
we left there at twenty minutes of three, ready to start. 
Q. 'You don't know what time you got to Danvillei 
A. ~o, sir. · 
Q. Do you know what time you left Danville Y 
A. No, I don't exactly know what time it was. 
Q. When did you go to sleepY 
A. When we started up the 'WIt. Cross Road. 
Q. What time did you go to bed that night? 
A. I went to bed about 8 :30-something like that. 
Q. About the same time as your brother-in-law¥ 
A. ~o, he always went early, because he is the 
page 15 } one that drives the truck. He went to bed about 
seven. 
Q. He went to bed about seven o'clock, and you went to 
bed around 8 :30? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. After this accident occurred, I believe you said Mr. Twy:. 
man came around the truck and struck a match? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Didn't he ask you if anybody else was in there T 
A. I told him-
Q. He struck a match to see if anybody else was in there, 
didn't he? 
A. I don't know. He struck a match, and I told him to blow_ 
it out. 
Q. At the same time, he was looking in the truck to see 
if anybody else was in there, wasn't he 7 
A. ~o, sir. · 
Q. Didn't you testify to that? 
A. No, sir, I said-
Q. What was his position when he struck this match f -. 
A. Looked like he was halfway drunk to me. 
Q. Ryland, when did you decide that f-you have testified 
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three times, and this is the first time you have said anything 
about that, isn't it Y 
A~ No, sir. 
Q. Did you testify to that at Rchoolfield f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Last week you testified that here Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are fully as sure of that as anything else you have 
testified here today Y · 
page 16 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You say you and Mr. Twyman went up to 
the Oarlbrook Dairy barn'? 
A. No, Jamerson's. 
Q. I mean Jamerson's Dairy BarnY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who did you see there T 
A. Well, I saw Clayton Shepherd and the Thompson boy. 
He started to the house first, and I said I would go down 
and get some of the boys, and when I got back; he was stilJ 
standing there. 
Q. Where did you leave him T 
A. About 100 feet from the fellow's house where we were 
going to call up. 
· Q. That is the house there in the yard near Mr. Jamer-
son's! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You knew Thompson and Shepherd f 
A. Yes, .sir. 
Q. In fact, Shepherd used to work for Carlbrook Dairy, 
didn't heY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you all walk back to the scene of the accident to-
gether? 
A. No, sir, I had to stay there and call. I think Shepherd 
and Thompson and Twyman walked back together. 
Q. Mr. Jamerson's house is some three or four hundred 
yards from the scene of the accident, isn't itY 
A. Something like that. I don't know exactly how far it is. 
Q. What time did you get in from your work Saturday 
afternoon? 
A. I guess about 2 :30-something like that. 
Q. You said six o'clock last week, didn't yonY . 
A. Not that I know of. I might have, but I don't think I 
did. 
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Q. You didn't say six o'clock last weekf 
A. I am not for sure. 
Q. You are not positive you didn't! 
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A. I am not for sure. 
Q. Since you testified that you got in at six o'clock, .you 
have been told to change that hour T · 
A. No, sir. .· · 
Q. No one has told you to change it from six to 2 :30? 
A. No, sir. . · · . 
Q. NooneY · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Yon haven't discussed that phase of it with your brother 7 
A. No, sir. · 
Q. How long did you stay at the scene of the accident af~r 
it was all overT · 
A. I stayed there until about 6 :30 or 7 o'clock, I guess. 
Q. That morningY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. MeaD:~hile Mr. Twyman had gone into Danville on the 
ambulance, hadn't he f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And had come back f 
A. Yes, sir. · 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION .. 
By Mr. Bendall : 
Q .. Were you all in any hurry to get to this C. C. C. CampY 
A. No, sir, because we didn't have to work much on Sun-
day morning, and we just were:n 't in any hurry. · 
page 18 } G. E. SCARCE, 
called as a witness on behalf of the· plaintiff, and 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : . 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Carter : 
·Q. What is your name, sir7 
A. G. E. Scarce. 
Q. Where do you live, Mr. Scarce f 
A. On North Main Street in Danville. 
Q. Were you traveling on what is known as the Mt. Cross 
Road on the night of the accident in which Mr. Adkins'was 
killed Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In which direction was your car going, Mr. Scarc~f 
A. Going east, towards Danville. 
Q. You were going towards Danville f 
A. Yes, sir. 
52 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Q. Do you know where Mr. Jamerson's Dairy is located Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Somewhere near Mr. Jamerson's Dairy, did you observe 
any car in the road there T · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you recall what sort of car it was Y 
A. Yes, sir, it was a Dodge Sedan. 
Q. A Dodge Sedan 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As near as you can get at it, I wish you would tell the 
jury where it was in the Mt. Cross Road with reference to 
Mr. Jamerson's house. 
-A. Well,. it was down this side of Jamerson's Dairy, from 
the road where you turn to go to his house, 150 feet, maybe, or 
I reckon it is 100 yards. 
page 19 ~ Q. When you say ·_,'this side of Jamerson's 
Dairy'', you mean between Jamerson's Dairy and 
Chatham, or between Jamerson's Dairy and Danville? 
A. Between Jamerson's and Danville. 
Q. In other words, you are speaking as if you were at 
homeY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is there anything at the side of the road where you 
saw the car? 
A. Yes, sir, a little railing-a field and a little railing. 
Q. What is the physical contour along there-is it level Y 
A. Well, it is in a little dip. There are two or three little 
dips come over like that. 
Q. Is it in a dip in the direction yon were going? 
A. It is a ,kinda 'long slope the way I was g-oing, but there 
is a short dip coming the other way. 
Q. In the dire~tion you were going there is a long slope, 
but coming from·Danville there is a short dip at that pointY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 1\{r. Scarce, will you please .state whether or not there 
were any lights on the car parked in the road' 
A. Well, when I came over the knoll, my lights reflected 
on his car, and I thought the lights were on, but when I came 
on. down, I seen they weren't. 
Q. The first impression, when your lights struck it, was that 
the lights were on, but as you came nearer to it, you saw 
that they weren't 7 
A. I thought at first it was coming on up the road, going 
~~ - . 
Q. Was the car facing youY 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. VVhere vvas the car in reference to the center of the 
road? 
A. It was almost in the center of the road. 
Q. What did you do, so far as your car was 
page 20 ~ concerned, as soon as you saw it 7 
A. I stopped just as quick as I could. 
Q. VVhat brakes did you apply Y 
A. I put on my foot brakes. I don't know whether I put on 
the emergency or not, but the boys said I did. 
Q. How close did you come to striking it? 
A. About a yard and a half. 
Q. VV ere you running fast t 
A. I was running about forty-five. 
Q. And you managed to clear it by a yard and a half Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you do? . 
A. I hacked up about two yards and throwed the hind end 
to the railing·s, and then went on by. 
Q. How did you go by-on your right or the leftY 
A. My right. 
Q. How much room did you have between the guard rails 
and your carY _. . 
A. I would say I had half a yard between the rails and the 
car sitting in the road. 
Q. Half a yard between the rails and your car? 
A. That 1nuch space between the rails and the car. 
Q. Between the guard rails and the right-hand side of your 
car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How much space was there between the left-hand side 
of your car and the car sitting in the road? 
A. Hardly any at ali-I had half a yard between. 
Q. VVas anybody in the carY 
A .. Yes, sir, Mr. George Davis-
page 21 ~ Q. I mean the car parked in the ro~d. 
A. Yes, sir, I saw two fellows in the front seat. 
Q. Did you see anybody in the back seat1 
A. I didn't notice. 
Q. Did you or anybody in your car say anything? · 
A. Yes, sir, one of the fell<;>ws hollered and said, ''Get that 
damned thing out of the road I'' 
Objec.tion by counsel for defendant. 
Overruled. 
Exception. 
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Q. Do you recall who it was said that Y 
A. J. E. Stratton. 
Q. Who did he say; it toY 
A. He said it to the fellows in the car. 
Q. He hollered it out of the window to the people in the 
parked carY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was there any answer from that parked carY 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Mr. Scarce, are you quite positive that at the time you 
passed, the lights were not on Y 
A.· No, there weren't any lights on. 
Q. After you passed this car, how far did you go-
A. (interrupting) I measured it. It was eight-tenths and 
ah~~ · 
Q. You continued on approximately eight and a half tenths 
of a mile toward Danville, and who did you meet Y 
A. I met the Carlbrook Dairy truck. · 
Q. Did you have any difficulty passing that 
page 22 ~ truck? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Would you give the jury some idea of what you think 
the speed of fhe truck was at that time? 
A. I would say it was running somewhere between thirty-
five and forty. 
Q. Were his lights on Y 
A. Yes, he turned his lights on dimmer, and I turned mine 
on dimmer. 
Q. When you first saw the truck, the lights were on full, 
and, then w4oever was driving the truck, turned the lights 
to dim? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you lmow that that was the Carlbrook Dairy truck? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you know who was driving it? 
.A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you know how many people were on it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You went on homeY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When did you hear of this accident Y 
A. Sunday about twelve o'clock. 
Q. Did you go back out there Y 
A. I went out to my father-in-law's, and saw the glass and 
everything in the road. 
Q. Where does your father-in-law live Y 
A. On the Mt. Cross Road. 
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Q. Did you have to pass the ·point where you had . seen 
this car the night before Y 
A. Yes. · 
page 23 ~ Q. When you got out there, what did you see 
in the road? 
A. Glass and milk in the road-I reckon it was milk. 
Q. When you got there, was the car there Y 
A. No, the car and truck were both gone. 
Q. The truck and the car had both been removed Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you got to where the glass and milk were spilled, 
where was that with reference to where you had aeen this 
parked car the night before T 
A. I reckon it was as far as from here to the table up the 
road. 
Q. From where you had seen this Dodge Sedan parked the 
night before f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who was in the car with you, Mr. Scarce? 
A. Mr. Davis and Mr. Stratton and Mr. Bowles and the 
little Bowles boy. 
Q. What sort of gear were you in when you passed by the 
car in the road Y 
A. Low gear. 
Q. How fast did you go by the carY 
A. I wouldn't say, but I went by just as slow as I could 
drive. 
Q. Mr. Scarce, have you, at the request of counsel for the 
plaintiff in this case, gone back to that point at night since 
that ~ime and made any experiments Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you locate in the road the place where you. saw 
the Dodge Sedan the night of the accident Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you take occasion to approach that point from the 
direction of Danville in an automobile! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was there anything put at the place where 
page 24 ~ this Dodge Sedan was on the night you saw it Y 
A. How was that! 
Q. At the time you went back there, was anything put in 
the road where you saw Twyman's car that night? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was that! 
A. My car. · · 
Q. In approaching the point at which that car was,! .from 
the direction of Danville, which I understand is the direction 
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the truck was coming, how close did you get to the point 
where the car was parked before . you could see the car at 
all? 
A. Well, when you first run over the knoll up there, it is 
about 120 steps, I think it is-I think we stepped it and it was 
120 steps from the Imoll, and then there is another little knoll 
to where my car was parked, and that was 27 steps. 
Q. Before you can see the car down there T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What becomes of your lights~ 
A. When you go over the top of the hill, there is another 
little knoll before your lights· go down on it. 
Q. And that is 27 steps? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And did you notice the speed of the car when you 
made that experiment¥ 
A. Yes, sir, we were driving 38 miles an hour, and just 
at the time we saw the car, we slapped on the brakes and 
then we skidded 15 feet beyond where I saw the car that 
night. 
page 2p ~ Q. Going at 38 miles an hour, you slapped on 
the brakes as soon as you could see the car, and 
skidded 15 feet beyond the point ·where you saw the Dodge 
Sedan that night Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was that the first point from which you could see the 
carY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Of course that night you were looking for it f 
A. Yes, sir, I didn't want to hit it. 
The Court: Mr. Scarce, a little while ago I understood 
you to testify that when you passed that car that night in 
the road, there was only about half a foot between the right-
hand side of ·the car and the guard rail. Mr. Carter then 
asked you the distance between your car and the other car-
he meant the left side. I want to understand what distance 
you estimate between the left-hand side of your car and the 
car in the road. 
Witness : I would say there was half a foot clearance in 
all. ~ 
The Court: You mean on both sides¥ 
Witness : Yes, sir. 
The Court: What distance would you say there was he-
tween the lcft-l1and side of your car, which was next to the 
car in the middle of the road, and the left-hand side of that 
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car, the way it was headed; in order to enable you to pass, did 
you scrapet it? 
Witness : No, sir, I 'vould say there was half a foot in all. 
I reckon I was away from him about three inches. 
Q. What sort of car were you driving? 
A. '30 Model Ford Sedan. 
Q. Do you know whether that was narrower or wider than 
the Carl brook Truck! · 
A. About the same. 
page 26 ~ The Court: I believe you testified a little while 
ago that at the top of the first knoll from this 
car that was in the road was about 120 steps? 
Witness: Yes, sir. 
The Court : I suppose, then, you mean you come down a 
grade from that knoll and get into another dipY 
Witness: Yes, sir, another little slope. 
The Court: And then you go up another little slope, do 
you1 
Witness: No, sir, when you come. down that, your lights 
go right down on the car then. 
The Court: Well, from the top of the first knoll, which 
you say is 120 steps away, did your car reflect the lights so 
you could see the parked car at that distance? . 
Witness: No, sir, when we got so we could see the car, 1t 
was down to 37 steps. 
The Court: That was the first point at which your lights 
threw in front sufficiently to enable you to see the parked car? 
Witness: Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAJ\IIINATION. 
By Mr. Sanford: 
Q. Mr. Scarce, this second dip that you spoke of, that is 
going- in the. same direction that Twyman's car was headed, 
is a very slight rise in the road, is it not? 
A. Yes, sir, just a little slight ris:e, but your lights go up. 
Q. You come down a gradual slope, and then there is just 
a very slight rise, and then into the place where the car 
w·as sitting? · i 
A. Yes, sir, just a rise that makes your lights go up.· _ 
Q. Isn't it true that when you come over the first knoll your 
lights strike where this car was, and then you lose· 
page 27 } it as you go on down the hill, and then pick it up 
again? _ 
A. No, sir. · · 
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Q. You were still driving the '30 Mode1 Ford the night you 
made this experiment Y 
A. No, sir, a V-8. 
Q. And you put the '30 ~Iodel down there for experimental 
purposes? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You say on the night you saw this car parked there, 
you were going some 45 miles an hour? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. And you saw the car and slowed down and went on by? 
A. I stopped. There wasn't any slow-down to it. I stopped. 
Q. You backed up, I believe you said? 
A. Yes, sir .. 
Q. You didn't turn around? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Mr. Scarce, when you saw this car in the position it 
was, and one of the men hollered at them, why didn't you 
get out and-
A. I didn't know nothing about that; I didn't have any-
thing to do with it. 
Q. Why didn't you call to them! 
A. I didn't do it; it wasn't any of my business. 
Q. Where had you been Y 
A. Been 'possum hunting. 
Q. Wbat time in the morning was it Y 
A. It was something like a quarter past four-along about 
that. 
Q. You had 'possum hunted right late, hadn't you, for Sun-
day morning? 
page 28 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You work on Saturday, and then on Sunday 
morning go 'possum hunting 1 
A. I don't work on Saturday. 
Q. When did you go out to Mt. Crossf 
A. I went out there about seven that night. 
Q. And 'possum hunted until about three Y 
A. Until about four. 
Q. Were you drinkingf 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Yo:u testified about this accident at Schoolfield, did you 
not, Mr. ScarceT 
A.· Yes, sir. 
Q. .At that time did you make any mention of having stopped 
and backed up your automobile! 
A. Yes, sir, I think so. 
Q. You are sure of thatf 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Of both things-that you stopped and backed up both? 
A.. Yes, sir. · 
Q. You are sure you said that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. You testified last week; at that time didn't yon say that 
you didn't testify that you backed npT 
A. No, sir, I didn't say that. . 
Q. What did you say? 
A. I said I did back up. 
Q. You didn't testify that you didn't say you baCked up Y 
A. I didn't say that I didn't back up. 
Q. You said you did back up 7 
page 29 ~ A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. What I am a·sking you is, if you didn't state 
at that time that when you ·testified about this accident at 
Schoolfield that yon didn't make any statement about having 
backed up7 · 
A. Yes, sir, I guess I did. I ought to. 
Q. I believe you say it was at the request of the plaintiff 
in this case that you went back out there and made these 
measurements, and also made this test? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Where dq you live, ~r. S~arceT 
A. I live in Danville. · 
Q. What part of Danville? 
A. North Main Street, right at the end of the car line. 
Q. Right at the end of th~ car line? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Along that Mt. Cros~ Road there are a succession of 
places similar to this one where . this car was parked 7 
A. Yes, sir, two or three places. 
Q. That are very similar! . 
A. Yes, sir, you can't hardly tell one from the other. 
Q. You pasged along there something after four in the morn-
ing? · 
A.· Yes, sir. 
Q. It was darkT 
A. Yes, sir, plenty dark. 
Q. And you went on and passed this Carlbrook truck about 
eight-tenths of a mile further on Y 
A. Yes, sir, eight-tenths and a half. 
page 30} Q. Do you ma~e a habit of recalling when yon 
· pass an automobile T · 
A .. No, I don't reckon I do. 
Q. Do yon make a habit of recalling which cars dim their 
lights? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. If they passed you, you would recall whether or not 
they dimmed their lights f 
A. Yes, sir, if a man don't dim his lights, I put it back on 
and throw it to him . 
. Q. If you passed five cars, would you recall which ones 
dimmed their lights and which didn't Y 
A. I don't reckon I would. 
Q. And would you recall the exact point where you passed 
a carY 
A. I recall where I passed this Carlhrook Dairy truck. 
Q. And that was eight-tenths of a mile from where you 
passed this other car f 
A. Eight-tenths and a half. 
Q. H·ow far would you say you could see in the road that 
r~ight-I don't mean where the lights were shining, but off to 
the rig-ht~ 
A. Well, it was a bad night for seeing-looked like the air 
was damp; you couldn't see far. · 
Q. But proceeding at 45 miles an hour, you saw this car 
and passed this car all right. 
A. I stopped and backed up and went on my way. 
Q. But you did go on by and miss it on both sides Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you passed close to the guard rail, how did you 
determine that you were only six inches from it? 
page 31 } A. I just had room to get by. I know I can drive, 
and it was all I could do to get by. 
Q. Sitting in the driver's seat can you tell the exact num-
ber of inches f 
A. It might l;tave been less than that. 
Q. You didn't get up out of your seat; you didn't reach 
over-a man was sitting beside you Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was he asleep Y 
A.' No, sir. 
Q. Was anybody in the car asleep? 
A. J had two young· boys; I don't know whether they were 
asleep or not. 
Q.· So far as you know, they might have been asleepf 
A. I don't know. I know one of the m~n wa 'n 't. 
RE-DffiECT EXA~fiNATION. 
By Mr. Carter: 
Q. Mr. Scarce, Mr. Sanford asked you about making thes<:-
tests at the request of counsel for the plaintiff; was there any 
special reason for going because we asked you~ 
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A. Going where? 
Q. Out to make this test-would you have gone for Mr. 
Sanford if he had asked you? 
A. Yes, I would have went for anybody. 
Q. Mr. Sanford said you had no trouble stopping; from 
which direction could you see this car in the road furthest-
coming from Danville or g-oing to Danville T 
A. Going to Danville. 
Q. And that is the direction you were going? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 32 ~ Q. I forgot to ask you, did you undertake to step 
the width of this road at this point-the hard sur-
facing? 
A. We didn't step it; we measured it. It measured 14 
feet. 
Q. Mr. Scarce, have you observed the road with reference 
to the territory off the road; would it have been practical to 
have pushed the car off the hard surface? 
A. Yes, sir, right back of it, towards Danville, there is a 
little drain there, and one man could have put it in neutral 
and shoved it right back down there. We put ours in there. 
Q. How far did you have to shove it to do that? 
A. As far as from here to this man. 
The Court: That doe.sn 't tell anything at all for the rec-
ord. Say how many feet. 
Witness: About 12 feet. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Sanford: 
· Q. If he had put the car in there, he couldn't have got it 
out? 
A. No, we put ours in there and got it out easy. 
Q. You went all the way back to the guard rail! 
A. No, we-
Q. The shoulders are three or. four feet wide, aren't they? 
A. About the width of that table. 
Q. You are sure of that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
~- ,Just as sure of that as of everything else you have 
testified? 
A. Yes, sir. 
The Court: I believe you testified that the first point at 
which this parked car could be seen by a car com-
page 33 ~ ing from Danville was when they came down thP 
grade from the top of the knoll into a little dip, 
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and then there was a little rise, which you said just now was 
37 steps! 
Witness: Yes, sir. 
The Court: In this demonstration you made at night, that 
point, 37 steps, from which you saw the car, was wher~ yon 
made application of the brakes? 
Witness : Yes, sir. 
The Court : And how far from this place did you say you 
stopped? · 
Witness: It skidded 15 or 20 feet above where the Dodge 
car was parked that night, and we weren't going but 38 miles. 
The Court: Did you make an application of the brakes 
immediately? 
Witness: Yes, sir, and skidded 38 feet. We didn't meas-
ure it, but-
The Court: You mean you applied the emergency-
Witness: No, the foot brakes. 
The Court: Did it lock the wheels 7 
Witness: It locked the rear wheels; I don't know whether 
it locked the front ones or not. 
Q. When you made this test, you said you could see it--
ll. Yes, sir. · 
Q. He was driving the carY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You said, "I can see it", and then he put on the bralres 1 
A. No, he could see it as good as I could. 
Q. And you say you skidded all the way up there, 37 steps? 
ll. I don't think so. His brakes were on-I don't 
page · 34 ~ think we skidded all the way, but he slapped his 
. brakes on and we skidded part of the way. 
Q. When did you go there for that purpose 1 . 
A. Saturday before last. 
Q. You went there for the purpose of proving that you. 
couldn't see that automobile? 
A. No, it was on Sunday night. 
Q. I say you went there for the purpose of proving that 
you couldn't see that automobile, didn't you 7 
A. For the purpose of proving you could see it. 
Q. ron went there for the purpose of proving you could 
see itT 
A. To see if we could see it or couldn't see it-which way 
it :was. 
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RE-RE-DIREOT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Carter: 
.. Q. Do I understand that you went there to find out the 
facts? 
A. Yes, sir, that is what we went for. 
JAMES BOWLES, 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Bendall: 
Q. Your name is James Bowles Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now James, look at these gentlemen and talk. Where 
do vou live? 
A. 1423 North Main. 
Q. In Danville? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How old are you? 
A. Fourteen. 
Q. Were you riding in Mr. Scarce's automobila 
page 35 } on the night, or rather morning, of October 27, on 
the Danville-Mt. Cross Road? 
.A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Where had you all been? 
A. We had been 'possum hunting. 
Q. Been 'possum hunting? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you recall, James, after you got on the Mt. ·Cross 
Road, coming towards Danville, meeting an automobile any-
'vhere on the road, or standing still? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Turn to these gentlemen and tell in what condition tbe 
automobile was-were the lights on? 
A. We was coming on down the road, and just as soon as 
we got over this little knoll, we seen the car, but not good 
enough to tell whether he had his lights oil or not. We slowed 
up and got about a yard from the car and the lights. weren't 
on, and we had to back up to pass ; the car standing still was 
in the middle of the road, if not more. 
Q. Who was driving the car you were in 7 
A. Mr. Scarce. 
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Q. What other people were in the car you were in besides 
Mr. Scarce 1 . 
A. Mr. Davis, Mr. Stratton, D. J. Osborne, and I. 
Q. Where were you in the car, James T 
A. I was in the back seat on the left. 
Q. In the back seat on the left¥ 
A. Yes, sir.· 
Q. Who was on the seat with you? 
A. It was D. J. Osborne and l\{r. Stratton. 
Q. D. J. Osborne and Mr. Stratton Y 
page· 36 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know, James, how much space there 
was on either side of 1\ir. Scarce's car when he passed the 
car standing in the road? 
A. You mean how much space was left after the car was 
parked? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I don't know exactly, but I guess about a yard and a 
half or two yards. 
Q. How much? 
A. Well, I would say about a yard. 
Q. \Vhen you passed this car parked in the road, how much 
space was there between Mr. Scarce's automobile and this 
automobile 1 
Mr. Sanford: Now the witness has testified to that, and he 
is going over it again-
Mr. Bendall: I just wanted to straighten him out-
The Court: I am not quite so sure the 'vitness understood, 
from the shape of his answer, but you can go ahead. 
Q. How fHst was Mr. Scarce's automobile going when it 
passed by this automobile? 
A. I don't know exactly, but when it passed the car, I gues~ 
it was going 10 or 15 miles an hour. 
Q. When it passed the parked automobile? 
A. After we had backed up, about 10 or 15. 
Q. Before or after you passed this carT 
A. When we had stopped and backed to go around. 
Q. How ciose to this automobile were you when you 
stopped¥ 
A. About a yard. 
Q. I understood you to say you backed up f 
A. Yes, sir, backed up. 
page 37 ~ Q. And passed the car 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What gear was Mr. Scarce in when he passed¥ 
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A. I don't know exactly. I was in the back seat. 
Q . .And you were about a yard from it when he backed Uil? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How much space was there behyeen Mr. Scarce's car and 
this other car' 
A. About a foot or two. 
Q. How muchY 
A. About two feet. , 
Q. How much space was there on the other side? 
A. I don't know exactly. 
Q. Did you see anyone i·n this automobile that was parked 
there? 
A. Yes, a man under the steering wheel and one beside 
l1im, and I think there 'vas two on the back seat. 
Q. You saw four in allY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did any of them say anything? 
A. The man under the st€ering wheel kinda raised his head 
up and looked at the car and laid his head back on the seat. 
CROSS EXA:NIINATION. 
By Mr. Sanford: 
Q. 'Vhere had you been that nig·ht 1 
A. 'Possum hunting. 
Q. vVere you with Mr. Scarce? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you with him all the time? 
page 38 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is he a relative of yours? 
A. No. 
Q. Who was the other boy with you? 
A. D. J. Osborne. 
Q. D. J. Osborne~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About what time in the morning was that? 
A. Right around four o'clock. 
Q. Do you recall passing any other car on the highway 
· at any otl1er timel 
A. 1Ve saw the Carlbrook Dairy truck going on to"rards 
the C. C. C. Camp. 
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L. vV. COLE, 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By ~1r. Carter: 
Q. Your -name is L. W. Cole¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And I believe you are chief of police at Schoolfield 7 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Chief, did you have occasion to go up on the Mt. Cros~ 
Road on the morning on which ~ir. Adkins was killed? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. vVhereabouts did you go to? 
A. In the hollow just belo'v Mr. Jamerson's house. 
Q. How far would you say that hollow is from the entrance 
to .Jamerson's home 7 
A. I declare, l\ir. Carter, I couldn't tell you. 
page 39 ~ Q. It is a short distance f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In plain sight? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, Chief, what condition did you find when you got 
there-just describe it; I will ask you first, what time did you 
get there? 
A. Some,vheres around 5 :30 ; I don't know exactly. 
Q. Just tell what condition you found there. 
A. '\Vhcn I got there the truck was laying in the road on 
its left side, the wheels pointing towards Danville, and Ml". 
Twyman's car was up the road towards ~ft. Cross, on tl1P 
left-hand side of the road, into the guard rail. 
Q. Could you form any opinion, from the condition in th~ 
road, as to where the collision between the two had occurr-ed~ 
Objection by counsel for defendant. 
Sustained. 
Q. Will you tell the jury, Chief, what, if any, marks you 
saw in the road 7 
A. I didn't examine the road. 
Q. You didn't? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Where were the milk bottles and broken glass? 
A. The milk and milk bottles were strewed practicaHy all 
over the road. 
Q. Near where the truck was overturned f 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far was the Twyman car from the truck? 
A. I didn't measure it. I imagine from here to the door. 
Q. About how many feet, for the sake of the record~ 
A. I imagine 50 or 60 feet. 
page 40 ~ Q. What indications were there on the truck or 
Twyman car of any collision 7 
A. I didn't look at the truck. 
Q. Did you look at the Twyman carY 
A. Yes, sir, the rear left-hand side was hit. 
Q. Did you examine the road up at that point to see if the 
truck left any marks? · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Where was Mr. Adkins' body Y 
A. Laying by the side of the road. 
Q. Was Mr. Twyman there¥ 
A. No. 
Q. Did he come back? 
A. Yes, he came back with the ambulance crew that taken. 
this other boy to the hospital. 
Q. What was his condition f 
A. About two-thirds drunk. 
Q. Did you talk to him with reference to what had oc-
curredf 
A. Yes, sir, I don't remember what he said, but I put him 
under arrest. 
Q. Did he give you any explanation of what had occurred 0l 
A. On the way back to town he said the car wouldn't run 
and they couldn't get it started, and they sat down in the 
car and went to sleep. · 
Q. Did he tell you whereabouts in. the road the car was 
when he went to sleep' 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. Did he. say anything about whether he had the lights on 
'"·hen he went .to sleep? 
A. No, he didn't. 
page 41} CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Sanford: 
Q. Mr. Twyman seemed very much upset and excited on ac-
count of what happened, didn't he, Chief? 
A. Well, I couldn't say; I imagine he was upset. 
The Court: Mr. Cole, was it the Hankins boy who was 
taken to the hospital, or who was it Y 
Witness: Yes, sir, the Hankins boy. 
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J. H. FARMER, 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIREC.T EXAlVIINATION. 
By Mr. Carter: 
Q. Your name is J. H. Farmer? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What official position, if any, do you hold, ~ir. FarmerY 
A. State police. 
Q. You are one of the officers of the State l\Iotor Vehicle 
Department Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. vVere you called out to the scene of the accident on the 
Mt. Cross road in which 1\fr. Adkins was killed Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About what time did you get there, Mr. Farmer¥ 
A. I got there right around five o'clock-maybe a little 
before. 
Q. Was Mr. Adkins' body there at the time¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was itT 
A. They had put the body in the hearse when I got there. 
Q. Was Mr. Twyman there when you got there 
page 42 ~ -the defendant 1 
A. No, sir, he was not. 
Q. Did he come up shortly after you did g·et there? 
A. Yes, sir, he came up in a few minutes, after I got there. 
Q. Did you get there before Chief ColeY 
A. Yes, sir, I was there when he got there. 
Q. Did you see Mr. Twyman when you did get there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was his condition 1 
A. He was drinking-. 
Q. Will you tell the jury 'vhat the conditions were in the 
road, with reference to the two cars when you got there that 
nig·htY 
A. The truck was laying on its left side, right straig·ht 
across the highway, 'vith the front of the truck towards the 
right-hand side of the road, and the car was headed to,vards 
Callands, about 15 or 20 feet from the truck, with the front 
of the car up next to the guard rails o•n the left side of the 
road. 
Q. Mr. Farmer, was there anything in the road to indicate 
the point where the impact had been? -
A. I couldn't tell-there was so much ice and milk in 
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the road, to tell where the car had been when the truck hit it. 
Q. Were there any tracks between the truck and this Dodge 
Sedan to show where this Dodge Sedan had been when it 
struck? 
A. From where the car was sitting, two marks in the road 
led back to where the truck was laying-marks about 10 feet 
long, as I remember,-maybe a little '!nore, maybe not t!aat 
much. 
Q. After that ten feet, from there back, what 'vas there 
to obscure it from there back to the truck? 
page 43 } A. Ice and milk spilled. 
Q. ~There was debris there from the wreck? 
A. I beg pardon 1 
Q. There were things from the wreck that obscured it from 
that point back! 
A. Yes, sir. 
The Court: How far did you say the car 'vas beyond the 
truck? 
Witness: It was about 15 or 20 feet. 
The Court: And that was approaching the direction of l\lt. 
Cr.oss f 
· Witness: Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you notice what damag·e had been done to the se-
rlnn-on what part of the sedan it was? 
A. There was a hole--there was a dent place in the left 
rear. corner of the sedan, just up where the rear light is, or 
where the license tag is. There was a dent place in the 
back of the body. The license plate showed it had been struck 
by something. 
Q. \V ere there any lights burning on the sedan when you 
got there? 
A. No, sir. 
· Q. What is the status of the size of the road there-what, 
if anything, is on the sides of the road at that point? 
A. There are guide rails on both sides. 
Q. Huard rails! 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was the guard rail on the right-hand side of the- road 
going from Danville damaged at all T 
.. A. I don't think so. 
Q. Was the one on the left damaged? 
page 44 ~ A. I think so. 
Q. What damage was done to that? 
A. I don't know anything more than one of them was loose. 
I don't remember whether they had a brace running- frmn 
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one to the other or not; I wouldn't say whether they did or 
not; I don't remember. 
CROSS EXAl\iiNATION. 
Bv Mr. Sanford:· 
"'Q. ~:fr. Farmer, I believe you stated that when you got 
there, the Twyman car had turned to the left-hand side of 
the road into the guard rail; is that right T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I-Iad it gone through the guard rail? 
A. I don't know, sir. I don't remember whether I could 
walk around the car between the car and the guard rail or 
not. 
Q. These marks that you say were made by the Twyman 
car, didn't they have the appearance of 1narks made by -the 
wheels of a car with the brakes dragging? 
A. Yes, sir, the hand brake was pulled up when I got there. 
Q. The hand brake-you mean the emergency brake? 
A. Yes, sir. , 
Q. "\Vhen you got there, this truck was lying on its left side, 
I believe you said T · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Something like this 1 (Illustrating with toy automobiles.) 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the car was on the other side of the truck, as yon 
go to 1\I t. Cross ? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 45 ~ Q. That was n1ore or less hidden from you1· view 
as you approached the scene of the accident that 
morning from Danville, was it not? 
A. The car was, yes, sir. 
Q. Yes, sir. You stated there, 1\fr. Farmer, that ~Ir. Tw:v-
man had been drinking; you smelled whiskey on his breath, 
did you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You smelled whiskey on his breath, and is that the rea-
son you say he was drinking? 
. .l\.. He staggered, and his actions showed him as drink-
Ing. 
Q. Do you know whether that was from drinki'ng, or his 
upset condition? · 
A. I don't kno·w whether he staggered from drinking or 
not. I kno'v he staggered, and I know I s1nelled whiskey on 
his breath. That is all I know about it. 
Q. He had just gotten out of the ambulance, had he not f 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. He had gone into Danville and had come back? 
A. Yes, sir, that is what he told me. 
The Court: ~fr. Farmer, ho'v did he talk? Did he talk 
like a sober man or a drunken man? That is one of the 
tests. 
Witness : He talked like a drunk man. 
The Court: How did he talk-incoherently, or clearly? 
Witness: ·The first thing I asked him, when I spoke to 
him, I asked was he driving the car. He said he was. I asked 
him to show me his papers, and he showed me his papers-
all I asked for. He gave me all the information I asked for. 
I could smell 'vhiskey on his breath and he staggered and 
acted like an ordinary dn1nk man would, and talked like one 
to me. 
Q. Mr. Farmer, when you speak of a man as being drunk, 
is he in possession of his faculties? 
page 46 ~ A. I have seen a whole lot of drunk people. 
Q. In this case you say J\tir. Twyman was able 
to give you all the information you asked for? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you question him about how the accident occurred? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Didn't you arrive at your statement that he was drunk 
from the fact that you smelled wl1iskey? 
A. I don't know that that is the reason. All I know is 
that I could smell whiskey, and that he staggered and talked 
to me like a drunk man. 
Q. How long after the accident was it when you got there 
and talked to him? . 
A. I g·ot there about five o'clock, and he come up in about 
ten minutes after I got there. · 
Q. After the accident, 1\fr. Farmer, you went back to the 
~cene, did you not? 
A. Yes, sir, several times. 
Q. I mean you went back at other times, other than that 
night-you went out there with me at one tim·e, did you not? 
A. Yes. sir. 
Q. On that occasion, Mr. Farmer, wasn't the car placed 
down there by the guard rail at the approximate position of 
the car at the time of the accident 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You and I then drove up and stopped our car when the 
car became plainly visible to us, didn't we? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far did we stop away from the other automobile? 
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A. I don't remember exactly how far away; we stopped · 
several times-stopped up on the hill about 400 
page 47 ~ feet from the car, and I stopped up on the next 
hill to see-maybe 250 feet, and then ;we stopped . 
down in a bottom just about 175 feet from where the accident 
was. 
Q. Well, could you see the car from that point 1 
A. We could see your car. 
Q. My car was there without any lights on it, wasn't it? 
A. Yes, sir, the lights was on at firstf and then the lights 
were cut off. 
Q. You could see it 175 feet away without any lights, and 
after you ~aw it, you brought your car to a stop-you didn't 
stop until you could see the car sitting in the dark, and then 
you stopped, and that was 175 feet awayY 
A. Yes, sir. 
The Court: Did you make an application of your brakes 
to see .. how far it would take you to stop your car? 
Witness: No, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Carter: 
Q. When you went out there, it was night time f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You put the car there, and knew it 'vas there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you went back up the hill and approached this car 
and were looking· for this car and knowing· 'vhere it was? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know ·at what speed you approached it? 
A. We weren't driving very fast. 
Q. And ~ou were looking for it with all the eyesight you 
were capable of looking with T 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 48 ~ Q. When you got to the top of the hill 250 feet 
away, did your lights more than just momentarily 
rest on the car? 
Mr. Sanford : He is cross examining his own 'vi tness. 
Mr. Carter: He has developed new matter. 
The Court: You haven't g·ot any right to cross examine 
your witness, even if he does. 
Q. When you got to the first hill, which was 400 feet away, 
state whether or not your lights did anything more than rest 
momentarily on the car. · 
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A. Your lights, when you come around the hill 450 feet 
· from where the accident was, don't even shine on the car at 
all. 
Q. When you saw it at that point, were the lights on it or 
notf 
A. His lights were on. 
Q. Now you say you g·ot to a point 200 or 250 f·eet away; 
how well could you see the car then~ 
A. What was your question~ 
Q. You said you stopped at a point-! don't recall whether 
it was 200 or 250 feet away; how well could you see the car 
then? 
... ~. I could see it all right from there. 
Q. Then why did you make the last stop at 175 feet away? 
A. \Ve just merely stopped again to make sure we could 
sec the car. From where the hill was, that was 450 feet to 
where the car was. 
Q. Am I correct in assuming that 175 feet was the first 
time you could plainly see the car 7 
A. No, this car that was there, I could plainly see it, but 
on the morning of the accident, thjs car which was involved 
in the accident was a kind of a gray car which was just about 
the color of the n1orning. It was harder to see that car 
than it was to see this other car, if that is what 
page 49 } you are trying to get at. 
RE-CROSS EXA~fiN.A.TION. 
Bv 1\f.r. Sanford: 
"Q. A.s a matter of fact, ~1r. Twyn1an's car is a blue car, 
isn't it? 
A. It is just about the sa1ne color as the weather was, or 
the atmosphere or fog was on the morning of this accident, 
and it was very hard to tell it was an automobile. 
Q. You saw the truck there when you drove up there 1 
A. Yes, sir, I saw it. 
W. 0. JAMERSON, 
called. as a witness on beh~lf of the plaintiff, and being :first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Carter: 
Q. What is your nan1e? 
A. W. 0. Jamerson. 
Q. Where do you live, Mr. Jamerson? 
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A. ~It. Cross Road, near Danville, six miles out. 
Q. What do you operate at your hon1e or place near Dan-
ville? 
A. vV e run a dairy and farm. 
Q. I-Iow close is your hon1e to the point where Mr. Adkins 
was killed in an accident~ 
A. 250 yards in a direct line. 
Q. vVere you awakened on the n10rning of the accident? 
A. I was called and asked to use the telephone. 
Q. Do you recall who called you~ 
A. Ryland Shelton. 
Q. Did you go down to the point of the acci-
page 50 ~ dent f 
A. I did. 
Q. When you got there, did you find l\Ir. Adkins' body? 
A. Yes, he was lying under the truck. 
Q. Where was the truck in the road f 
A. The truck "ras lying cross-ways of the road with the 
engine to the right side of the road. 
Q~ Where was 1\!Ir. Twyman's car? 
A. It was to the left side of the road, some 20 or 30 feet-
I don't recall exactly. 
Q. 1\!Ir. Jamerson, are you familiar with the road at that 
point1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Fron1 the point at which you saw the truck lying, how 
far 'vould a car have to have been pushed or shoved to have 
gotte·n it completely off the hard sttrface? 
A. I haven't measured it; I g·uess 50 or 60 feet, probably 
not more than 40 feet. 
Q. Is the situation at that point easily adaptable to push-
ing a car off the hard surface? 
A. It would have been no trouble for two or three to have 
pushed it entirely off the hard surface. 
Q. It could have been pushed off the hard surface of the 
road? 
A. By pushing it off the left. 
Q. How far was that? 
A. 70 or 80 feet. 
page 51 ~ CROSS EXA~1:INATION. 
By Mr. Sanford: 
Q. In which direction? 
A. Towards Danville. 
Q. How far away 'vas that? 
A. On the left side of the road! 
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Q. Yes. 
A. 70 or 80 feet. 
Q. You mean on the left going towards Mt. Cross Y 
A. On the right coming this way. 
Q. Going towards Danville? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It would have been the left going towards Mt. Cross? 
A. Yes, the way the truck and car were going. 
Q. You say the car could have been pushed off to the left 
of his side of the road about 80 feet-
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. -from where the accident occurred? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Right below where the accident occurred, at the end of 
the guard rail, going towards Danville, is it possible at that 
point to push a car off on the right-hand side? 
A. Yes, sir, I think so. I have driven a tractor along there 
to keep it off the hard surface. · 
Q. You mean get all four wheels off? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Ifow far off~ 
page 52 ~ A. I don't know. I have never measured it. A 
tractor is not much narrower than a truck. 
Q. Did you notice that night what part of the truck was 
damaged? 
A. The truck didn't seem to be damaged so much. The left 
end of the bumper-
Q. 'l,he left end of the bumper? 
A. The bumper on the left. 
Q. The bumper on the left-hand side of the truck was dam-
aged? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 'l~he car was clamag·ed in the rear to the left of the tire 
carrier? 
A. That is right-to the left side of the car. 
Q. ~fr. Jamerson, there is a succession of hills and de-
pressions along that highway, is there not? 
A. Yes·. 
Q. Just beyond that, isn't there one v:ery similar-! mean 
towards Danville? -
A. You mean towards Danville? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Now towards Danville from where the wreck was there 
is a very slight rise, and then another rise, right much more. 
Q. And as you go over another rise, there is a very per-
ceptible dip that looks something like the one at your place Y 
A. Yes, it is similar. -
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Q. And it has got a guard rail down there? 
A. Yes, it has got a guard rail. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Carter: . 
Q. Mr. Jamerson, what about the weather conditions that 
morning when you were there? 
A. I didn't take any special notice of that. 
page 53~ W; E. CLARl{, 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXA.:r..£INATION. 
Bv l\{r. Carter : 
.. Q. Your name is W. E. Clark 1 
A. ;N. E. Clark, yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you live, ~1r. Clark? 
A. Danville. 
Q. What is your occupation? 
A. Service manager for the Wyatt-Chevrolet Corporation. 
Q. vVere you familiar with the Oarlbrook Dairy truck driven 
by Mr. Adkins~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you have occasion to go over it and "examine it 
shortly prior to the accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How many days before the accident? 
A. It was three.or four days. 
Q. Three or four days before the accident? 
A. Three or four days before the accident, yes, sir. 
Q. What would you say was the condition of the brakes 
of the car at the time you examined it? 
A. I think the brakes were in good condition just three or 
four days prior to the accident. 
Q. Did you inspect the truck and go over it at that time? 
A. Yes, sir, it was the n1onth of state inspection, you know, 
and of course it requires you to go over the brakes, horn, 
windshield wiper, and things of that kind. 
Q. VVas that done? 
page 54 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the car turned back as in good condi-
tion? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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CROSS EXAl\fiNATION. 
By 1\{r. Sanford: 
Q. What model Ford was that f 
A. I think it was a '34. 
Q. All those cars give a lot of trouble about brakes, don't 
thevt 
A. I don't know; we do very little Ford work. 
Q. The brakes are very difficult to adjust' 
A .. No, sir, not so difficult to adjust. 
Q. They are not as good as Chevrolets Y 
A. Well, I don't know about that. . 
Q. Did you examine this truck after the accident' 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \¥here· was the lick? 
A. On the left front corner of the Ford. 
Q. ·That was on the Ford truck? ~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you examhie the carT 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was the lick on that~ 
A. Left rear corner. 
page 55 } C. F. HODNJiJTT, · 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and 
l1eing first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
Bv JVI r. Carter: 
··Q. What is your name? 
A. C. F. liodnett. 
Q. What is your occupation, ~fr. Hodnett? 
A. Salesman for Wvatt-Chevrolet. 
Q. You live in Danville? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you have occasion to go out on the Mt. Cross Road 
on the n1orning of the accident in which 1\fr. Adldns was 
killed? 
A. Yes, sir, I went out there. 
Q. What time did you get out there? 
A. I got out there a while before light-I don't know ex-
a.ctly. 
Q. What was the weather condition that. morning? 
A. Well, it was damp that morning-looked like the a1r 
was heavy? 
Q. You mean it was misty' 
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A. '¥"ell, I don't say it was misty, but it looked like the air 
was heavy. You couldn't drive fast. 
Q. JVIr. Hodnett, what were the conditions you found when 
you got out there, with reference to this accident? 
A. Well, they had already moved the body, but the truck 
was lying right across the road on its left side, and this 
car was sitting up the road 20 or 30 feet, headed into the 
fence on the left-hand side. 
Q. Did you observe any marks from where the truck· was 
lying· to the car? 
A. No, sir, I can't say I taken any particular notice. 
Q. Did you exan1ine the Dodge Sedan to see 
page 56 ~ where it had been struck? 
. A. Yes, sir, it had been struck to the left side, 
on the rear, something to the left of the spare tire. 
No questions by counsel for defendant. 
0. S. :NIAYBERRY, 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXA~fiNATION. 
By :M~r. Bendall: 
Q. You are JVIr. 0. S. :Niayberry? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I believe you are a regular police officer in the· City of 
Danville? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 1\t[r. Mayberry, on the night or early morning of October 
27, 1935, did you have occasion to go out on the ~ft. Cross 
Road? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see a truck belonging- to the Carlbrook Da1ry! 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Out on that road? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What were the conditions under which you saw it, Mr. 
Mayberry? 
A. I reported for duty at 7 o'clock on that morni•ng, and 
Mr. Ada1ns, a police officer, and myself drove out to the 
scene of this wreck. I saw a car had been pushed off, over 
on the right-hand side of the road-somebody had run into 
it, and right in the middle of the road there was a lot of bottles 
and glass where a truck had turned over. Milk had run back 
this way below that, but from where these bottles were lay-
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ing, about 75 feet down this way, I looked there and saw 
some marks in the middle of the road. Somebody had ap-
plied their brakes and slided their wheels, and -
page 57 ~ milk had done run back all this way. That was 
right in a dip-in the bottom .. 
Q. Was the truck there at the time you got there 7 
A. No, sir, the truck had been moved. 
Q. How far was the automobile you speak of from the 
glass and milk in the road? 
A. It was at that time pushed off the hard surface, over to 
the right, I would say twenty-five, thirty feet. 
Q. Do you know whether or not that automobile had been 
moved from the point where it stopped after the accident Y 
A. I do not. 
Q. Was it light when you got there, 1\{r. Mayberry? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It was light? 
A. Getting light; it was 7 o'clock. 
The Court: You say that automobile was on the right-
hand side of the road, or the left 1 
Witness: On the right, going out fron1 Danville out the 
M t. Cross Road. 
Q. I understood you to say you saw marks ; were those 
marks between the milk and the automobile standing stillY 
A. As you come over this swag, and go over the little knoll, 
and just as you get over this swag, at these railings, you could 
see where smnebody had applied their brakes, and then up 
the road, it was just about 75 feet to all these bottles-looked 
like where the truck had turned over. 
Q. Do yon recall the condition of the weather that morn-
ing? 
A. As I recall, it was damp-kinda foggy. I noticed going 
up there these places that you go through-these 
page 58 ~ swags-looked like the fog was settling in them; 
I know I turned on my lights. 
Q. Was there more fog in the dips than on the higher 
places? 
A. It seemed that there was. 
1\tir. Sanford: Does your Honor think that has got any-
thing to do with it; this was at 7 o'clock. 
The Court : How far back towards Danville was there an 
indication that the wheels of the truck or something began to 
skid to the place where you saw the milk-that would indicate 
the place where the truck had turned over? 
80 .Supreme Court of Appeals of ·virginia. 
Witness: The best I could say, Judg·e,-I didn't measure 
it-it looked about 65 or 75 feet. 
The Co~rt: That would be approximately 25 yards~ 
Witness : Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. Sanford: 
Q. You saw where the glass and debris was there in the 
hig-hway, did you not Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did those marks lead back from that debris to the left 
side of the road 1 · 
A. ];ookcd like more the center of the road. 
Q·. Didn't it appear to be made by an object turning over? 
A. I couldn't say. 
Q. \tVasn't the upper mark wider than the lower mark? 
A. I couldn't tell. At that point the nillk had run a11 over 
the street there. 
Q. You have no idea what it was made by1 
A. No, sir. 
page 59 ~ J. W. SHELTON, 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. Carter: 
Q. Your name is J. W. Shelton? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you live, ~{r. Shelton? 
A. Paces. ' 
Q. That is in Halifax County f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What business are you engaged in 1 
A. The dairy business, manager of the Carlbrook Dairy. 
Q. You are manager of the Carlbrook Dairy? . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What relationship do you occupy to Mr. Adkins, who 
was killed in this accident Y 
A. I had his work in charge. 
Q. I mean what kin? 
A. Brother-in-law; he married my sister. 
Q. And he was working· under you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
F.· W. Twyman v. DouglasS. Adkins, Adm'x. 81 
Q. What were his duties in connection with the Carlbrook 
Dairy? 
.A. His duties were to deliver the milk and take care of the 
collections. 
Q. Do you know, of your own knowledge, what he was sup-
posed to do on this Sunday morning he was killed 1 
A. What J:le was supposed to do? 
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. Yes, sir. The first thing, when he would go 
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on ~ft. Cross, and then he would come back to 
town and make deliveries to retail purchasers, which he 
:finished up about 7:30 or eight, and then the wholesalers. 
Q. Do you know what load he had on when he left the Carl-
brook Dairy that morning? 
A. Weight? Approximately 125 gallons, and around 1,700 
lbs. 
Q. You mean his load, independent of the. truck, was 1,7007 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know what time he left the dairy f 
A. No, sir, I do·n 't. I wasn't up. 
Q. What was the first information you had of the acci-
dent? 
A. This telephone operator at Ingram called me at ap-
proximately 4 :30. · 
Q. Did you have smne difficulty in getting accurate informa-
tion as to what had happened 1 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
Q. How long a tin1e did it take you to find out what had 
happened? · 
A. When she called, she didn't seen1 to know so much, ex-
cept that there had been an accident-
Q. Never mind about the details; just give us an idea of 
how long it was? 
A. About 15 minutes. 
Q. So you left home about what time? 
A. I imagine a quarter of five, or five. 
Q. vVhen did you get to the scene of the accident? 
A. As soon as I could get from my home to the scene of 
the accident. I called the Glidewell boy to get a truck and 
get the rest of the n1ilk, and then Townes to come and get 
the body, and then I went to the scene of the ac-
page 61 ~ cident. . 
Q. Could you give the jury some approximate 
idea of when you got to the scene of the accident 1 
A. Well, some time in the neighborhood of 5 :30 and six. 
I drove just as fast as I could. 
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Q. What were the weather conditions when you got there? 
A. Vv ell, there w·as between a heavy mist and a fog all the 
way from home to the scene of the accident-I mean as to 
lights picking up an object, as they would on a clear night. 
Q. "\Vhen you got there, did you find Mr. Adkins' body' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. vVas ~Ir. Twyman there? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you see Mr. Twyman that night~ 
A. No, I did not. I passed the ambulance before I got to 
the scene of the accident, and when I g·ot to the scene of the 
accident, I got out of the car and was looking at the body 
when _the ambulance came up, and I understand that the of-
ficers arrested him, and I didn't see him that night. 
Q. Describ~ the physical scene-the condition of the road, 
etc. ' 
The Court: What was the date of the accident? 
Witness: October 27. 
A. When I g·ot there, the first vie\v of it, I saw lVIr. Farm-
er's car-l couldn't tell what kind of ca1·-I saw it was 1\{r. 
Farmer's car; he was kinda off the right side of the road 
with his lig·hts burning, and I dicln 't see the car. The truck 
was right across the road, with the engine and the wheels 
to the right, making a complete blockade of the road. ~Ir. Twy-
man's car-I didn't measure the distance--was 15 or 20 feet 
above there, with the left front wheel ag·ainst the 
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middle of the road at a 45 degree angle. · 
Q. vVhat was in the road-any debris, signs of wreckag·e? 
A. Yes, sir, the road coming· back towards Danville was 
completely covered with gas, milk, and cylinder oil. 
Q. Did you observe any marks at all between the car that 
was overturned and 1\IIr. Twyman's car? 
.A .• Between the truck and 1\IIr. Twyman's car? 
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. Yes,· sir. 
Q. vVhat kind of mark? 
A. Well, I wouldn't say it was a skid mark caused by tl1e 
brakes being locked or the road being wet, but from the top 
of the tn1ck to where his car was against the railing·s, there 
was a mark. 
Q. Did you observe any track from where the truck was 
towards Danville? 
A. Yes, sir, from this end of the milk-
Q. When you say "this end", you mean towards Danvillef 
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A. Yes, sir, from the truck, the left brakes seemed to cateh 
the load before the right did, two or three feet before it hit the 
milk; from then on everything was hid from view. · 
Q. Ho'v far was that from the point of collision Y 
A. "\V ell, just as to the point of collision, I couldn't say. 
Q. Ho'v far from where the truck turned over? . 
A. You mean 'vhere the milk and all were-I would say 35 
or 40 feet. 
Q. Did you examine the Dodge Sedan with reference to 
where it had been struck 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where? 
A. The bumper on the· left side of the car was 
page 63 ~ hit, and the back corner-the left corner of his car 
there. 
from there out towards this glass, it was hit in 
Q. Now, Mr. Shelton, did you go with Mr. Scarce out there 
Sunday a week ag·o to make any tests with reference to this 
situation? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you put a car at the place where you understood 
Twyman's car was on the night of the accident? 
A. Yes, sir. ' 
Q. From which direction did you approach that car? 
A. Ftom the rear. • 
Q. IR that from the direction of Danville? 
A. Yes, sir, I tried to set it in a position along about where 
it was. 
Q. vVho told you where the Twyman car was sitting? 
A. l\fr. Scarce. 
Q. As you approached from Danville, were you looking for 
the car? 
A. Yes, I 'vas. . 
Q. How close did you get before you could see it? 
A. T got l\fr. Scarce in the car with me. I pulled up in 
low g·ear to where my lig·hts would pick it up, and moved the 
car and left a man standing 'vhere I picked it up. Then I 
went down the road and came back down there at 45 miles 
an hour. When I got to 'vhere he was standing, I broke my 
car. JVfv wheels skidded 100 feet-I went on one-third or 
one-hal{ of these rails. Then I went back with Mr. Scarce, 
and came back at 38 miles. It also skidded again. It seemed 
at first that I had gone a little further than I should, but when 
you check it at 45 miles, you make at the rate of 66 feet 
per second, and the carefullest driver will take a second to 
take his foot off the accelerator and apply his brakes-
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page 64 ~ Mr. Sanford: If your Honor please, I object 
to the witness arguing the case to. the jury. 
Q. vVhat was the distance of the nearest point from which 
you could see that car' 
. A. It was about 37 yards. 
Q. And you did make the experin1ent, so far as speed was 
concerned, both at 45 and 38 miles per hour? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At either one of those speeds, were you able to stop your 
car, beginning at the point where you first saw the car, in 
time to avoid going past where this car was? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. l\1.r. ~helton, you knew 1Ir. Adkins very well; he wars 
'your brother-in-law? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How old was he? 
A. 29 or 30. 
Q. Do you lmow anything about his ·health? 
A. H:is health was all right, because I had to have all my 
employees examined for the Health Department at South 
Boston. 
Q. Did he lose any time from his work T 
A. He never had missed a day. 
Q. How long had he been with you t · 
A. If he had worked another day, it would have been a 
year. 
Q. What were his wages Y 
A. His wages would run around $85.00. 
Q. What were his wages? 
A. His wages would tun $85.00-it would run about $120 in 
all. He was on a commission ; his wages showed a 
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been, which would run $85, $90 straight salary. 
· Q. That was the 'money he received, and in addition to 
that, what did he get? 
A.. He got his house and his milk and his breakfast every 
morning. 
Q. Did his house include a garden lot' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you ever in his home and with him when he was 
with his children! 
A. Yes, sir, quite frequently. 
Q. Will you tell the jury what, if any, attention he paid to 
his children Y 
A. \Veil, I think he was one of the most devoted husbands 
I have ever seen. 
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Q. I am speaking· of his children. 
A. Vvell, father, too. 
Q. Do you know what the width of the truck is Y 
A. The width of the truck, no, sir, but it is right much 
wider than a car. I haven't measured it, but I know we have 
a special milk body, built for retail distributors. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By 1\{r. Sanford: 
Q. Mr. Shelton, what time is it customary for your driver 
to leave on this Danville route? 
A. The Danville route, around three,-not later than three, 
not much before. 
Q. Has that been the custom for some time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was that the custom when J\fr. Shepherd worked for 
von? 
· A. ~Ir. Shepherd never worked for me but three or .four 
weeks. 
Q. Did JYir. Shepherd leave at three? 
A. No, Mr. Shepherd left before, but he taken that privi- -
lege. 
Q. He left earlier 1 
page 66 } A.· Yes, sir. 
Q. On Saturday afternoon, what time did ~1 r. 
Adkins get in? 
A. Well, as to the exact time, I couldn't say. I wasn't 
there, hut I came in a little after hvo, and he was there when · 
I got there, checking up. 
Q. You have a brother who made a statement in this case 
before? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He said that he got in at six, didn't he? 
A. \Vell, you said ''Got in at six and left at two", and 
caught him napping, and he said, "Yes". 
Q. He did make that statement 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Your purpose ·in making this test was not to see the 
car before .you just had to? 
A. I was trying to see it as soon as I could. 
Q. I believe you say you are the brother-in-law of the Ad-
ministratrix in this case, Adkins' wife Y 
A. I am. 
Q. You made the test at 45 miles an hour, you say, and at 
38 miles an hour.? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. If you had been going 20 miles an hour, there would have 
been no difficulty to stop, would there¥ 
.lL No, with this car there, and knowing it was there, and 
looking for it, and with my car, I could have stopped it at 20 
miles nn l1 our, yes, sir. 
Q. Do yoq know how much 1\fr. Adkins saved out of his 
salarv~l 
A. ·No, sir, I don't. 
Q. Did he save anything? 
A. Not that I kno'v anything· about, no, sir. Mr. 
page 67 ~ Adkins hadn't been making this salary so awful 
long. When he first came with me, he was work-
ing in the barn at a smaller salary than the route men make. 
At this point, court was adjourned for lunch, and recon-
vened at three o'clock. 
1\f r. Carter: Mr. Shelton,· I overlooked this question. I 
would like to ask Mr. Shelton what were the habits of Mr. 
Adkins; was he a man of good habits or otherwise¥ 
Witness: Yes, sir. 
1\tlr. Carter: 'What? 
Witness: He wasn't a man that used had language, and 
he didn't drink. 
CROSS EXA~IINATION (Hesurriea1• 
Bv 1\tir. Sanford: 
.. Q. One other question, nir. Shelto·n; in order to park your 
car down there where you stated it was parked off the hard 
surface beyond the g-uard rail, yon had to run it up on a 
hank, clidn 't you? 
A.. I don't quite get where you mean. 
Q. I mean at a point at the end of the guard rail towards 
Danville-you say you drove your car over there; in order 
to get tl1e car off the hard surface, it was necessary for yon 
to drive up on a bank, 'vasn't it? . 
i\. No, sir, I was headed with my car in the same direction 
the Twyman car was headed, with the. right wheels in the 
ditch, and the car 'vouldn't have gone up the bank. I had 
1ny right wheels in the ditch. 
Q. And while you were down there parked in the road, 
weren't there other automobiles passing you? 
A. At the time these cars 'vere passing, I was off the high-
way. I didn't try to make the test when I would see any cars 
coming. 
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A. I wasn't making any tests while cars were coming in 
either direction, because we were watching out for that. 
Q. At that time you didn't have any taillight on your car, 
did you? 
A. I don't remember definitely about that. 
FRANK ~IARSHALL 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and being first 
du1y sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXA~1INATION. 
By Mr. Carter: 
Q. Your name is Frank L. ~Iarshall Y 
.i\ .• No "L" in it. 
Q. Frank Marshall. And you live at Chatham Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is your business, Mr. Marshall Y 
A. Insurance business. 
Q. In the conduct of your business, do you have occasion 
to refer to and use what is known as the American Mor-
tality Tables' 
.A. I do. 
Q. \Vhat are those tables~ 
A. It is the experience of how. long a person will live at a 
given age-that the averag·e person will live. 
Q. Those tables are based on scientific calculations of the 
prospective life of an average person? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you those mortality tables with you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would you examine that table and tell the 
page 69 ~ jury 'vhat the expectancy of life of a man 29 years 
old is, according to those tables. 
A. Thirty-six and a fraction years. 
Q. Thirty-six and a fraction years-; in other words, that is 
how long you could expect to live at that age Y 
A. That is rig·ht. 
No questions by Counsel for Defendant. 
Plaintiff Rests. 
~fr. Sanford: If your Honor please, I desire to make a 
motion at this time. 
(The jury retires.) 
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Mr. Sanford: If the ~Court please, my motion is that" the 
evidence of the plaintiff be stricken, because it is insufficient 
to .. support a verdict, and I base that on the fact that all of 
the plaintiff's evidence which deals directly with how this ac-
cident occurred, shows that Adkins, the driver of this truck, 
was guilty of contributory neglig·ence as a matter of law. 
The evidence of the plaintiff's witness, Mr. Farmer, was 
to the effect that this automobile was plainly visible for 175 
feet; the evidence of Mr. Shelton was that it was 37 steps, 
and he further stated that if the truck had been traveling at 
a rate of speed of 20 miles an hour, it could have been 
stopped, in time to have avoided this injury. 
All the evidence shows that there was no obstruction there,. 
other than this knoll, and if there had been an obstruction 
there, it would have made it necessary for this man Adkins, 
in operating this truck, to exercise ordinary care, and in ex-
ercising ordinary care, he should have stopped his automobile 
in time to have avoided injury to himself, as well 
page 70 ~ as injury to other persons in the car. A man should 
operate his car safely; if there are knolls or ob-
structions, he should drive accordingly. 
The evidence plainly shows that this man was driving at a 
rapid rate of speed. One witness said the car was knocked 
some 60 or 70 feet from where it was supposed to have been 
struck, showing that he •was driving· at a high rate of speed 
• * * 
(Mr. Sanford argues the motion before the court.) 
The Court: I shall have to overrule your motion to strike 
out. Unless it is a clear case, it ought to go to the jury. · 
Mr. Sanford: We desire to save the point, if your Honor 
please. 
(The jury returns.) 
I-I. S. PEIRCE, 
called as a witness on behalf of the defendant, and being 
first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Sanford: 
Q. Is your name H. S. Peirce f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is your business, ~Ir. Peirce f 
A. I am a civil engineer and surveyor .. 
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Q. How many years' experience have you had? 
.A.. About 11 years. 
Q. Some time after the 27th of October, at my request, did 
you go to a place on the Mt. Cross Road and make a plat of 
the road-did you go to a point on it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was this place you went to 1 
· A. Well, it is-I don't remember exactly how 
page 71 ~ far from Danville. It seems to me it was seven or 
eight miles, maybe a little more. 
Q. Was it near the Jamerson Dairy 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far would you say it was from where Mr. Jamerson 
lives? 
A. I don't believe I can answer that. 
Q. Just guess as to the distance, of course,-,vas this place 
pointed out to you as being the place where an accident had 
occurred? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there anything there at the time-any signs of . de-
bris, etc., to show you where an accident had occurred f 
A. Yes, sir, there was glass and milk bottles, and you could 
see the milk that had run down the road, and a post was torn 
. down-a fence post. 
Q. How many days after the accident was it that you made 
the plat? 
A. I think it was just a day or two, n1aybe the next day. 
Q. Was the guard rail on on the left-hand side of the high-, 
way, as you face l\it. Cross, knocked dow1~f 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q. Is this the map which you n1acle? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Please point out to the jury on this map the direction 
that this road travels-the direction you travel on this road. 
A. This direction is to Danville; that direction is to Mt. 
Cross. It is very nearly east and west. This is north this 
way-this arrow. 
Q. Wo'v point out on this map where you found the debris. 
A. The debris was right at this point. I show an arrow 
pointing to it, just west of this culvert-the 'vater drains un-
der the road. · 
Q. Is this a guard rail that you indicate here by 
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A·. Yes, sir. 
Q. Point out the point ,where the guard rail was broken. 
A. It was broken right along in here. 
Q. That is on the left-hand side as you go to Mt. Cross? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is the distance fron1 this point where the guard 
rail is broken to the top of the hill, as you go towards Dan-
ville~ 
A. That is 530 feet. 
Q. No'v point out on the 1nap approximately the top of the 
hill. 
A. Right along he,re. 
Q. 540 feet frmn this point? 
A. 530 feet. 
Q. From this point? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you measure the width of the shoulder at a point 
12 feet east of the end of the guard rail? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What 'vas the width of that1 
A. Well, you mean on the northern side of the road: 
Q. That is right. 
A. That is 4.4 and only about 13 feet back it runs into 4 
feet-it varies there; that is from the edge of the road to the 
ditch line. 
Q. How 'vide is the road at that point? 
A. 15 feet wide. 
Q. Ho'v 'vide is the 'road between the guard rails-that is, 
the hard surface? 
· .A. 15 feet. 
Q. What is the distance fron1 the break in the 
pag·e 73 } g·uarcl rail to the depression-the first deptession 
in the road? 
A. The first depression 1 
Q. Or the break of the grade. 
A. You mean to the lowest point? 
Q. Yes. 
A. That is 230 feet from the lowest point in the road to 
where the post was broken. 
Q. 230 feet. Point out on the map where that lowest point 
IS. 
A. That is right at this culvert here. There is a culvert 
about where the accident happened, and then back here is an·· 
other cnl vert. 
Q., That is in the direction of Danville from the point of the 
accident1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Beh:\reen the top of the hill, toward Danville, and the 
place where this accident occurred, is there a slight rise-
in other words, do you come down the grade and then go up 
a little bit, and then down again? 
},. W. T'\VY}nall v. DouglasS. Adkins, Adm'x. 91 
.A.. Well, here is the grade ; you go down on a 4.8% grade 
until yqu come to the low point, which is that culvert, and 
then you rise slightly about a foot, and then you go more 
or less straight, and then up another hill. 
The Court : Where was the car~ You are getting me all 
balled up with that map. . 
Witness : The car was along here. 
!tfr. Sanford: This is the debris here. 
The Court: Why can't he show where the car wa~ ~ 
Q. This guard rail-is that the point where you saw the 
debris on the highway just opposite Y 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Point that out. 
page 74 ~ .A. That is right here on the plan; on the pro-
file, right here. 
Q. That is w:here the car came to rest-of course, there is 
quite a controversy as to where it was actually sitting. What 
is the distance from the eastern end of this guard rail to the 
debris? - · 
.A. That is 60 feet. 
Q. Did you notice the contour of the road on the west 
side of where the areident occurred? 
A. I only noticed that it went on up a hill. I didn't carry 
my survey to the top of that hill. I didn't go any further, anu 
I can't remember exactly the condition of the road, because 
I didn't go any further. 
Q. Do you recall whether it was any different, so far as the 
grade was concerned, on either side? 
A. No, sir, very little difference. 
Q. vVas there anything· on top of the hill, as pointed out 
on the map here, to where this debris was, to interfere with 
the vision of the driver of an automobile? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. As you come over the hill at that point, where would be 
the range of the lights-where would it strike? You will 
have to use the profie. 
A. If you were right along here, the beam would strike 
along down in here. 
Q. As you came on down? 
A. It probably would have a tendency to strike along in 
here. 
Q. Right in the depression f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As you got to this point, coming on down hill, would 
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your lig-hts strike directly on any object that had stopped 
in the depression or low place f 
· A. I don't think it would along in here. I think 
page 75 t it would have to be along in here some place. 
. · Q. And what is that distance from 'vhere this de-
bris wasY 
A. That would be around 200 feet. 
The Court: Is this the place right here, the little rise 
you speak of, and this the dip f 
Witness: That is right. 
The Court: And up here the top of the hill i 
Witness: Yes, sir. 
The Court: And the car was rig·ht here~ 
Witness : Y: es, sir. 
CROSS EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. Carter: 
Q. That was where the car was after th~ accident Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you don't know where this car was before the 
accident? 
A. No. That is where I 'vas told it was-60 feet-
Q. Told by whom 1 
A. I don't recall-someone. 
Q. My friend J\IIr. Sanford? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How far was the point you estimated the lights as first 
shining on that, to the point 60 feet back? 
A. That would be around 140 feet-somewhere like that. 
Q. So when you got down here where you could first see, it 
would be 140 feet from where you estimate the car. was 1 
· A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't actually go out there at night and see where 
the lig·hts would strike 1 
pag·e 76 ~ A. No, sir. 
Q. ·Yours is just theory, from your measure-
mentsY 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is this little road? 
A. A farm road. 
Q. How far is that from the point of the accident? 
A. About 341 feet. 
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CH.ARLIE MAYS, 
called as a witness on behalf of the defendant, and being 
first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIREC'r EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Sanford: 
Q. Is your name Char lie :Mays? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Charlie, were you employed at the C. C. C. Camp on 
the Mt. Cross Road on October 27 of last year7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On the night before, October 26, did you go into Dan-
ville? 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. And at a later hour were you picked up by a Mr. Twy-
man¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were you picked up J 
A. About a mile out of town. 
Q. About a mile out of town! -
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On what highway were you picked up? 
A. On the main highway. 
Q. A mile from town going toward Mt. Cross f 
page 77} A. Yes, sir, going toward camp. 
Q. Who was with you? 
A. Nestor and Hankins. · 
Q. About what time was that? 
A. Well, it was-you mean when he picked us up? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Around one o'clock. 
Q. After he picked you up, did you have any trouble with 
the automobile f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What trouble did you have? . 
A. Well, they thought the gas line was stopped up. 
Q. Did you do any work on it Y 
A. Yes, sir. _ 
Q. Did you have to do any pushing? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Bendall: We object to his leading the witness. 
Q. How much pushing did you have to do Y 
A. Well, we pushed all the way from the main highway to 
where the wreck happened. . 
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Q. Were you in the car at the time the wreck occurred Y 
·A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Just before you reached a point where the accident oc-
curred, what had you done in order to try to get the car 
further on Y 
A. Well, just before we got to where it happened, I got in 
the car and went off to sleep, but we had passed the place one 
time and come up there and then went back there again. 
Q. You mean you had pushed past the place 
pag·e 78 ~ where the accident occurred-then did the car roll 
backwards? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. V\7here did you go when it rolled backwards Y 
A. Backwards and forwards for a ~vhile. 
Q. Were you attempting at all times to get it started Y 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
Q. On which side of where the accident occurred-on which 
hill was it that you got in the car? 
A. It was on the hill towards Danville. 
Q. Did you knew when the car was parked T 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Or when it came to a stop f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When you got in the car, were the lights burning? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. vVhat time 'vas that; do you know f 
A. Between three and four o'clock. 
Q: Between three and four o'clock!. 
A. Yes, sir. 
. Q. While Mr. Twyn1an was in your presence, did he take a 
drink? · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was there anything about his manner that indicated 
to you that he was drinking? 
A. No, sir. 
·Q. Were any of the boys in your party drinking? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Where had you been that night? 
page 79 ~ A. Been to a show. 
Q. In Danville 1 
A. Yes, sir-midnight show. 
Q. You mean by a midnight show, a show that lets out at 
midnight? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. After the accident occurred. what was the position of 
1\Ir. Twyman's carY · 
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A. Well, it 'vas sitting on the left-hand side of the road, 
into the guard rail. 
Q. Headed into the guard rail Y 
A. Headed into the guard rail at the side of the road. 
Q. Where was the truck 7 
A. It was turned right square over, right behind it, with 
the front end of the truck on the right-hand side of the road. 
Q. Did you and the other boys in the car get out and try to 
get the truck off Mr. Adkins Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Could you do it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What did you then doY 
A. Well, Mr. Twyman, he went for help. 
Q. After help was brought, and the truck removed from 
the mun, did you go on to camp? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 80 ~ CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By M.r. Carter: 
Q. You were asleep when the accident occurred Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long had you been asleep Y 
A. I couldn't say for certain. 
Q. You don't know whereabouts in the road the car was at 
that time-you don't know whether the lights were burning 
then or not! · . 
A. Not at that time. 
Q. Where was 1\tir. Twyman when you went to sleep! 
A. He was under the wheel. 
Q. Of course, nobody in the car was drinking? 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. You couldn't smell any whiskey at alU 
A. No. 
Q. You don't know where ~fr. Twyman had been when he 
picked you up 1 
A. No. 
Q. You say he picked you up between three and four 7 
A. No, sir, he picked us up about one. 
Q. And you 'vere out there three hours before the accident 
happened? 
A. Well, he picked us up at one, and this was between 
three and four. 
Q. How far did you find yourself and the automobile in 
which you were sleeping from the truck when you woke up Y 
A. Well, I couldn't say for certain. 
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Q. You know very little about it. That is all. Where are 
you from-where is your home? 
A. Bristol. -
page 81 t RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Sanford: 
Q. You are now at the C. C. C. Can1p at Salem, are- you 
not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you awakened after the accident occurred, it was 
still very dark, 'vasn 't it Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you make any measurements there, or observa-
tion as to marks or tracks Y 
A. I did not. 
DELTON NESTOR, 
called as a witness on behalf of the defendant, and being 
first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Sanford: 
Q. Is your name Delton Nestor1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where is your home, Mr. Nestor¥ 
A. Hillsville, Virginia. 
Q. Are you now employed in the g·overnment service¥ 
A. Yes, sir, at the C. C. C. Camp. 
Q. On the night-morning, rather, of October 27 were yon 
employed at the C. C. C. Camp on the Mt. Cross RoadY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On that night did you go into Danville¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who was with you Y 
A. I went down-there were two or three truck loads go-
ing down. 
Q. As you were returning to the camp, were you picked 
up by anyone Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 82 ~ Q. Who picked you up 1 
A. Mr. Twyman. 
Q. About what time were you picked up? 
A. It was between twelve and one o'clock. 
Q. Were you going then in the direction of campY 
A. Yes, sir. 
l .. _ 
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Q. After you got in his car, did you have any trouble with 
the car? 
A. Yes, sir, we rode something like a half a mile, and 
started up hill, and the car began to spit, and wouldn't go up 
hill, and we had to push it, and the same way with the next_ 
one. 
Q. Did that continue on until you finally stopped 7 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Pushing up every hill you came to 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where did that start-· you said it started after you had 
gone about a mile, but I mean with reference to the intersec.,. 
tion of M t. Cross· Road and #58 7 
A. It started right after we left #58, starting up that little 
hillth&~ . 
Q. What is the last thing you recall before the accident T 
A. Well,-the last thing before the accident? 
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. Was when the car was up on this little hill and started 
rolling· off a little knoll and I got in the car. 
Q. Had the car already gone past the point of the acci-
dent! 
A. Yes, sir, we pushed it up a little knoll and couldn't make 
it, and we rolled back, and we thought we would get a start 
and make the grade, and g·ot in the car. 
Q. Where did you take your seat? 
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Q. At that time were the lights on the car burn-
ing? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the next thing you knew? 
A. The next thing was. after the truck had hit the car, 
we all waked up-I did-waked up. · 
Q. Were you injured' 
A. No, sir, kinda addled for a little while. 
Q. The boy in the car with you-Hankins-was injured, I 
believe? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you know anything a bout when the car was parked, 
or when it came to a stop Y 
A. No, sir, I don't. 
Q. After the accident, what was the position ·of Mr. Twy-
man's car? 
A. W ell,--after the accident 7 
Q. Yes. 
A. The car was sitting kind of at an angle across the road, 
with the left front tire against the guard rail. The back end 
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of the car was sitting out in the road, and the front was 
against the guard rail. 
Q. You don't know what distance it had been knocked Y 
A. No, sir, I don't. 
CROSS EXAJ.VIINA.TION. 
By Mr. Bendall: 
Q.· :M:r. Nestor, when you left Danville, who was with you! 
A. vVhen I left Danville? 
Q. Yes, sir, starting back to camp. 
A. I left town by myself and got to the end of 
page 84 ~ the bridge and got with Charlie Mays, Hankins, 
and Shelton. 
Q. Were you all going to go back to campY 
A. Yes, sir. _ 
Q. Where had you been? 
A. To the show in town. 
Q. Which show? 
A. The midnight show. 
Q. Which show-which theatre? 
A. The Broadway, the midnight show. 
Q. What time did you get out of there Y 
A. Ten minutes to twelve. 
Q. What time did you get in Twyman's car? 
A. About 12 :30. 
Q. And where did you get in Twyman's car? 
A. About a mile out of town at a filling station. He got 
gas there. 
Q. You got in his car about a mile out of town at a filling 
station, and he got gas there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where did ydu first have trouble with the carY 
A. Just after we turned off. 
Q. How far had you gone .up the Mt. Cross Road before you 
started having trouble? 
A.. Not more than a couple of hundred yards. 
Q. What was the nature of the trouble 1 
A. I don't know, myself; I think the gas line. 
Q. Would the car run any more? 
.A. It would go and then stop. 
page 85 }- Q. Would it go up hill? 
A. No. 
Q. ·You all pushed the car up every hill on the Mt. Cross 
Road? 
A. Yes, sir, unless it was just a slight rise. 
Q. Where did you get in the carY 
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A. A little knoll this side of there, towards Danville. 
Q. Did you all push it up that knoll¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And then jumped in f 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Was 1\ir. Twyman in the car at that time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were these other boys in the car at the time! 
A. One of the boys hadn't got in. 
Q. Why did you get in Y 
A. There was no use to stand outside when I could get in. 
Q. Which one didn't get in¥ 
A. The little boy-Hankins. 
Q. When did he get in Y 
A. I don't know; I went to sleep. 
Q. When did you go to sleepY 
A. I was so near give out, I went to sleep right away. 
Q. Where was Mr. Twyman Y 
A. He was under the wheel of the car. 
Q. "What was he doing? 
A. I didn't notice ·what he was doing. 
. Q. When you went to sleep, did you notice 
page 86 r whether the lights were burning? 
A. Yes, they were burning. 
Q. Do you know whether they were after you went to 
sleep¥ 
A. No. 
Q. After the accident occurred,-you were in the automo-
bile at that time? 
A·. During the accident. 
Q. Did any of these boys leave the scene· of the accident 
after the accident occurred? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. None left there f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. They all stayed there Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. After the truck ran into the back of the car, and you 
realized this accident had occurred, how far was the auto-
mobile from the truck at that time¥ 
A. Around 10 feet-I didn't measure it. 
Q. Yon weren't drinking? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was l\fays drinking Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was anybody drinking Y 
A. No, sir, I couldn't tell if it was. 
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Q. Nobody in the party was drinking? 
A. I couldn't tell it if they was. I had been with them 
three or four hours. 
Q. How long were you asleep f 
A. I couldn't say how long I was. 
Q. Do you know Mr. B. C. Coleman Y 
page 87 ~ A. No, sir, I don't. 
Q. Do you know where Cole1nan's Store is on 
the Mt. Cross Road f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do ·you know this gentleman standing in the door? (In-
dicating man brought in for identification.) 
A. No, sir. 
· Q. Have you ever seen him before f 
A. I may have seen him before. 
Q. Do you know the young gentlen1an standing beside him t 
(Indicating second man brought in for identification.) 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Have you ever seen him before? 
A. No, sir, not that I know of. 
Q. I will ask you if, on the day after the accident-about 
1 o'clock Sunday afternoon, the day of this accident-at 
Coleman's store, you didn't state, in the presence of witnesses, 
'that Mr. Twyman 'vas drunk, and just parked his car-
A. No, sir, I did not. 
Q. In the presence of those two men who just came there to 
the doorY 
A. No, sir, I don't remember being at the store. 
Q. You don't remember being around ·Coleman's Storef 
A. No, sir. 
page 88 ~ C. W. ALLBRIGHT, 
called as a witness on behalf of the defendant, and 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. Sanford: 
Q. What ~re your initials, Mr. Allbright¥ 
A. C. W. 
Q. C. W.? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you work, 1\Ir. Allbright¥ 
A. Swicegood's Funeral Home. 
Q. Do you recall that on the night of October 27 you were 
called to an acddent on the Mt. Cross RoadY 
A. I don't recall the date, but I remember the accident. 
\~ 
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Q. An accident in which Mr. Lloyd Adkins was killed? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who did you bring in from this accident? 
A. I brought in the Hankins boy. 
Q. Who came with you in the ambulance? 
A. Mr. Twyman. 
Q. Mr. Twyman came with you in the ambulance Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long was he in the ambulance-how long were you 
in his company? 
A. Well, no longer than to the hospital from the accident. 
Q. Then didn't you bring him back? 
A. Yes, sir, 1\tlr. Swicegood's brother carried him back to 
the scene of the accident. 
Q. State whether or not Mr. Twyman had the appearance 
of being under the influence of whiskey? 
. A. Well, if he was I couldn't tell it. 
page 89 ~ Q. How long after the accident was it, approxi-
mately, before you ·got there? 
A. Well, I couldn't say how long it was. It wasn't but 
just a few minutes. 
Q. Do you recall when it was when you answered the call T 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS EXAiviiNATION. 
By ~fr. Carte'S: 
Q. Did you pay any particular attention, ~{r. Twyman Y 
A. No, sir, I \didn't. 
Q. You went o_ut'there to get a person to take. to the hos-
pital, and your attention was directed to that Y 
A. Yes, sir.' 
Q. Did you see ~{r. Adkins' body out there f 
A. I saw the body on the side of the road. 
Q. Did you pay attention to that? 
A. 'No, sir. 
Q. This gentleman just drove into town with you, and 
all you can say is that as far a~ you know, if he was under 
the influence of whiskey, you don't know it; is that right f 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. You don't mean to say that he was not under the influ-
ence of liquor Y 
A. No. 
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RE-DIRECT EXA.~liNATION. 
By 1\fr. Sanford: 
Q. If he was, you could not tell itt 
A. No, sir. 
page 90 ~ C. E. SHEPHERD, 
. called as a witness on behalf of the defendant, and 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAl\tiiNATION. 
By Mr. Sanford: 
Q. Is your name C. E. Shepherd 1 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Where do you live, 1\tir. Shepherd¥ 
A. 1\it. Cross Road. 
Q. Who do you work for? 
A. W. 0. Jamerson. 
Q. Is that the Jamerson Dairyf 
A.' Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you recall the night on which an accident occurred-
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. -out there on the ::1\It. Cross Road? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that the accident involving· a truck of the Carlbrook 
Dairy and a car driven by 1\ir. Twyman T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did someone come and wake you up Y 
A. Yes, ~ir. 
Q. Or rather, to get you Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Prior to this time, 1\ir. Shepherd, had you noticed an 
automobile on the highway? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What attracted your attention to itT 
A. Well, I got up and went to the barn, and had to go to 
. the house and get my keys, and a car was sitting-
page 91 ~ down there with the lights on, and I j-q.st noticed 
it. 
Q. You say you saw a car sitting down there with the lights 
onY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What time was that? 
A. About 3 :30,-something like that. 
Q. How long after that was it that you had notice that an 
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A. I don't know-something like 15 or 20 minutes. 
Q. Did you go to the scene of the accident 1 
A. With Mr. Twy:q1an. 
Q. With ~Ir. Twyman, you say~ 
A. Yes, sir, me and him walked down the road together. 
Q. Did ~Ir. Twyman have the appearance of being under 
the influence of whiskey¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you talk to him! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you discuss the accident with him~ 
A. He said a truck was turned over and a man under it 
and come and help him get him out. 
Q. Did he say anything to you about calling the law Y 
A. Yes, he asked if there was a telephone there, and asked 
somebody to call the ambulance. 
Q. How long have you wqrked at the Jamerson DairyY 
A. I reckon 12 or 14 months-something like that. 
Q. Are you very familiar with the road between the point 
where this accident occurred and Danville Y 
page 92 ~ A. Pretty much. 
Q. Coming from towards Danville to the point 
where this accident occurred, is there any obstruction between 
the top of the hill towards Danville and the place where 
the accident occurred? 
A. I shouldn't think so. 
Q. Is there any great deal of difference in the visibility on 
one side of the depression there from the other! . 
.A. Not so much-a little bit, but not so much, I don't think. 
Q. Have you driven over that road at night? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Could you see before you reached the point where this 
accident occurred-was the road plainly visible in front of 
you? 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you present when Mr. Shelton made some tests 
and demonstrations out therP. on the highway? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In order for him to park his car on the right-hand side 
of the l1ighway, just east of the end of the guard rail, where 
did he have to drive it Y 
A. He drove it just up against the bank. 
Q. Did he drive it up on the bank Y 
A. His wheels were up against it-I don't know whether he 
was up on it. 
Q. His wheels were across the ditch? 
A. Yes, sir, his wheels were across the ditch. 
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Q. While he was there, making these demonstrations, did 
other automobiles pass Y 
A. Yes, sir. ' · 
Q. Did he have any tail lig·ht on . his car 7 
A. No, sir. 
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A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you formerly work for the Carlbrook DairyY 
A. I used to, yes, sir. 
Q. When did you work for them? 
A. Well, I was 'vorking there at the time Mr. Shelton come 
down there. It was year before last. 
Q. Did you bring milk into Danville 1 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you drive a truck 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·At that time, what was the customary hour for you to 
leave Ingram? 
A. Well, when I left home, I aimed to get up at one o'clock 
and dress and get my load and get into town-
Q. How late was it 'vhen you got· back Y 
A. It was different hours, usually around three and four 
o'clock. 
Q. Did you sometimes get back later 7 
A. Yes, I.have been later getting· in. 
Q. Would you sometimes get back as late as six o'clock~ 
A. I don't know whether I have or not. I just don't recall 
whether it has been that late or not. It has been right late 
sometin1es when I would get back. 
Q. How far is it from the place where this accident oc-
curred to the place of business of this Carl brook Dairy Y 
A. I just couldn't hardly tell. · It is about 6 miles from 
there to Danville, and they say it is about 22 miles from 
Carlbrook to Danville. 
Q. And that is not counting the distance through 
page 94 ~ the cityY 
A. No, sir, I don't suppose so. / 
CROSS EXAMINATION. I 
By Mr. Bendall: 
Q. ~{r. Shepherd, when did you leave the employ of the 
Carlbrook Dairy? 
A. When did I leave? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I just couldn't ·tell you. I worked a while after Mr. 
Shelton come there. 
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Q. ·what year was it 1 
A. Year before last. 
Q. Why did you leave 1 
.A. I got another job at the time. Me and Mr. Shelton didn't 
get along. 
Q. He discharged you f 
A. Well, I don't know whether he did or not. 
Q. One of you had to leave, and it was you~ 
A. No, I didn't have to leavef 
Q. But you left? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who was it, on the night of the accident, came up to 
your home and informed you of the accident? 
A. Ryland Shelton and ~ir. Twyman. 
Q. You know Ryland Shelton' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You tell the court and jury that both of them came down 
there--you are sure of that? 
A. Yes, sir. Twy1nan never come in the barn, but Ryland 
Shelton eome in the barn. :.Mr. Twyman was out from the 
barn. 
Q. And you say· you sa'v an automobile down 
page 95 ~ there at the scene of the accident when you went 
to the barn-yot} don't know whether it was this 
same automobile or not? 
A. I don't know 'vhether it was the same automobile, but 
there was one do,vn there ''Then I went to the barn. 
Q. What time did you go to the barn Y 
A. Something like ten minutes· past three. 
Q. \Vhat time was it 'vhen they came down there for you Y 
A. Something like four o'clock. 
Q. How did you know there was a car down there, other 
than by the lig·hts' · 
A. I heard a car crank up the motor and cut off, and then 
I saw the lights. · 
Q. How long did you hear that? 
A. It just cranked up and cut off. 
Q. Did you hear it more than once, or was it continuous 7 
A. I don't remember hearing it but once. 
Q. Did anyone else go with you from the barn? 
A. Yes, sir. Clifton Thompson went with Ryland to Mr. 
Jamerson's to call the ambulance. 
Q. He 'vent with Ryla11;d to call the ambulance? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. W11ere was Mr. Twyman then? 
A. Me and him was standing in the road. . 
Q. Was Mr. T'vyman drinking? 
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A. I couldn't tell that he ·was. 
Q. Did you get close to him? 
A. Yes, sir . 
. Q. Did you talk with him 1 
.A. Yes, sir. 
page 96 ~ Q. You testified at this case in the preliminary 
hearing at Schoolfield on the 31st day of Octo-
ber, 1935, didn't you, ].{r. Shepherd¥ 
A. Y.es, sir. 
Q. Didn't you testify then that you didn't pay any atten-
tion to ].!Ir. Twyman, and you didn't know whether he was 
drunk or not' 
A. No, sir, I didn't say that, I don't think. 
The Court: You say you couldn't tell it-do you mean 
you couldn't tell, or just didn't see any signs of it' 
Witness: I didn't see any signs of his drinking. 
The Court: The word ''could" implies that you were 
making an effort-
. Witness : I didn't make any effort. 
Q. The question was asked, did you have any occasion to 
observe him, and your answer was "No" . 
.A. How was that. 
Q. The question with reference to his drunken condition, 
and your answer was no, you didn't make any observation. 
A. I don't know what you mean by ''observation". 
Q. Did you observe him-did you see him? 
A. Yes, I saw him. 
Q. Did you see him enough to come to any conclusion as to 
whether he was drunk or sober~ 
A. Well, me and him walked from there down to the place 
of the. wreck, and he walk~d just as straight as I did. 
Q. I will ask you if this question wasn't asked you at School-
field: "If you didn't pay .much attention, what made you 
think he wasn't drunk~'' Answer, ''I don't know 
page 97 } if he was or wasn't''. ) 
A. I don't think I made that answer. 
Q. Mr. Shepherd, just beyond the scene of this accident, / 
is there a farm road leading out to the right, coming towards . 
Danville' 
.A. Going towards Danville? 
Q. ·Yes, sir. 
A. Yes, sir, it goes out to a colored fellow's house on the 
place. 
Q. And on the left-hand side of the road, just beyond the 
\, 
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scene of the accident, isn't there a place where you could push 
a car completely off the hard surface? 
A. You could drive one, but I don't know whether you could 
push it. 
Q. Why not¥ 
A. There is a ditch there about a foot deep. 
Q. You could push it into the ditch? 
A~ Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXA~IIN.A.TION. 
iBy Mr. Sanford: 
Q. If you pushed the automobile into the ditch, part of it 
would still be on the hig~way, wouldn't it 7 
A. I should think so-the wheels. 
Q. Did you observe any skid marks on the highway that 
night? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you notice any the next day Y 
A. No, sir. 
page 98 t OTIS HANKINS, 
called as a witness on behalf of the defendant, 
and being· :first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMiNATIO~T. 
By 1\1:r. Sanford: 
Q. Is you name Otis Hankins? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Otis, where do you live, or where do you call homeY 
A. War, West Virginia. 
Q. On October 27, 1935, were you employed at a C. C. C. 
Camp on the Mt. Cross road? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On Saturday night-that is, on October 26-did you 
go into Danville Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who went with you? 
A. Well, I went with several boys on the army truck. I 
went in with a truck load of them. 
Q. What did you do in Danville Y 
A. Went to the show. 
Q. What time did you leave Danville going towards camp 7 
A. It was a few minutes to twelve. . 
Q. Were you picked up on the road? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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-- Q. What road were you picked up on f 
A. On Route #58. 
-Q. How far from Danville? 
A. I would say somewhere between a mile or two. 
Q. Who were you withY 
A. I was with a boy Shelton, and we met Nest or and Mays. 
Q. You were with Shelton and you met Nestor 
page 99 ~ and Mays? 
· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who picked you up Y 
A. Mr. Twyman. 
Q. What par.t of the car did you take your seat in f · 
A. On the left-hand side of the rear seat. 
Q. After you started towards camp, did you have any 
trouble with the car? 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
Q. What trouble did you have? 
A. Well, I don't know; it ,just wouldn't run. 
Q. Did you and the other boys push? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How much pushing did you do f 
A. Well, I don't know. We pushed fot; two or three hours. 
Q. What made you finally stop? 
A. Well, we got to a hill and couldn't get up any further, 
and just had to park. 
Q. You couldn't push it any further, so you just gave up 
and parked it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you assist Mr. Twyman in the parking of the car f 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Just tell the jury what you did Y 
A. I stood out there and directed him. I 'vas directing 
him where to run it to. 
Q. Where did he put it 7 
A. He put. it on the shoulder on the right-hand side of 
·the road; the two right-hand wheels were off. 
Q. I will show you a m'ap. Point out to the jury about ) 
where this car was parked with reference to the J 
page 100 ~ guard rail on the Mt. Cross Road. This is sup- -· 
posed to indicate the guard rail near where the 
accident occurred. This is towards Mt. Oross. This is to-
wards Danville. Now whereabouts on this road, with refer-
ence to this guard rail, was the car parked Y 
A. This is the guard rail Y 
Q. Yes, and this is where the car was supposed to be after 
the accident. This is the guard rail near where the accident 
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rail along this highway, was this car parked; wher€ did you 
stop it? 
A. I figure it was along here somewhere. 
Q. What distance from the guard ra.il? 
A. Around 10 feet. 
Q. What part of the car was off the hard surface when 
you got into it f 
A. Was off the hard surface Y 
Q. Yes. 
A. The right-hand side was about half-way off, I think. 
Q. Were the lights burning f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you and Mr. Twyman have any conversation after 
you got back in the car? 
A. Yes, sir, we said something about walking on into camp, 
and he looked to see what tin1e· it was, and said something 
about re.sting and then walking on to camp. 
Q. What time was it? 
A. It was ten to four. 
Q. Did you walk on in to camp'! 
A. No. 
page 101 } Q. What was the next thing you knewf 
A. The next thing I knew I was down on my 
knees on the floor boards of the car. 
Q. Were all the other boys all in the car when you got in 
the last time 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What happened to you 7 
A. You mean when the accident happened 7 
Q. Yes. 
A. I got four fractured vertebrae .. 
Q. Are you wearing a cast now 7 
A. Wearing a brace. 
Q. Were you removed to the hospital that night? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Otis, was there anything about Mr. Twyman's manner 
or conduct that indicated he was drinking before t1Jis accident 
occurred? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you see him taking a drin~ 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Were you drinking? 
A. No, sir. 
. Q. As far as you could tell, were any of the other boys 
drinking? 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. Why did it take you so long to go from the place you 
were picked up to "rhere the accident occurred? 
A. Well, just as soon as we turned off at this intersection, 
we had to push it until we got where the accident happened. 
Q. What caused you to go to sleep so quickly? · 
A. Well, I don't know unless it was just being so tire'd 
and worried. 
page 102 ~ Q. Did any cars pass you while you were 
stopped there on the highway? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. As far as you could tell, was the car as far off the high-
way as you could get it¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Carter: 
Q. You say the last you knew, it was about 10 minutes to 
4 o'clock? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is when you got in the car 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you say at that time you had backed the car off the 
nard surface, half off and half on? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And this accident occurred at 4 :20? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You had been asleep half an hour? 
A. I don't thing it was that long. 
Q. Well, you certainly had been asleep for some time Y 
A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. You don't know where the car was when it was struck? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Yon don't know whether the lights were on or off? 
A. They were on when I went to sleep. 
Q. But you don't know whether they were on or off when 
the car was struck Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. As a matter of fact, if a. car passed you on the right 
before the accident, you were so asleep you didn't see them? 
A. No, sir. 
page 103 r Q. were the other boys asleep before you were? 
A. I think so. o 
Q. Neither you or Mr. Twyman or any of the other boys 
tried to push the car back a little ways down the road and off 
the edge? 
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Q. That could have been very easily done, couldn't it Y 
A. Well, I don't know about that. 
Q. Didn't you testify over here last week, I believe it was, 
in a criminal matter? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Didn't you say then that the only reason you didn't 
push it off down there was that you just didn't think about it?. 
A. Yes, sir. I didn't think of it, myself. I don't know 
what about Mr. Twyman. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Sanford: 
Q. Have you been back to the place where this accident 
occurred since? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When was that~ 
A. It was day before yesterday. 
Q. Was that the only time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Along the right-hand side of the road-that is, your 
right-hand side that night-is there any space there within 
100 feet that you could get a car completely off the hard 
surface without going into the ditch-that is, on the right-
hand side? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you see any obstruction there in the 
page 104 r road that would prevent a person com~g from 
towards Danville from seeing the automobile in 
its parked position Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was there any difference in the hill on one side or the 
other side of where the accident occurred Y 
A. Well, I don't think so. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Carter: 
Q. Yon went out there in the daytime Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You didn't go out there and see how the lights would 
strike that car parked there at night? 
A. No. 
Q. You say there was no place on the right-hand side, but 
there was on the left-hand side just a very short distance 
away, wasn't there? 
A. Well, I do~ 't remember. 
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C. E. SHEPHERD, 
.re-called· by the plaintiff, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. Bendall: 
Q. Mr. Shepherd, how long was it you heard this automobile 
down there before you discovered there had been an accident T 
A. It was around 30 minutes, I suppose-something like 
that. 
Q. Around 30 minutes. I will ask you if at Schoolfield you 
didn't say, in answer to these questions : ''Did you see or 
hear an automobile or vehicle of some kind· near the scene 
of the accident before the accident 1 '' Your an-
page 105 ~ swer, "Yes". "How long before?" Your an-
swer, ''Something nke an ho1;1r, I reckon''. This 
question, "What did you hear or see~" Answer, "I went 
to the barn and forgot my keys and I went back, and as I 
come out of the door, I heard this car crank up and cut 
off a time or two, and I never paid no more attention to it, 
but I went on to work". Did you make that statement? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And you say it was an hour before the accident in this 
statement? 
A. I don't know whether I said an hour or not. It wasn't 
as much as an hour; I don't think I said an hour. 
RUSSELL TURNER, 
called as a witness on behalf of the defendant, and being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows : · 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By ~{r. Sanford: 
Q. Is your name Russell Turner 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you live, Mr. TurnerY / 
A. I live in Danville. 
_ Q. What is your occupation Y 
A. Service manager of Gardner Motor Company. 
Q. Do you recall when an accident occurred on the Mt. 
Cross R.oad which involved a truck of the Carlbrook Dairy 
and a car owned by Mr. Twyman 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was Mr. Twyman's car fixed in your garage Y 
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Q. Did you have occasion to go to the scene of the accident. 
on the morning thereafter? 
A. Yes, sir, I was -called up there to get the 
page 106 ~ wreck. 
Q. Had the cars been moved when you got 
there? 
A. The truck had. 
Q. Where was Mr. Twyman's car? 
A. It was up there in that dip beyond the guard rail from 
where the accident occurred-a. little above th~ guard rail. 
Q. Have you frequently traveled that road f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At the time you got there, were any marks visible, made 
by either the truck or the car 7 · 
A. I didn't particularly notice the marks. I noticed quite a 
bit of milk down there; and couldn't ten much about the road-
bottles and milk. 
Q. What time did you get there 7 
A. Right around 8 o'clock. 
Q. Eight o'clock in the morning? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you driven over that highway at night? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As you approach the scene of the accident coming from 
Danville, is there anything to obstruct your view? 
A. No, sir. There is a very small knoll there before you 
get to where the accident occurred, but I imagine you can 
see a car all right there. Of course, there wasn't any parked 
there at the time I went over the road. · 
Q. Is there a. great deal of difference between the vision 
coming from the east than coming from the west? 
A. Than it is coming towards Danville"/ 
Q. Is there any difference in the vision going towards Mt. 
Cross and going towards Danville! 
page 107 ~ A. Yes, sir, there is a little difference. There 
is a lmoll going east-going to,vards Mt. Cross-
a small one. · 
Q. Well, coming the other way? 
A. That is coming~ down hill almost all the way, on a level 
coming down hill. 
Q. Where was :h1:r. Twyman's car struck! 
A. In the back, on the left rear side. 
Q. On the left of the rear tire carrier 7 
A. Yes, it knocked tl1e tire carrier to one side--to the right. 
Q. Did you see the truck? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Where was that Y ·. 
A. At. the Wyatt-Chevrolet place. 
Q. Where was the blow on that? 
A. It was on the left of the front. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Carter: 
Q. Mr. Turner, you say you are in charge of the service 
department of Gardner ~fotor Company? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been in the automobile business? 
A. About 12 or 14 years. 
Q. You have driven all sorts of cars during that period of 
~eY . 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would you say that you are an expert automobile 
driver? 
A. I don't know. Everyone else says so. 
Q. Aren't you considered the best driver in town f 
A. I would think so, yes. Of course, everybody thinks they 
are the best driver. 
page 108 r Q. Isn't this true-a. man who has his foot on 
the accelerator and is confronted with the neces-
·sity to stop, can he in1mediately stop that car, or does it 
take an appreciable time to take his foot from the accelerator 
and move it to the brake? 
A. I have noticed most drivers kind of hesitate-some of 
them do it in two or three seconds. 
Q. Your idea is that even a good driver would take a second 
or two? 
A. I believe he would. 
Q. So the car would go some considerable distance in that 
second or two before he could even apply the brake? 
A. Yes, sir, I think so. 
F. W. TWYMAN, 
the defendant, called as a witness in his own behalf, and 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Sa.nford: · 
Q. Is your name F. W. Twyman Y 
A. Yes. 
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Q. On the night of October 27-morning, rather, of October 
27, were you involved in an accident with a truck driven by 
Mr. Lloyd Adkins Y 
A. I was. · 
Q. On the night in question, Mr. Twyman, where had you 
beenY 
A. Well, I had been out to this tea room-the Drift Inn 
tea room out on the Martinsville Road. 
Q. What thne did you leave there? 
A. I left there around 11 or 11 :30. 
Q. Then where did you gof 
page 109 ~ A. Went on back to Danville. 
Q. What time did you leave Danville, going 
towards campY 
A. Right close to 1 o'clock. 
Q. Were you at that time employed at the 0. C. C. Camp 
on }ft. Cross f 
A. I was. 
Q. In what capacity? 
A. As labor foreman. 
Q. And what time did you leave Danville going towards 
campY 
A. About 1 o'clock. 
Q. Did you pick up anyoneY 
A. Well, about a mile out of Danville I stopped to get gas, 
and two 0. C. C. boys asked me to give them a ride back to 
camp, Nestor and Mays. 
Q. Then did you pick up any more 1 
A. Yes, a couple of hundred yards down the ro·ad a couple 
more boys waved me down and I picked them up. 
Q. Did you have any trouble with your a.utomobileY . 
A. As I turned off #58 on 1\it. Cross, on this rather long 
hill, the car started missing, and about three-quarters of the 
way up the boys started pushing. Something was wrong 
with the gas line. The car would pull on a level, but on a 
hill, it wouldn't. I tried it in first and second, but it wasn't 
getting enough gas to pull, that was all. 
Q. What caused you finally to stop the automobile? 
A. Well, it seems like the car kept running worse and 
worse, and most of the hills I had to push it over-that is, 
the boys did-I had to drive, and when we got _just this side 
of Mr. Jamerson's there· is a hill each way, and the battery 
went dead and we had to stop. · 
Q. Before you finally came to a stop, tell what 
page 110 ~ you did about getting the car off the highway. 
A. We were there in this depression. In drift-
ing down the hill on the· D·anville side of the accident, we 
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tried to start the car and the . car did start, and all the boys 
jumped in and we went on down to . the next hill and tried 
'to start again, and the battery wouldn't turn the motor over, 
and we drifted down the hill and it didn't do much good, and 
I felt we couldn't go any further. I allowed the car to drift 
on down the hill, and I parked it on the right-hand side of 
the road, or parked it on the right-hand side. 
Q.- Did the car drift .on.down as far .as it would under its 
own power? 
A. Yes, it did. And Hankins was there, pushing the car, 
and of course I cut it to one side. The car was off the road; 
I could feel this side of the car go off the road and in a sligl1t 
depression. 
Q. Were your lights burning at that time~ 
A. They were. · 
. Q. Was Hankins the last man who got in the automobile Y 
A. He was. 
Q. Then what did you all do? 
A. Well, I decided-of course I 'vanted to get the car in 
if I could, but I decided to stay awake, and told these other 
boys to go to sleep, and I would try to stop someone and 
get them to give us a push on into camp, and shortly ther<'-
a~ter I dropped off myself. 
Q. At that time were you at all under the influence of liquor 
or intoxicating beverages Y 
A. Well, of course that evening out at the Driftwood Tea 
Room I had taken two or three drinks, and of course I was 
under the influence of those three drinks, but I 
page 111 ~ wasn't drunk .. 
. Q. How long had it been since you had thoseT 
A. I left there about 11 :30. 
Q. What time did this accident occur 7 
A. When we stopped there it was, according to the best of 
my lmowledge, around 4 o'clock, and the accident must have 
occurre~ shortly thereafter-15 or 20 minutes, possibly a 
little later. 
Q. Was there ample room to the left of your car fo"r a · J 
vehicle to pass Y / 
A. I think there was. 
Q. How far was your car knocked from the place where it 
was parked .or had stopped, to the point where it came to 
rest after the accident 7 
A. About 60 feet. 
Q. With respect to the guard rail that we have talked about, 
point out on this map about where your car was parked at 
-the time you went to sleep. 
\ 
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A. My car was parked along here-about ten feet from the 
railing here. 
Q. About 10 feet east of the railingt 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And after the accident, where was it, with respect to 
this mapY 
A. About 60 feet in this direction-! imagine right in here. 
The post was knocked out. 
Q. Was the front of your car through the guard rail on the 
left-hand side Y 
A. It was. 
Q. Where was the truck after the accident f 
A. Well, the truck came to rest about 15 feet back of my 
car. The truck was lying across the road on its left side, 
with the motor protruding on the right-hand side of the road. 
Q. Mr. Twyman, take these two cars on the table here, 
and demonstrate to to the jury the position of 
page ll2 } your car and the position of the truck. ' 
A. Like this book was the road, we were going 
out towards Mt. Cross. My car· was sitting at an angle, lik~ 
that, and the truck was 15· feet back this way, towards D·an-
ville, lying on its left side, with its motor .tow;"rds the right 
side. 
The Court: At right angles or diagonally-tJ'.e truck? 
Witness : I would say practically at right angles with the 
road. 
Q. After the accident, Mr. Twyman, what did you do? 
A. Well, I got out of my car. and found this boy Ryland 
Shelton, and we tried-the four of us tried-to lift the car 
and couldn't do it, so we ran up to Mr. Jamerson's Dairy 
barn, and he went on ahead into the barn there and found 
].{r. Shepherd, I believe, and then when he came back, I asked 
him if he knew these people and he said he did, and I sug-
gested that he call the ambulance. _ 
Q. Did you return to the scene of the accident! 
A. I did. . 
Q. Did you all get the truck off Mr. Adkins~ 
A. We did. 
Q. What did you do then? 
A. We had to wait perhaps ten minutes for tbe ambulance 
to get there-it may have been :fifteen, and of course I was 
looking after Hankins at the time, and when the ambulance 
came, I went in to to\vn with Hankins. 
Q. Did you come back to the scene of the accident 7 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Were you then arrested 1 
A. I was. 
Q. Did you have any opportunity to observe 
page 113 } any marks on the highway? 
A. No, I didn't. vVhen I got back to the scene 
of the accident and got out, ~ir. Farmer asked to see my 
driving permit and then he turned me over to Chief Cole. 
f wanted to look around, but Chief Cole was sleepy and wanted 
to go on. 
Q. Did Chief Cole accuse you of being intoxicated 1 
A. He did, and I told him if he thought that, I ·wanted to 
mill a doctor and let him say, and not hill?-. · 
Q. Did he do that 1 
A. He did not. 
Q. What did he do? 
A. Took me to jail and locked me up. 
Q. Did you go back to the scene of the accidentf 
A. I did. 
Q. When? 
A. The next day. 
Q. Did you examine the road with reference to skid marks? 
A. I did. 
Q. What did you find? 
A. Two skid marks, one apparently made by my car. and one 
by the truck. 
Q. Was the skid mark made by the truck apparently made in 
turning over? 
A. That was my idea-it was kinda flattened out. 
Q. In which dii·ection did it go? 
A. Over to the left-in the direction of the left. 
Q. Did you meet any cars on the road that night, before 
. you finally stopped your car? 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. There was very little traffic, was there 7 
page 114} A. I didn't see any. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. No traffic at all? / 
Q. How long have you been with the C. C. C. Camp, ~Ir. 
Twyman? 
A. Since November, 1933. 
Q. Where is your home? 
A. Appomattox, Virginia. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Carter: 
Q. Mr. Twyman, how long had you been located at this 
C. C. C. Camp out on the Mt. Cross Road at the time of the 
accident? 
A.. I had be~n there since April. 
Q. Then you had been there something over six months? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How frequently had you had occasion to drive back and 
forth over this road from camp to Danville and return Y 
A.. Well, in that time, I probably averaged going to Dan-
ville twice a week, something like that. 
Q. You were thoroughly familiar with the road Y 
A. I was. 
Q. Do you know whether tha.t road is a state highway or 
not? 
A. No, I don't think it is numbered. 
Q. It is a hard surface road Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And it is a road that receives considerable use? . 
A. Well, I wouldn't say that; it hasn't been my observation. 
Q. You don't think there is a considerable amount of traf-
fic that moves over it to Danville? 
page 115 ~ A. There may be; I never have noticed it. 
Q. What tim.e did you leave camp on the after-
noon of Octob~r 26? 
A. About 8 o'clock. 
Q. Were you alone ~1 
A. At that time, yes. 
Q. And did you go right in to Danville? 
A. I did. . 
Q. What time did you go to the Drift Inn tea room"' 
A. We left Danville, I think, between 9 :15 and 9 :30. 
Q. You refer to "'ve "-I assume there were others with 
vouf 
.. A. Another boy was with me. 
Q. You and just one other boy? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Does l1e live in Danville Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where is the Drift Inn tea roomY . 
A. I think it is about 15 miles out on the Martinsville R<>ad 
-13 or 15. 
Q. Isn't it east of Bachelor's HallY 
A. It is just this side of Bachelor's Hall. 
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Q. Aren't you mistaken about the distance out there-isn't 
it about 8 or 10 miles Y 
A. Well, I may be;· all my travelling to there has been 
through the country. · 
·Q. It is right along the side of Route #58, the :Martin~ville 
highway? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What sort of place is the Drift Inn tea room; what 
do you do out there? . 
. A. Well, frankly, I don't know. I have been 
page 116 ~ out there on two occasions. 
Q. Isn't it a dance hall' 
A. It was that night. 
Q. And drinking place Y 
A. I suppose you would call it that. · 
Q. A pretty good crowd out there? 
A. That night there were plenty besides myself. 
Q. And there is general drinking! 
A. Well, if you want to say so. 
Q. I just want to know wl!a.t you say. 
A. Well, I admitted that I was drinking. 
Q. They serve beer out there Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did yQu buy a.ny beerY 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You were drinking whiskey! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As you recall it, you had three drinks Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are you sure you didn't take more than three f 
A. I am. 
Q .. My experience is that after the second one, you sort of 
lose count; ~on 't you find that true Y 
A. Not after my second. 
Q. You don't have any difficulty keeping count? 
A. Up to the second one. 
Q. How about the third? 1 
A. Up to the third one. I 
page 117 ~ Q. You are pretty sure about the three drinks! · 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you leave theref 
A. 11:30. . 
Q. And you left· with the same gentleman Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was he drinking, too Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you dro.ve right on back to Danville¥ 
\ ,_,_ 
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A. Yes. 
Q. You drove the carY 
A. No, he drove. 
Q. He did. Did you stop in Danville 1 
A. Yes, we got a sandwich, and he said he would ~o on 
home. 
Q. Did you have anything more to drink 1 
A. I didn't. 
Q. Any beer? 
A. No, coffee. 
Q. How long were you there in Danville f 
A. Not more than half an hour. 
Q. Did you take him home? 
A. No. . 
Q. Then you started for the C. C. C. Camp f 
A. Yes. 
Q. What time~ 
A. Right around one o'clock. It might have been :five or 
ten minutes before. 
Q. You said you left Danville for the Drift Inn 
page 118 ~ about 9 :15 or 9 :30? 
A. About that time. 
Q. It certainly didn't take you more than 10 minutes to 
drive there f 
A. I will say if it is 13 miles it would take longer than 
that. 
Q. Well, say, half an hour-it didn't take you more than 
half an hour; that is 9:45; you stayed out there an hour? 
A. Possibly longer. 
Q. Could you give me some idea of how long it was you 
stayed? Did you dance anyT 
A. Some. 
Q. Did you kno"7 any folks out there? 
A. No. 
Q. That is a pretty ,live. place, isn't it? 
A. I didn't think it . was so hot, myself. 
Q. It is a big time place, though 1 
A. I think it is considered as such. 
Q. That is what people go there forT 
A. Yes. 
Q~ And that is what you went for? 
A. I went to look around. 
Q. And you still think you were not there more than an 
'hour? 
A. I might have been there longer. I could :figure it out. · 
Q. How ~oul~ you g_o about doing that 7 
A. See how long it takes to drive out there and back~ · : 
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Q. You either miscalculated how long you stayed in Dan-
ville or how long you stayed out there, didn ~t you Y · 
A. I left Danville about 9 :15, got out there about 10, and 
stayed about an hour and got back to Danville 
page 119 ~ about 11 :30. 
Q. Do you think it took you 45 minutes -to get 
· backY 
A. No. 
Q. You were a. little speedier coming back! 
A. Yes. 
Q. You kind of stepped on the gas Y 
A. We didn't speed. 
Q. But you did get back a little quicker¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. What time did you get back to Danville Y 
A. About a quarter past twelve. 
Q. You think it took three-quarters of an hour to get back 
·a distance of 13 miles t · 
A. It may have been 11 :30 or 12 when we left there. 
Q. It might have been 11 :30 or 12 when you left there Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. You probably were out there 1-1/2 hours to 2 hours! 
A. Possibly, yes, sir. 
Q. Are there any bouncers out there at the tea room ~l 
A. I don't recall any. 
. Q. When you left, you say you left Danville ahout one 
·o'clock in the morning y 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. You stopped at a filling station going out' 
A. You mean after one o'clock¥ 
Q. Yes. . 
A. I stopped at the first filling station on the left; right 
out of Danville. 
Q. You crossed. the Union Street Bridge? 
A. I did. 
page 120 ~ Q. And you stopped at the first filling station on 
the left after that f 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you get theref 
A. Five gallons of gas. 
Q. Anything else Y 
A. No. 
Q. And then you went on up that #58 highway--the c~on­
crete road-and I suppose you picked up these C. C. C. boys 
before you got to the place where you turned off! 
A. I picked up two where I got the gas, and picked up the 
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Q. Did you have any trouble going to the Drift Inn 7 . 
.A.. No, sir. 
Q. Did you have any trouble coming back to Danville? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you have any trouble until you got the gas 7 
A. No, sir. It might have missed once or twice, but no 
serious trouble, until I turned off to the right. 
Q. And right away you started having trouble f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You couldn't get along at all going up hills! 
A. I didn't say we couldn't get along at all; the boys pushed. 
Q. All these boys had to get out and start pushing. How 
far is that point where you turned off #58 to where this 
accident occurred Y 
A. It is about 3 miles. 
Q. And it took you from shortly after 1 o'clock to shortly 
after 4 o'clock to make those 3 miles Y 
page 121 ~ A. It did. · 
Q. How much further along the road was the 
C. C. C. Camp from the point of the accident Y 
A. About 3 miles. 
Q. You got about half way from #58 to the C. C. C. Camp 
before you gave up in disgust! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did it ever occur to you, going along there, that you 
might get off the road, instead of being a menace to traffic Y 
A. It occurred to me, but I thought I would like to get the 
car in. 
Q. It did occur to you it was a dangerous situation t 
A. No, not while the car was running. 
Q. What did occur to you was a dangerous situation! 
A. After the car was parked. 
Q. It did occur to you·that that was a dangerous situation! 
A. Yes. 
Q. And notwithstanding that, you parked the car theret 
A. I had to. 
Q. These boys had had no particular trouble in pushing the 
car up these various hills Y 
A. I am su1·e that they had. 
Q~ How many hills are there in that 3 miles Y 
A. I couldn't say, but the land is rather rolling in there. 
Q. Certainly there are 6 or 8 hills'between #58 and where 
you stopped Y 
A. Probably more than that. 
Q. How much of that distance had they actually pushed the 
carf 
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A. You have got me; I don't know. 
pag~ 122 ~ Q. Probably as much as half! 
A. No, I wouldn't say that. 
Q. Certainly a mile:-a third of it Y 
A. No, not a third of it. 
Q. Well, half a mile-a sixth of it' 
A. I would say around a fourth of it. 
Q. Around a fourth of it-in other words, three-quarters 
of a mileY 
A. Ym;, ~ir. 
Q. Mr. Twyman, can you give the ju1 y any explana~iou of 
why it wouldn't have been a very simple matter to have pushed 
the car 100 feet at most off the hard surface, off the left-hand 
sideY 
A. The only reason I have is that I didn't see any place to 
park it. We had gone past the scene of the accident and the 
car died down and I couldn't start it, and I felt like there was 
room tq pass the car, in an open place-no reason for anyone 
coming along and running into it. 
Q. Did you under~ake to go back and see at all whether it 
was practical to push the car off the road Y 
A. My car was parked off the road. 
Q. But fully half of it was on the hard surface, accordoing 
to your testimony. 
A. I wouldn't say half, but two wheels 'vere off. 
Q. That left two wheels on the hard surface, and half the 
car on the hard surface? · 
A. I wouldn't say half the car. . 
Q. But you certainly didn't go to the trouble, or think it 
. necessary, to even look back and see if it wasn't possible to 
push the car a few feet and get it out of danger¥ 
A. I thought my car was in a safe place. 0 
page 123 ~ Q. You did ; do you still think it was? . 
A. Yes, sir, I think so now, going back and look-
ing at it. 
Q. You think it was as safe on the hard surface as it would 
have been offY 
A. No, I don't think there was any place to get it off. 
Q. You don't mean to deny the testimony of certain wit-
nesses who testifiedthat 100 feet on the left, and a littleo'fur-
ther on the rigl1t, it could have been pushed entirely off the 
hard surface Y 
0 
A. What do you mean, left? 
. Q. On the left, going towards Mt. Cross Y 
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A. (Interrupting) Isn't the road shown by the map you 
have introduced here 7 
Q. This profile map-where did you say on this map the 
· • ear was at the time of the accident-on the profile. 
A. Right in here. 
Q. In other words, you stopped on the hill, do I understand 
you to sayY 
A. No, it was along in here. 
Q. You say there was no place on the left-hand side of the 
road, without going up a hill on the left-hand side going 
towards Mt. Cross Y 
A. The farm road you are speaking of is up a. grade-a 
very steep grade. 
Q. I am not speaking of a road; couldn't you have just 
pushed it off.-isn 't there just a field over on the left-hand 
sideY 
A. Yes, sir, this is a field right here. Here is the scene 
of the accident. 
Q. That is going towards Mt. Cross, isn't it? 
A. No, towards Danville. 
Q. Wasn't ther.e a field where you could have parked, 
'vithin 100 feet back? · 
page 124 ~ A. No, there is no place to my knowledge. 
Q. You told the jury just a few minutes ago 
that it did occur to you that if you stopped anywhere you 
would be in a position of danger, didn't you i 
A. I did. 
Q. A~d when you did stop, you did not look to see if there 
was any place you could get off the road 1 
A. No, there was no doubt in my mind when I stopped there 
that anybody had room to go by. 
Q. Were you right sleepy? 
A. I was tired, naturally. 
Q. When you got into your car, you are quite positive you 
turned your lights on, or kept them on f 
A. When I parked my car, the lights were on. 
Q. You told a jury here last week that you didn't know 
whether your lights were on or not at the time of the acci-
dent? 
A. Well, of course I was asleep at the time of the accident, 
but-
Q. Your battery had gone dead? 
A. The battery was weak~ 
Q. Wouldn't the battery being weak affect the lights f 
A. It wpuld some. 
Q. The battery had gotten so weak it wouldn't turn the 
motor! · 
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A. It had. 
Q. The last you recall, they were burning brightly Y 
A. I never paid particular-! never noticed about their 
particular brightness or dimness. I know I had lights. 
Q. Would you say they were in such condition you could 
observe them 500 feet away? 
A. You say were they in a condition so they 
page 125 ~ could be observed 500 feet away? They were. 
Q. You think they were? 
A. I know that. 
Q. Mr. Twyman, with your car body on the hard surface, 
with your lights, as you say, perhaps dim, but as you recall 
it, on, your got under the wheel and went to sleep? 
A. It wasn't voluntarily. I just went off to sleep. 
Q. You were tired and exhausted Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you got back into the car, was it almost an -im-
mediate thing that you went to sleep? 
A. No, I reckon I stayed awake 5 or 10 minutes. I smoked 
a cigarette. 
Q. All the other boys had already gone to sleep? 
A. Well; they were quiet; I presume they were asleep. 
Q. And you were just sitting there in the road, smoking a 
cigarette? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You did finally drop off to sleep, and the next thing you 
.... knew, the accident had occurred T 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't see the truck approach you Y 
A. I did not. · 
Q. You don't know how fast it was running¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You don't know whether its lights were on or offT 
A. Of the truckY 
Q. Yes, sir. 
page 126 ~ A. No, sir. 
Q. You don't know what the driver did to avoid 
A. I do not . 
the accident, if anything at all? I 
. Q. Yd.out 1jus~ __ hfave nho kno'"!ldedgte of anything that occurred _,____ · 1mme 1a e y ~ ore t e acc1 en T 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Where were you the first thing you realized immediately 
after the accident T 
A. The first thing I realized when I got out of the car. 
I saw a plank against the door. I had· to sort of slide out 
the door. · 
\ 
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Q. What kind of plank? 
A. A plank or log-I couldn't open the door. I got out 
and went back to the truck. 
Q. How far away was the truck? 
A. About 15 feet from my car. . 
Q. I understood you to say on direct examination that your -
car was knocked about 60 or 70 feet? 
A. Something like that. 
Q. The truck had come on after it struck your car and 
turned over Y 
A. Well, the car had moved 60 feet from where it was last 
parked. 
Q. So the truck, from where it struck your car, it must have 
gone 40 or 50 feet before it turned over in the road 1 
A. It probably had. 
Q. You went back over to the truck; where was young Mr. 
Shelton? 
A. When I first noticed Mr. Shelton he was standing up in 
the road, right beside the truck. 
Q. Did you know anything about Mr. Adkins 7 
A. No, I asked him if he was driving, and he 
page 127 } said ''No'', and then we tried to lo~ate him. 
Q. Did you locate him? 
A; Yes. · 
Q. '¥here? 
A. Under the truck. 
Q. What was it you first saw? 
A. His hand. 
Q. Did you strike a match? 
A. I struck a match, of course. 
Q. And then got the C. ·C. C. boys and tried to lift the 
truck off and couldn't 1 
A. No, they couldn't. 
Q. And then you went for help? 
A. Y-es. 
Q. Where did you go? 
A. To Mr. Jamerson's, right in the yard. 
Q. Who went down to where the men were working Y 
A. ~Ir. Shelton did. 
Q. Where did you stay? 
A. Under the light. 
Q. Was anything said when he went down there about your 
'phoning for the ambulance? · · 
A. One of them came out with Mr. Shelton, and I suggested 
that if he knew the place, he had better call. . 
- Q. You don't recall Mr. Shelton. suggesting that_you call 
the ambulance Y · · 
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A. No, I don't. 
Q. Were you upset! 
page 128 ~ A. Certainly. 
Q. Excited 1 ·· 
A. Rather. 
Q. Were you hurt yourself 7 
A. Just minor bruises. 
Q. Who did actually do the 'phoning Y 
A. One of the men volunteered to. 
Q .. You did notY 
A. No. 
Q. You went back down to the scene of the accident 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you all went down there, you managed to get the 
truck off Mr. Adkins' body! · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Wha.t killed him, apparently, do you know¥ 
A. The truck apparently skidded on top of him. 
Q. Was his head badly mashed·! 
A. Yes, sir, it was. · 
Q. Had you discovered at that time that Mr. Hankins was 
hurt also, or 'vhen did you make that discovery Y 
A. Yes, sir, we knew then ·he was hurt. 
Q. How long w-ere you there before the ambulance came· and 
got him! 
A. I don't know. I guess I sat in the car with him 10 minutes 
before the ambulance came. 
Q. You didn't take a drink during that timet 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you have any whiskey with you f 
A. No, sir. 
page 129 ~ Q. Did you take a~y drink when yon came in 
town with the ambulance 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. In other word-s, you didn't take a drink after the acci-
dent that night! 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did any car at all, so far as you know, pass you out 
there while you were parked! 
A. Not as far as I know. 
Q. So if Mr. Scarce drove by there and saw your car witb ·. 
the lights out, parked in the middle of the road, that wa::; 
while· you were asleep! · 
A. Bound to have been. 
Q. You don't know whether anybody in the car hollered 
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at you and telling you to ''get that damned thing· out of the 
road"? 
.A. No, sir, I don't. 
Q. Is that happened, that happened while you were asleepf 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Defendant rests. 
REBUTTAL. 
B. C. COLEMAN, 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Bendall : 
Q. You are Mr. B. C. Coleman? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you live, Mr. Coleman 7 
A. Mt. Cross. 
Q. What is your occupation Y 
page 130 ~ A. Farmer. 
Q. In the winter time what do you· do f 
A. I work in the warehouse. 
Q. Acree's Warehouse in Danville 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Coleman, do you know the witness who testified here 
a while ago, by the name of Nestor? 
A. Y·es, sir, I have seen him several times. 
Q. Did you have occasion to see him and hear him talk on 
October 27 at Coleman's Store on Mt. Cross about 1 o'clock. 
A. ,Yes . 
. Q. What statement, if any, did he :i:nake about this accident f 
A. He was talking about the wreck and I asked him who 
~n was in it, and he went on to tell me. He. said the man 
who was driving was drunk and they all went to sleep. 
Q. Was the person who made this statement the same one 
who was on the witness stand testifying when you came out 
for purposes of identification f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was anybody· else there when he made that statement f 
A. My son was there. 
Q. What is your son's name f 
A. Raleigh Coleman. 
Q. Do you have any interest in the outcome of this caseY 
A. No, sir. 
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Bv Mr. Sanford: 
·Q. Are you related to ~Irs. Lloyd AdkinsY 
A. No, sir. 
Q. To Mr. Shelton Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Where did you say you were Y 
A. I was on the store porch. 
Q. You _say about 12 o'clock~ 
A. About 1 o'clock. 
Q. This boy came up there and told you that 7 
A. He was up at the store and 'vas talking about the wreck, 
and I was asking about it, and he told me-said .they had 
trouble with the car-had been somewhere to a dance. 
Q. Who did you first tell this to? 
A. Well, I told it over at my house, to my wife and father. 
Q. Then who else did you tell it to 1 
A. I don't know. I told it-
Q. Fiow did you make it known to ~{r. Shelton? 
A. I told it at the warehouse Sunday evening, and I reckon 
that is where he got hold of it. 
Q. Do you kno'y all the boys at the C. C. C. CampY 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How did you happen to know this boy ·Nestor? 
A. Well, T know eel his face. 
Q. Do you know all· the faces over there T 
A. No, sir. 
page 132 r RALEIGH COLEiviAN, · 
called as a witness pn behalf of the plaintiff, and 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT ·EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Bendall: 
Q. Your name is Raleigh Coleman? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are the son of ~Ir. B. C. Coleman? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you live up at Mt. Cross? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Raleigh, were you at Coleman's Store at Mt. Cross on 
Sunday, October 27, about 1 o'clock? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Do you recall seeing the witness who was testifying a 
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short time ago when you came out of the room for him to iden-
tify you ; do you recall seeing him there on that occasion Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you ever seen him before 7 
A. ~o, sir. . 
Q. Please state ·what statement he made regarding this 
accident that had occurred earlier in the morning. 
A. He said the boy driving the car was drunk, and they 
had been off to something they had over town, and had trouble 
with the car and parked it and went to sleep. 
OR08S EXAJ\IIINATION. 
By Mr. Sanford: 
Q. Didn't he say they accused the boy driving the car of 
being drunk Y · 
A. Yes, sir. 
pag·e 133 ~ RE-DIRECT EXAMINATIO~. 
By Mr. Bendall: 
Q. Did he say they accused him, or that he was drunk:Y 
A. I believe he said he was drunk. 
RE-CROSS EXA!!IINATION. 
Bv Mr. Sanford: 
"'Q. You are just not sure which he said Y 
A. I am almost positive of it. · 
Q~ You just told me that he said they accused the boy driv-
ing the car of being drunk; now which is right Y 
A. What I said at first. 
Q. What made you say t.he other 7 
A. I misunderstood. 
Q. 1Hisunderstood what Y 
A. The question you asked me. 
Q. What time 'vas it you saw this boyY 
A. It was something after 12 o'clock. 
Q. What time do they eat over at the C. C. C. Cam.pt 
A. I don't know. 
Q. It was something after 12; how much after Y 
A. I haven't any idea: · 
Q. Do you know whether it was after one Y 
A. I don't know whether it was or not. 
Q. Was it in the day or night 7 
A. In the day. 
Q. Was it as Iate as 3 o'clock! 
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A. No. 
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until today? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Where did this conversation take place? 
A. Out on Coleman's Store porch. 
Q. Have yon ever seen Nestor since that time 
B. C. COIJEMAN, 
recalled as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff. 
DIRECT EXAJ\1INATION. 
By ~{r. Bendall: 
Mr. Sanford: If your Honor please, this witness has been 
sitting there. . 
Q. You stated about this statement Nestor made in your 
presence at Coleman's Store on October 27; was his state-
ment that this man was accused-
The Court: He has already testified about that. 
Mr. Bendall: I simply wan{ to make it clear. 
The Court: You can't make it clear by repeating it. 
J. W. SHELTON, 
·recalled as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, testified as 
follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Carter: 
Q. Do you know Mr. Shepherd, who testified for the de~ 
fendant? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When did you first know him? 
A. I have known Mr. Shepherd for a good many years-
in fact, about three years before I went down there and taken 
charge of this dairy. 
Q. Do you know thE-' circumstances under which he left 
the service of the Carlbrook Dairy Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 135 ~ Q. What were they? 
_1\.. I let him go. 
Mr. Sanford: Does your Honor think that is material? 
Mr. Carter: . For the purpose of showing bias. 
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The Court: Mr. Shepherd himself testified that he and 
Mr. Shelton couldn't get along. ~fr. Shepherd frankly ad-
mitted there was trouble between him and Mr. Shelton. I 
don't know what you are trying to prove, but I should think 
that would be sufficient. 
STIPULATION. 
It is stipulated and ag·reed between counsel that the evi-
dence taken before C. R. Warren, Trial Justice, by Miss Ida 
Mandie, may be read as evidence for the purpose of contra-
diction in this case, without the appearance of 1\Iiss Mandie 
as a witness, in such cases as foundation may have been laid 
by counsel for contradiction. 
At this point, the jury was dismissed until Monday, March 
30. Counsel exchanged instructions, and submitted copies of 
instructions to the Court. 
Mr. Carter: If your Honor please, we don't object to In-
structions B, D and E offered for the ~efendant. 
We object to Instruction A. (Reads.) There is an instruc-
tion with a direction to find for one. of the parties which ig-
nores the question of whether the lights were burning on the 
car, which the state law requires, and· lack of which consti-
tutes negligence per se. 
Instruction C-,¥e object to that on the grounds that it may 
he misleading, and that the jury might. think it was intended 
to eliminate from consideration the question .of 
pag~ 136 ~ solace and comfort in which the exact extent of 
damage cannot be shown. 
Instruction F-We know of no statute or provision of law 
of Virginia which requires a driver to drive so he can stop 
within the range of his lights. The circumstances might 
chang·e that considerably. A man going around a curve or up 
and down hill-we know of no statute or any law of this state 
which impo~es any ·duty upon a man to do that. 
Mr. Sanford: I have no objection to Instructions Nos. 1, 
2, and 3, read in conjunction with No. 4. 
Instruction No. 5-I think that is misleading. I don't think 
that is the law, and I object to it. · 
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No objection to No. 6. 
ln..c;truction No. 7-I object to that. In other words, if the 
jury believed this man was parked down there in a negligent 
manner, it tells them that this man had a right to run into it. 
Instnwtion No. B-I object to that because I don't think 
th~re is any evidence here upon which to base it. There is 
no evidence bearing on anything the man did do to avoid the 
accid€nt, so far as I recall it,--no evidence that he either 
tu1"11ed to the right or turned left, or what-nothing but that 
he just ran into the back end of that car. 
Instruction No. 9-That, read in conjunction with mine, no 
objection to that. 
{Adjourned.) 
March 30, 1936. 
Mr. Sanford: The Court understands before we go too 
far, I desire to rene'v my motion. We have some other evi-
dence, but it wouldn't make any difference in the Court's rul-
ing, because it is simply evidence offered for the sake of 
contradiction. I desire to renew my motion to 
page 137 ~ strike the evidence of the plaintiff, for the same 
reasons that were assigned in the motion at the 
end of the plaintiff's evidence in chief. 
The Court: That will be overruled. 
Mr. Sanford: I except to the ruling of the Court. 
For the sake of the record, I also desire to note an excep-
tion to the action of the court in amending certain instruc-
tions, both those offered by the plaintiff, and. those offered 
by the defendant, and to the refusal of the instruction offered 
by the defendant. 
(.Jury returns.) 
Mr. Bendall : If your Honor please, we would like to read. 
for the purposes of the record, the following questions and 
answers of Mr. Shepherd, at Schoolfield. This question was 
propounded by the court, 
"Q. Do you recall an accident near .Jamerson's home sev-
eral nights ago between a truck and a Dodge Y 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see or hear an automobile or vehicle of some 
kind near the scene of the accident before the accident Y 
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A. Yes. 
Q. How long before Y 
A. Something like an hour, I reckon.'' 
.And this. fluestion: 
'' Q. Did you notice whetlier he was drunk or sober 7 
A. I don't think he was drunk. I didn't pay much attention 
to him. · 
Q. If you didn't pay much attention, what made you think 
he wasn't? · · -
A. I don't know if he was or wasn't.'' 
i 
page 138 ~ Mr. Sanford: If the court please, the founda-
tion was laid for this contradiction of George 
Scarce's testimony, because I asked him if he made a state-
ment before the trial justice. I think I had better read all 
the evidence of this witness, and the same is true of Ryland 
Shelton. · ,· 
(Reads) 
"Q. Were you traveling the Mount Cross Road the night 
the accident took place between the truck of Carlbrook's Dairy 
and tl1is gentleman here f 
A. I don't know that gentleman. 
Q. Were you traveling that highway that night? 
A. Yes, sir, last Saturday night. 
Q. Do you recall seeing an automobile parked on the road Y 
A.pproximately where this accident did occur Y 
.A. It was a Dodge Sedan parked right this side of J amer-
son 's Dairy. 
Q. Did you later learn there had been an accid~nt there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that automobile ·approximately where the accident 
took place? 
A. tTust exactly. I saw where the bottles broke in the road. 
I went up there yesterday. · · .. 
Q. How was the car parked in the road. Tell us how it 
stood on the highway. 
A. Middle of the · road is right here and the car-I don't 
know how it was parked exactly, but I was running about 
forty-five or fifty miles an hour-" . . 
Mr. Bendall: Forty-five or fifty? My record says forty-
five. 
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Mr. Sanford: It-should be the same-' 'forty-five or fifty"; 
yours was copied from this. ~ 
page 139 ~ (Continues reading·.) 
''A;· (Continued)-there is a long knoll 'coming this way 
down towards Danville, sloped towards this car, and I saw 
it and I thought it was moving when I first saw it. I thought 
the lights were on and I thought it was moving towards me 
and as I come close to it, it looked like it was going to turn 
out. I seen the lights won't on and I put on my brakes, got 
my emergency brake, and stopped, and I was that close to 
it when I stopped; and I pulled up against 'the pavement 
close as I could get. I don't reckon I missed the car that 
much. 
Q. Yon went by on the left side of· the car' 
A. No, sir, on the right side. 
Q. Coming this way Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
. Q. Facing the car ahead of you, did you go by the right 
side or left side' 
A. Right side coming down. 
Q. Did you come up in front- of the carY 
A. Yes. 
Q. 1 And the reflection of your own car on the headlights 
caused you to think-· 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And when you pulled out and came by on the right-hand 
side, that put him almost in the middle of the road 1 
A. Yes, sir, I had to get out right against the paling to 
get by. I was meeting the car. 
Q. And you had very little space to pass? 
. · A. Just room enough to get by and I had to 
page 140 } pass by like this. 
· Q Did you see anybody in the car at the time? 
A. Two gentlemen in the front sef).t. After we passed, one 
of them Raid, ''Hey, better get that damn thing out of the 
road". 
(Mr. Sanford): Then there were some questions baClr and 
forth between the witness and the Court, straightening out ---........... 
who he was talking about. Then it,goes on-
"Q. You recall meeting Mr. Adkins driving the Carlbrook 
Dairy truck after passing the carY 
A. Yes, just a little ways. 
Q. About how far from where this car was parked? 
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A. I don't know. I hadn't been driving five minutes, I 
know. Might have been at l\!Iount Olive Church. 
Q. Yo~ get any impression as to the speed of the truck as 
you passed? 
A. I guess twenty-five or thirty miles. 
Q. You got by all right without striking him? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You saw the car before you got to it Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. And time enough to make that and take care of yourself 
all right? 
A. Yes. I was coming this way, you see; I could see it. 
Q. What time of night did you pass this car? · 
A. About five or teD minutes past four. We left my fa-
ther's-in-law ·about four o'clock and took about five or ten 
minutes to come down the ·way we were driving. 
Q. Where do you live Y 
A. North Danville.'' 
pag-e 141 } 1\{r. Sanford: This is Ryland Shelton's testi-
mony: 
'' Q. Your name is Ryland Shelton? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you the brother of this gentleman and brother-in-
law of the Mr. Adkins 'vho was killed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you 'vith Mr. Adldn~ the 'night of the accident? 
.A. Yes. 
Q. Where were you going? 
A. To the C. C. C. 
Q. vVhat for? 
A. To take some milk. 
Q. Did you have plenty of time to get to Camp, or were 
you in a hurry 7 · 
A. Plenty of time. · 
Q. What were you doing at the time of the accident! 
A. I was asleep. 
Q. How long had you been asleep? 
A. Just before we left the Busy Bee Cafe, I reckon. 
_____ Q. Did you stop at the Busy Bee 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What for? 
A. To get something to eat. 
Q. Was Mr. Adkins-did he seem to be all right? 
A. Yes, sir; he won't in no hurry. W. e were about half 
an hour early. 
' 
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Q. What was the condition of his health? Was it all right 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 142 ~ Q. I reckon you woke up as soon as these cars 
struckf 
A. Yes, sir, I woke up and the fellow asked me where was 
driving the car if anybody in there with me and I said, ''Yes''. 
When I started out, I had one of my feet out of the window. 
Q. When you woke up' 
A. Yes, and the gas tank busted and gas pouring every-
where and the fellow driving the car come around "rith a match 
in his hand. 
Q. And gas running everywhere Y 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. What did you tell him Y 
A. I told him to blow the match out. 
Q. Have you seen this truck since the accident? 
A. Yes. 
Q'. Do you know whether the front end was damaged Y What 
partT 
A. The left-hand side where it turned over. 
Q. Do you know anything· further about it? 
A. No, I don't much. I remember the fellow driving turned 
around back and started and stopped at the side door and 
his foot was sticking in about that much; least, part was un-
der the truck. 
By the Court: I think he is talking about the boy that was 
killed was under the truck with his foot sticking out. 
Q. ·you say the man driving the car ask~d you, first, was 
anybody with you, didn't he f 
A. No. Yes, he did. 
Q. What did you tell himY 
A. I told him yes. 
Q. He came around first with a match? 
page 143 ~ A. That was-yes. · 
in thereY 
A. Yes.· 
Q·. That was before he asked you if anybody was 
Q. What was he doing with a match Y 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did he come up to the truck with the match and look in? 
A. Yes, hollered and told him I was in there. 
Q. He used the match to see if anybody was in the truck? 
A. Yes ; struck the match to see if anybody was in the 
truck.'' 
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page 144} INSTRUCTIONS. 
PLAiNTIFF'S IN8TRUCTION NUMBER I (Granted). 
''The Court instructs the Jury that it is unlawful to park or 
stop a vehicle upon a highway in this State (whether attended 
or unattended) during the period from a half hour after sun-
set to a half hour before sunrise w~thout displaying upon such 
vehicle one or more lamps projecting a white light visible 
under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of 500 ft. · 
to the front of such vehicle and projecting a red or yellow 
light visible under like conditions from a distance of 500 ft. 
to the rear, and the Court tells the Jury that such conduct 
constitutes negligence under the law of Virginia.'' 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER II (Granted). 
''The Court instructs the Jury that it is ·unlawful to stop a 
vehicle on a highway in this State in such a manner as to 
impede or interfere with or render dangerous the use of said 
highway by others, and the Court tells the Jury that such con-
duct constitutes negligence under the law of Virginia.'' 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER III (Granted). 
''The Court instructs the ,Jury that it is unlawful for any 
person to leave standing any vehicle (attended or unattended) 
upon the paved, improved, or main travelled portion o£ any 
highway in this state when it is practicable to leave such ve-
hicle standing off the paved, improved or main travelled por-
tion of such highway, and the Court tells the Jury that such 
conduct constitutes negligence under the law of Virginia.'' 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER IV (Granted). 
page 145 } "The Court instructs the ,Jury that if they be-
lieve from the preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendant was guilty of some act of negligence as defined 
in other instructions, and that such negligence was a proximate 
cause of the death of plaintiff's decedent, then the jury should 
find for the plaintiff, ·unless they believe from a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the plaintiff's decedent was also 
guilty of some act of negligence. which contributed· to his 
death.'' 
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PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER V (Grant(ld). 
''The Court instructs the Jury that in order to warrant a 
finding by the Jury that negligence was the proximate cause 
of an injury it must appear that the injury compla.in~d of was 
in the natural and probable consequence of the alleged neg-
ligence, unaccompanied by any intervening contributing cir-
cumstances and conditions; that it ought to have been afore-
seen in· the light of attending circumstances.'' 
The foregoing instruction was objected to by counsel for the 
<~efendant as offered, but upon the court amending same by 
adding the 'vords, "unaccompanied by any intervening con-
tributing circumstances and conditions", the objection was 
withdrawn. . 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION N'UMBER VI (Granted). 
''The Court instructs the J urv that the law does not nre-
sume negligence. . The burden of ·proving the defendant's ~eg­
ligence in this case ·is upon the plaintiff, and the burden of 
showing any negligence upon the part of the plaintiff's de-
cedent is upon the defendant unless negligence of the plain-
tiff's decedent is established by the plaintiff's evidence.'' 
PT.JA.INTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER VII (Offered). 
page 146 ~ "The Court instructs the tTury that a person is 
under no duty to anticipate unlawful or negligen!' 
conduct upon the part of another.~'_ 
Counsel for the defendant objected to the foregoing instl1JC-
tion, and stated as his grounds for the objection that it wa~ 
misleading, and in effect told the Jury that if they believed 
that the defendant had parked his car in a negligent manner 
that the plaintiff's intestate had a right to run into it, a·nd 
the defendant would be responsible for his injury or death. 
The Court thereupon amended the instruction, and counsel for 
the defendant objected to the instruction as offered and al~o 
to the amendment, and excepted to the action of the court in 
the giving of this instruction. 
PLAINTIF:Ii,'S INSTRUCTION NTJMBER VII (Grant~d). 
'• The Court instructs the Jury that a person is under no 
duty to anticipate unlawful or negligent conduct upon the 
part of another, but this does not relieve such person of the 
F. W. Twyman v. DouglasS. Adkins, Adm'x. 141 
duty to keep a proper lookout, or the exercise of ordinary care 
for his own safety.'' 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION N-U~iBER VIII (Granted). 
"The Court instructs the Jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that the plaintiff's decedent was driving the tru~k 
with ·ordinary care and prudence, and keeping a reasonably 
careful outlook for obstructions and that without fault upon 
his part the plaintiff's decedent was, as a result, of t~e de-
fendant's neglig·ent conduct, sudd~n]y confronted With an 
emergency, and that in attempting to meet such an emer-
gency and avoid a collision, he did what an ordinarily prudent 
person would have done if confronted with a like emergency, 
but that he failed to avoid the collision, then in such case the 
plaintiff's decedent would not be guilty of negligence be-
cause it now appears that another course might have been 
more judicious." · 
page 147 ~ Counsel for defendant objected to the foregoing 
instruction, and stated as his grounds therefor 
as follows: ''I object to instruction number VIII because· I 
do not think that there is any evidence here, upon which to 
base it. There is no evidence bearing on anything that Lloyd 
Adkins, the deceased, clid to avoid the accident, so far as I 
recall, no evidence that he either turned to the right or turned 
left or what--nothing but that he just ran into the back end 
of that car. 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NTJMBER IX (Granted). 
"The Court instructs the Jury that if they believe from 
the preponderance of evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to 
recover, in estimating the damages the jury should find the 
sum with reference : 
First: To the pecuniary loss of the widow and children, at 
a sum equal to the probable earnings of the deceased, con-
sidering his age, -business, capacity, expenses, habits, energy, 
and perseverance during his probable life. 
___,-- Second: In ascertaining the probability of life reference 
may be had to the scientific tables on that subject. 
Third: rrhey may consider the loss of his care, attention, 
and society to his widow and children. 
Fourth: They may add such sum as they may deem fair 
and just by way of solace and comfort to his widow for the 
142 8upreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
sorrow, suffering, and mental anguish occasioned by his death, 
provided they do not find over ten thousand dolla~s. 
The Court further instructs the Jury that in the event they 
shall find a verdict for the plaintiff they shall direct in what 
proportion the damages assessed shall be distributed to the 
wife and children of the said dec.edent, and the Jury are 
further instructed that the burden is on the plain-
page 148 ~ tiff to establish the foregoing element of damage 
by a preponderance of the evidence.'' 
DEFENDANT'S.INSTRUCTION A (Granted). 
''The Court instructs the Jury that if you believe front the 
evidence in this case that at the time of the accident, the de-
fendant's car had stopped on the highway because it was 
inoperative, and that the def-endant pushed, or caused same 
to be pushed off the highway as far as possible, and that the 
lights were displayed, as required by law, even though a por-
tion thereof was on the hard surface, the defendant was not 
guiltv of negligence in so doing, and if you believe that tb!l 
car stopped or was parked under these circumstances, you 
must find for the defendant." 
DEF~JNDANT'S INSTRUCTION B (Granted). 
''The Court instructs the Jury that if you believe from the 
evidence that Lloyd Adkins was guilty of negligence in the 
operation of the Carlbrook Dairy truck, and such negligence 
proximately conhibuted to the accident which caused his 
death, then you must find for the defendant.'' 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRlJCTION C (Refused). 
"The Court instructs the Jury that the measure of liability 
of the defendant or defendants in this action, if liable at all, 
according to all of the instructions and all the evidence in 
the case, is to the extent of proven damage.'' 
Counsel for the defendant excepted to the action of the Court 
in refusing the foregoing instruction, and stated that in his 
opinion instruction correctly expressed the law bearing on 
the case, and that the instruction should be given to be read 
in connection with the plaintiff's instruction num-
page 149 ~ ber IX or otherwise the Jury might be misled a~ 
to the amount of damage permitted in cases of 
this character. 
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DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION D (Granted). 
"The Court instructs the Jury that the burden is on the 
plaintiff to prove that the defendant, was negligent in one 
or more of the particulars named, and that such negligence 
was the proximate cause of the damage to the plaintiff, and 
that this must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that is, the evidence of the plaintiff must outweigh the evi-
dence of the defendant. However, if you believe that the 
plaintiff was negligent and that his negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury, you cannot find a verdict in his 
favor, but you must find a verdict for the defendant. If yon 
believe that both parties were negligent and that the dam-
age resulted from their combined negligence and that such 
negligence continued to the very moment of the collision, then 
you cannot weigh the negligence of the one against that of 
the other, for the negligence of the plaintiff bars a recovery 
under such circumstances, and you must find for the de-
fendant.'' · 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION E (Granted). 
''The Court instructs the Jury that if you believe from the 
evidence in this case that at the time of the collision which 
caused the death of Lloyd Adkins, that he, Lloyd Adkins, 
was operating the truck of the Carlbrook Dairy, and in FlO 
doing he faile¢L to keep a proper lookout for cars that might 
be parked on the highway, he was guilty of negligence, and 
if this negligence contributed to· the accident, then you must 
find for the defendant regardless of whether the defendant 
w·as negligent or not.'' 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION F (Offered). 
''The Court instructs the jury that it is the duty 
page 150 ~ of all persons using the highways to keep their 
vehicles under control at all times, and have due 
r.egard for the conditions of the highway, its width and sur-
face; and while driving at night, it is the duty of drivers to 
operate their motor vehicles so that they can stop within the 
range of their lights ; and in this case if yon believe from 
the evidence that the deceased, Lloyd Adkins, immediately pre-
ceding, or at the time of said collision, was operating the 
truck of the Carlbrook Dairy _in such way and manner that 
he could not stop after he saw, or should have seen, the defend-
ant's car, in the exercise of ordinary care, and such failure 
on his part contributed to the accident, then yon must find 
for the defendant." 
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DE~.,ENDANT'S INSTRUCTION F (Granted). 
''The Court instructs the Jury that it is the duty of all per-
sons using the highways to keep their vehicles under control ' 
at all times, and have due regard to the traffic, its width and 
surface; ·and in this case if you believe from the evidence 
that the deceased, Lloyd Adkins, immediately preceding, or 
at the time of said collision, was operating the truck of The 
Carlbrook Dairy in such way and manner that he could not, 
in the exercise of ordinary care, stop after he saw, or should 
have seen, the defendant's car, in the exercise of ordinary 
care, and such failure on his part contributed to the accident, 
then you must find for the defendant.'' 
Counsel for defendant excepted to the court's refusal to 
give instruction F as offered, and to the instruction as grant.erl, 
and stated that his reasons for the objection and excepti0n 
were that the instruction as offered, correctly stated the law 
as applicable to the case, and that the striking out .of the 
·words ''and while driving at night it is the duty of drivers to 
operate their motor vehicles so that they can stop 
page 151 ~ 'vi thin the range of their lights", was prejudi-
cial to the defendant's rights and that he inter-
preted the statute to directly imply the duty on all persons 
to operate motor vehicles at night so that same could hE-
stopped within the range of their lights, otherwise they would 
be guilty of negligence. · . 
Counsel for the defendant then excepted as follows: 
''For the ~ake of the record I also desire to note an excep-
tion, to the action of the Court in amending certain instruc-
tions, both those offered by the plaintiff and those offered by 
the defendant, and the refusal of the instructions offered by 
the defendant." 
The Court then read the instructions to the Jury, and the 
case was argued by counsel for the respective parties, ann 
the Jnry retired to consider its verdict. 
. The Jury then rendered the following verdict: "We the 
.1 ury find for the . plaintiff and fix her damages at $10,000.00 
Ten Thousand Dollars.'' Whereupon the defendant by coun-
sel moved the court to set aside the verdict of the Jury an cl 
enter judgment for the defendant, because contrary to the 
law and evidence, and the admission of improper evidence on 
behalf of the plaintiff over the objection of the defendant, and 
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the refusal to admit proper evidence offered by the defend-
ant, and giving improper instructions offered by the plain-
tiff over the objection of the defendant, and refusal 
of proper instructions offered by the defendant, and 
the refusal of the court to strike out the evidence of the plain-
tiff on the motion of the defendant, which motion is continued 
until tomorrow. 
page 152 ~ I, J. Turner Clement, J udg·e of the Circuit 
Court of Pittsylvania County, Virginia, who pre-
Rided over the foregoing trial of Douglas S. Adkins, Adniin-
istratrix of Lloyd ~L Adkins, deceased, a,gainst F. W. Twy-
man, in the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County, Virginia, 
at the Courthouse thereof at Chatham, Virginia, ~Iarch _28, 
30, and 31st, 1936, do certify that the foregoing, together with 
the exhibits therein referred to~ is a true and correct copy 
and report of the evidence, ·all of the instructions, offered, 
amended, granted and refused by the court, and other inci-
dents of the said trial of the said cause, with the objections 
aud exceptions of the respective parties as therein set forth. 
As to the original exhibits introduced in evidence as shown by 
tl1e f~regoing report, to-wit: ''Exhibit, Peirce, number one 
(~fap)," which has been initialed by me for the purpose of 
identification. It is agreed .bY the plaintiff and the defend-
ants that it shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals as a part of the record in this cause, in lieu of certifyjng 
to said Court copies of said exhibits . 
. And I do further certify that the attorneys for the plain-
tiff,. Douglas S. Adkins, Administratrix of Lloyd M. Adkins, 
deceased, ha.d reasonable notice in writing given by the de-
fendant, F. \V. Twyman, of the time and place when the forr-
going report of the testimony, exhibits, instructions, excep-
tions, and other incidents of the trial would be tendered and 
presented to the undersigned by signature and authentica-
tion. 
Given under my hand this 2" day. of May, ~936. 
J. T .. CLEMENT, 
Judge of the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County, Va. 
____. The foregoing transcript and report was filed with me May 
. 2, 1936. 
J. T. CLEMENT, Judge. 
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page 153 ~ Virginia : 
At a Circuit Court c~ntinued and held for the County of 
Pittsylvania. at the Courthouse thereof on Tuesday the 31st 
day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hun-
dred and thirty-six. 
Douglas S. ~~\.elkins, Administratrix of Lloyd M. Adkins, De-
ceased, Plaintiff, 
anainst 
F. W .... Twyman, Defendant. 
This day came again the plaintiff by her attorney as well 
as the defendant by his attorney, on the motion made on yes-
terday to set aside the verdict of the jury, which motion thP. 
court overruled, to which the defendant excepted, therefore. 
it is considered by the court that the plaintiff recover of the 
defendant the sum of $10,000.00 and her costs in this behalf 
expended, but· the amount of said verdict of $10,000.00, after 
the payment of the cost and such reasonable attorney's. feef" 
as shall be allowed ·shall be disbursed as follows: One-third 
thereof to Douglas S. Adkins, the widow of Lloyd M. Ad-
kins, deceasP.d, and the remaining two-thirds to his three in-
fant children now living, in shares of one-third each. A.ntl 
the defendant by counsel indicating his desire to apply to 
the Supreme Court of Appeals for a writ of error to saicl 
judgment, :lt is ordered that the judgment be suspended for 
the term of ninety days from this date, upon the defendant or 
someone for him entering into a suspension bond 'vithin ten 
. days from tl1is date before the Clerk of this Court in the sntu 
of $10,000.00, 'vith security approved by him, and conditioned 
ac~ording to law. 
I' 
page 154 } ..t\nd at another day, to-wit: 
Virginia: 
At a Circuit Court continued and held for the County of 
Pittsylvania, at the Courthouse thereof on Monday the 30th 
day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hun-
dred and thirtv -six. 
This day cmne again the plaintiff by her attorneys and the 
defendant by his attorney, and the jury sworn on Saturday 
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appeared ~n court according to their adjournment, and having 
fully heard the evidence, instructions of Court and argument 
of counsel, upon their oath do say. "We the jury find for 
the plaintiff and fix her damages at $10,000.00 Ten Thousand· 
Dollars.'' vVhereupon the defendant by counsel moved the 
court to set aside the verdict of the jury and enter judgment 
for the defendant, because contrary to the law and evidence, 
and the adn1ission of improper evidence on behalf of the plain-
tiff over the objection of the defendant, and the refusal to 
admit prop<.~r evidence offered by the defendant, and giving 
jmproper instructions offered by the plaintiff over the objec-
tion of the defendant, and the refusal of the Court to strike 
out the evidence of the plaintiff on the motion of the de-
fendant, which motion is continued ·until tomorrow. 
State of Virginia, 
County of Pittsylvania, to-wit: 
1, E. ·E. Friend, Clerk of Circuit Court for the County of 
Pittsylvanin, i.n the State of Virginia; do hereby certify that 
the foreg·oing is a copy of the record in the action at law of 
IJouglas S. Adkins, Administratrix of Loyd M. Adkins, De-
ceased, a.qa·1.nst F. W. Twyman, lately pending in the Circuit 
Court, and I further certify that notice was given to George 
E. Bendall and ,Jno. W. Carter, Jr., Counsel for plaintiff, as 
required by Section 6339 of the Code of Virginia. 
page 155 } In testimonv whereof .. I hereunto set my hand 
this the 4th day of May~ 1936. 
E. E. FRIEND, 
Clerk of Circuit Court of Pittsylvania 
County, Virginia. 
Fee for copy of record $10.00. 
page 156 } CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 2. 
_..,...,-. Defendant, Twyman's instruction C refused. 
''The Court instructs the Jury that the measure of liability 
of the defendant or defendants in this action, if liable at all, 
a~Jcording to all of the instructions and all the evidence in 
the case, is to the extent of proven damage." 
·; 
' ~ -.- . 
148 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
The foregoing instruction requested by the defendant, Twy-
man, was denied, and the defendant, Twyman, excepted. 
Teste: 
J. T. CLEMENT, Judge. 
May 2", 19364 
Filed with me May 2; 1936. 
J. T. CLE~IENT, Judge. 
page 157 ~ CERTIFICATE OF' EXCEPTION NO. 3. 
Defendant, Twyman's instruction F offered. 
''The Court instructs the jury that it is the duty of all per-
sons using the highways to K:eep their vehicles under control 
at all tinl(lS, and have due regard for the conditions of the 
highway, it~ width and surface; and while driving at night, 
it is the dut:r of drivers to operate their motor vehicles so 
that they can stop within the range of their lights; and in 
this case if you believe from the evidence· that the deceased. 
Loyd Adkins, immediately preceding·, or at the time of said 
collision, was operating the truck of the Carlbrook Dairy in . 
such way and manner that he could not stop after he saw, 
or should have seen, .the defendant's car, in the exercise of 
ordinary care, and such failure on his part contributed to 
the accident, then you must find for the ·defendant.'' 
. : The foregoing instruction requested by the defendant, Twy-
man, was denied, the court thereupon amended the instruc-
tion, and the defendant, Twyman, excepted to the acts of the 
court in refusing the instruction as offered, and giving the 
instruction as amended. 
Testet 
J. T. CLEMENT, Judge. 
May 2", 1936. 
FUed with me May .2, 1936. 
J. T. CLEMENT, Judge. 
.-,_.._ 
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l'age 158 } CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 4. 
Plaintiff'~ instruction number 7. 
•'The Court instructs the Jury that a person is under no 
duty to anticipate unlawful or negligent conduct upon the part 
id another, but this does not relieve such person of the duty 
to keep a proper lookout, or the exercise of ordinary earn 
for his own safety." 
The foregoing· instruction was granted by the Court on its 
own motion as an amendment to an instruction requested by 
the plain1i11 and the defendant, Twyman, excepted upon the 
grounds stated in the certificate embodying all of the in-
structions. 
Test~: 
J. T. CJJEM!ENT, Judge. 
May 2", 1936. 
Filed with me l\tlay 2, 1936. 
J. T. CLEMENT, Judge. 
page 159 } 9ERTIPICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 5. 
Plaintiff's instruction number 8. 
"The Court instructs the Jury that if they believe from 
the evidence that the plaintiff's decedent was driving the truck 
"rith ordinary care and prudence, and keeping a reasonable 
careful outlook for obstructions and that without fault upon 
his part the plaintiff's decedent was, as a result of the de-
fendant's neg·ligent conduct, suddenly confronted with an 
emergency, and that in attempting· to meet such an emer-
gency and avoid a collision, he did what an ordinarily pru-
dent person would· have done if confronted with a like emer-
gency, but that he failed to avoid the collision, then in such 
ease the plaintiff's decedent would not be guilty of negligence 
because it now appears that another course might have been 
more judicious.'' 
The foregoing instruction was offered by the plaintiff, and 
granted by the court, and the defendant, Twyman, excepted 
150 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
upon the grounds stated in the certificate embodying all of 
the instructions. · 
Teste: 
J. T. CLEMENT, Judge. 
May 2", 1936. 
Filed wi t.h me May 2, 1936. 
J. T. CLEMENT, Judge. 
page 160 ~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 6. 
The following instructions were granted at the request of 
the plaintiff and of the defendant, and by the court's own mo-
tion, respectively as hereinafter denoted ; are all of the in-
structions that were granted at the trial of this cause. 
Instruction number 1. 
''The Cou.rt instructs the Jury that it is unlawful to park 
·or stop a vehicle upon a hig·hway in this State (whether at-
tended or unattended) during the period from a half hour 
after sunset to a half hour before sunrise without displaying 
upon such VP.hicle one or rnore lamps projecting a white light . 
visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance 
of 500 ft. to the front of such vehicle and projecting a red or 
yellow light visible under like conditions from a distance of 
500ft. to the rear, and the Court tells the Jury that such con-
duct constitutes negligence under the law of Virginia.'' 
Instruction number 2. 
''The Court instructs the Jury that it is unlawful to stop 
a vehicle on a highway in this State in such a manner as to 
impede or interfere with or render dangerous the use of said 
highway by others, and the Court tells the Jury that such 
conduct constitutes negligence under the la'v of Virginia.'' · 
0 
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Instruction number 3. 
''The Court instructs the Jury that it is unlawful for any 
person to leave standing any vehicle (attended or unattended) 
upon the paved, improved, or main travelled portion of any 
highway in this state when it is practicable to leave such ve-
hicle standing off the paved, improved or main travelled por-
. tion of such highway, and the Court tells the 
page 161 ~ Jury that such conduct constitutes negligence un- · 
. der the law of Virginia.'' 
Instruction number 4. 
''The Court instructs the Jury that if they believe from the 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was guilty 
of some act of negligence as defined in other instructions, 
and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the death 
of plaintiff's decedent, then the Jury should find for the 
plaintiff, unless they believe from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff's decedent was also guilty of some 
a~t of negligence which contributed to his death." 
Instruction number 5. 
"The Court instructs the Jury that in order to warrant a 
finding by the Jury that negligence was the proximate cause 
of an injury it must appear that the injury complained of 
was the natural and probable consequence of the alleged neg-
ligence, unaccompanied by any intervening' contributing cir-
cumstances and conditions; that it ought to have been afore-
seen in the light of attending circumstances .. " 
Instruction number 6. 
"The Court instructs the Jury that the law does not pre-
sume negligence. The burden of proving the defendant's neg-
ligence in this case is upon the plaintiff, and the burden of 
showing any negligence upon the part of the plaintiff's de-
cedent is upon the defendant u'Illess negligence of the plain-
tiff's decedent is established by the plaintiff's evidence." 
Instruction number 7. 
"The Court instructs the Jury that a person is under no 
duty to anticipate unlawful or negligent conduct upon the 
152 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
part of another, but this does not relieve such person of the 
duty to keep a proper lookout, or the exercise of ordinary 
care for his own safety." 
page 162 ~ Coun.sel for the defendant objected to the fore-
going instruction, and stated as his grounds for 
the ,objection that it was misleading, and in effect told the 
Jury that if they believed that the defendant had parked his 
car in a negligent manner that the plaintiff's intestate had 
a right to run into it, and the defendant would be respon-
sible for his injury or death. The Court thereupon amended 
the instruction, and counsel for the defendant objected to the 
instruction as offered and also to the amendment, and ex-
cepted to the action of the court in tlw giving of this instruc-
tion. 
Instruction number 8. 
"The Court instructs the Jury that if they believe from 
the evidence that the plaintiff's decedent was driving the truck 
with ordinary care and prudence, and keeping a reasonably 
careful outlook for obstructions and that without fault upon 
his part the plaintiff's decedent was, as a result of the de-
fendant's negligent conduct, suddenly confronted with an 
emergency, and that in attempting to meet such an emer-
gency and avoid a collision, he did what an ordinarily pru-
dent person would have done if confronted with a like emer-
gency, but that h.e failed to avoid the collision, then in such 
case the plaintiff's decedent would not be guilty of negli-
gence because it now appears that another course might have 
been more juqicious. '' 
I 
Counsel for defendant objected to the foregoing instruc-
tion, and stated as his grounds therefor as follows : ''I ob-
ject to instruction number 8 because I do not think that there 
is any evidence here, upon which to base it. There is no 
evidence bearing on anything that Loyd Adkins, the deceased, 
clid to avoid the accident, so far as I recall, no evidence that 
he either turned to the right or turned left or what-nothing 
but that he just ran into the back end of that car. 
page 163 ~ Instruction number 9. 
''The Court instructs the Jury that if they believe from 
the preponderance of evidence that the plaintiff is entitled 
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to recover, in estimating the damages the jury should find 
the sum with reference: 
First: To the pecuniary loss of the widow and children, at 
a sum equal to the probable earning·s of the deceased, con-
sidering his age, business, capacity, expens~s, habits, energy, 
and perseverance during his probable life. 
Second: In ascertaining the probability of life reference 
may be had to the scientific tables on that subject. 
Third: They may consider the loss of his care, attention, 
and society to his widow and children. 
Fourth: They may add such sum as they may deem fair 
and just by way of solace and comfort to his widow for the 
sorrow, suffering·, and mental anguish occasioned by his 
dE'ath, provided they do not find over ten thousand dollars. 
The Court further instructs the Jury that in the event 
they shall find a verdict for the plaintiff they shall direct in 
what proportion the dama.ges assessed shall be distributed 
to the wife and children of the said decedent, and the Jury 
are further instructed that the burden is on the plaintiff to 
establish the foregoing element of damage by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.'' 
Instruction number A. 
'~The Court insturcts the Jury that if you believe from the 
evidence in this case that at the time of the accident; the de-
fendant's car had stopped on the highway because it was in-
operative, and that the defendant pushed, or caused same to 
be pushed off the highway as far as possible, and that the 
lights were displayed, as required by law, even 
page 164 r though a portion thereof was on the hard sur-
face, the defendant was not guilty of negligence 
in so doing, and if you believe that the car stopped or was 
parked under these circumstances, you must find for the de-
fendant.'' 
Instruction B. 
''The Court instructs the Jury that if you believe from the 
evidence that Loyd Adkins was guilty of negligence in the 
operation of the Carlbrook Dairy truck, and such negligence 
proximately contributed to the accident which caused his 
death, then you must find for the defendant.'' 
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Instruction number D. 
''The Court instructs the Jury that the burden is on the 
plaintiff to prove that the defendant, was negligent in one or 
n1ore of the particulars named, and that such negligence was 
the proximate cause of the damage to the plaintiff, and that 
this must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
is, the evidence of the plaintiff must outw·eigh the evidence 
of the defendant. However, if you believe that the plaintiff 
was negligent and that tir~ .,,~'!;ligence was the proximate cause 
of the injury, you cannot find a verdict in his favor, but you 
must find a verdict for the defendant. If you believe that 
both parties w~re negligent and that the damage resulted 
from their combined negligence and that such negligence con-
tinued to the very moment of the collision, then you cannot 
weigh the negligence of the one against that of the other, 
for the negligence of the plaintiff bars a recovery under such 
circumstances, and you must find for the defendant.'' 
Instruction number E. 
''The Court instructs the Jury that if you believe from the 
evidence in this case that at the time of the collision which 
caused the death of Loyd Adkins, that he, Loyd Adkins, was 
operating the truck of the Carlbrook Dairy, and in so doing 
he failed to keep a proper luokout for cars that might be 
, parked on the highway, he was guilty of negli-
pag·e 165 ~ gence, and if this negligence contributed to the 
accident, then you must find for the defendant 
regardless of whether the defendant was neg·ligent or. not.'' 
Instruction number F. 
"The Court instructs the Jury that it is the duty of all 
persons using the highways to keep their vehicles under con-
trol at all times, and have due regard to the traffic, its width 
and surface; and in this case if you believe from the evi-
dence that the deceased, Loyd Adkins, immediately preceding, 
or at the time of said collision, was operating the truck of 
the Carlbrook Dairy in such way and manner that he could 
not, in the exercise of ordinary care, stop after he saw, or 
should have seen, the defendant's car, in the exercise of or-
dinary care, and such failure on his part contributed to the 
accident, then you must find for the defendant." 
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The foregoing instruction was granted by the court on its 
own motion as an amendment to an instruction offered by the 
defendant, Twyman, and the defendant, Twyman, excepted to 
the Court's refusal to give instruction F as offered, and to 
the instruction as granted, and stated that his reasons for the 
exception were that the instruction as offered correctly stated 
the law as applicable to the case, and that the striking out 
of the words ''and while driving at night it is the duty pf 
drivers to operate their motor vehicles so that they can stop 
within the range of their lights, was prejudicial to the de-
fendant's rights and that he interpreted the status to directly 
imply the duty on all persons to operate motor vehicles at-
night. so that same could be stopped within the range of their 
lights in the event that it became necessary, otherwise they 
would be guilty of negligence. 
page 166 ~ Teste: 
J. T. CLEMENT, Judge. 
May 2", 1936. 
],iled with me ~lay . 2, 1936. 
J. T. CLEMENT, Judge. 
page 167 ~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. 7. 
After the Jury's verdict, the defendant, F. W. Twyman, 
moves that the Jury's verdict be set aside and final judgment 
in his favor entered, upon the grounds that the verdict of the 
.Jurv was contrarv to law and the evidence and without evi-
dence to support it, and the .admission of improper evidence 
on behalf of the plaintiff over the objection of the defend-
ant, and the refusal to admit proper evidence offered by the 
defendant, and giving improper instructions offered by the 
plaintiff over the objection of the defendant, and refusal of 
the court to strike out the evidence of the plaintiff on a mo-
tion of the defendant, but the court overruled this motion 
and entered final judgment for the plaintiff and the defend-
ant, ~,. W. Twyman, excepted. · 
Teste: 
J. T. CLEMENT, Judge. 
May 2", 1936. 
Filed with me May 2, 1936. 
J. T. CLEM'ENT, Judge. 
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page 168 } I, E. E. Friend, Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
Pittsylvania County, Virginia, do certify that the 
foregoing report of the testimony, exhibits, instructions, ex-
ceptions, and other incidents of the trial in the case of Douglas 
S. Adkins, Administratrix of the Estate of Lloyd ~L Adkins, 
deceased, against F. W. Twyman, together with the original 
exhibit therein referred to, all of which has been duly au-
tb.enticated by the Judge of the said Court, were lodged and 
filed with me as Clerk of the said Court, on the 2nd day of 
May, 1936. 
E. E. FRIEND, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Pittsylvania 
County, Virginia. 
A Copy-Teste : 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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